By this language, Cæsar wished to show that he did not violate the law, enacted a year before under his consulate, which forbade the governors to leave their provinces without an order of the Senate. He purposely appealed to an old decree, which gave unlimited powers to the governor of Gaul, a province the importance of which had always required exceptional laws.206 The reply of Ariovistus was equally proud: —
“Cæsar ought to know as well as he the right of the conqueror: he admits no interference in the treatment reserved for the vanquished; he has himself causes of complaint against the proconsul, whose presence diminishes his revenues; he will not restore the hostages to the Ædui; the title of brothers and allies of the Roman people will be of little service to them. He cares little for threats. No one has ever braved Ariovistus with impunity. Let anybody attack him, and he will learn the valour of a people which, for fourteen years, has never sought shelter under a roof.”207
March of Cæsar upon Besançon.
III. This arrogant reply, and news calculated to give alarm, hastened Cæsar’s decision. In fact, on one side the Ædui complained to him of the devastation of their country by the Harudes; and, on the other, the Treviri announced that the hundred cantons of the Suevi were preparing to cross the Rhine.208 Cæsar, wishing to prevent the junction of these new bands with the old troops of Ariovistus, hastened the collecting of provisions, and advanced against the Germans by forced marches. The negotiations having probably lasted during the month of July, it was now the beginning of August. Starting from the neighbourhood of Tonnerre, where we have supposed he was encamped, Cæsar followed the road subsequently replaced by a Roman way of which vestiges are still found, and which, passing by Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Etrochey, and Dancevoir, led to Langres.209 (See Plate 4.) After three long days’ marches, on his arrival towards Arc-en-Barrois, he learnt that Ariovistus was moving with all his troops to seize Besançon, the most considerable place in Sequania, and that he had already advanced three days’ march beyond his territory. Cæsar considered it a matter of urgency to anticipate him, for this place was abundantly provided with everything necessary for an army. Instead of continuing his march towards the Rhine, by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort, he advanced, day and night, by forced marches, towards Besançon, obtained possession of it, and placed a garrison there.210
The following description, given in the “Commentaries,” is still applicable to the present town. “It was so well fortified by nature, that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Doubs, forming a circle, surrounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred feet,211 which is not bathed by the water, is occupied by a high mountain, the base of which reaches, on each side, to the edge of the river. The wall which encloses this mountain makes a citadel of it, and connects it with the oppidum.”212
During this rapid movement of the Roman army on Besançon, Ariovistus had advanced very slowly. We must suppose, indeed, that he halted when he was informed of this march; for, once obliged to abandon the hope of taking that place, it was imprudent to separate himself any farther from his re-enforcements, and, above all, from the Suevi, who were ready to pass the Rhine towards Mayence, and await the Romans in the plains of Upper Alsace, where he could advantageously make use of his numerous cavalry.
Panic in the Roman Army.
IV. During the few days which Cæsar passed at Besançon (the middle of August), in order to assure himself of provisions, a general panic took possession of his soldiers. Public rumour represented the Germans as men of gigantic stature, of unconquerable valour, and of terrible aspect. Now there were in the Roman army many young men without experience in war, come from Rome, some out of friendship for Cæsar, others in the hope of obtaining celebrity without trouble. Cæsar could not help receiving them. It must have been difficult, indeed, for a general who wished to preserve his friends at Rome, to defend himself against the innumerable solicitations of influential people.213 This panic had begun with these volunteers; it soon gained the whole army. Every one made his will; the least timid alleged, as an excuse for their fear, the difficulty of the roads, the depth of the forests, the want of provisions, the impossibility of obtaining transports, and even the illegality of the enterprise.214
Cæsar, surprised at this state of feeling, called a council, to which he admitted the centurions of all classes. He sharply reproached the assembled chiefs with wishing to penetrate his designs, and to seek information as to the country into which he intended to lead them. He reminded them that their fathers, under Marius, had driven out the Cimbri and the Teutones; that, still more recently, they had defeated the German race in the revolt of the slaves;215 that the Helvetii had often beaten the Germans, and that they, in their turn, had just beaten the Helvetii. As to those who, to disguise their fears, talk of the difficulty of the roads and the want of food, he finds it very insolent in them to suppose that their general will forget his duty, or to pretend to dictate it to him. The care of the war is his business: the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones will furnish wheat; in fact, it is already ripe in the fields (jamque esse in agris frumenta matura). As to the roads, they will soon have the opportunity of judging of them themselves. He is told the soldiers will not obey, or raise the ensigns (signa laturi).216 Words like these would not shake him; the soldier despises the voice of his chief only when the latter is, by his own fault, abandoned by fortune or convicted of cupidity or embezzlement. As to himself, his whole life proves his integrity; the war of the Helvetii affords evidence of his favour with fortune; for which cause, without delay, he will break up the camp to-morrow morning, for he is impatient to know if, among his soldiers, fear will prevail over honour and duty. If the army should refuse to follow him, he will start alone, with the 10th legion, of which he will make his prætorian cohort. Cæsar had always loved this legion, and, on account of its valor, had always the greatest confidence in it.
This language, in which, without having recourse to the rigours of discipline, Cæsar appealed to the honour of his soldiers, exciting at the same time the emulation both of those whom he loaded with praise and of those whose services he affected to disdain, – this proud assertion of his right to command produced a wonderful revolution in the minds of the men, and inspired the troops with great ardour for fighting. The 10th legion first charged its tribunes to thank him for the good opinion he had expressed towards them, and declared that they were ready to march. The other legions then sent their excuses by their tribunes and centurions of the first class,