History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2. Napoleon III. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

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from Trévoux to Villefranche. (See Plate 4.) The slowness of their march need not surprise us if we consider that an agglomeration of 368,000 individuals, men, women, and children, dragging after them from 8,000 to 9,000 wagons, through a defile where carriages could only pass one abreast, would necessarily employ several weeks in passing it.175 Cæsar, no doubt, calculated beforehand, with sufficient accuracy, the time it would take them to gain the banks of the Saône; and we may therefore suppose that, at the moment when he repaired into Italy, he hoped to bring thence his army in time to prevent them from passing that river.

      He established his camp near the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône, on the heights which command Sathonay; thence he could equally manœuvre on the two banks of the Saône, take the Helvetii in flank as they marched towards that river, or prevent them, if they crossed it, from entering into the Roman province by the valley of the Rhone. It was probably at this point that Labienus joined him with the troops which had been left with him, and which raised to six the number of his legions. His cavalry, composed principally of Ædui and men raised in the Roman province, amounted to 4,000 men. During this time the Helvetii were ravaging the lands of the Ambarri, those of the Ædui, and those which the Allobroges possessed on the right bank of the Rhone. These peoples implored the succour of Cæsar. He was quite disposed to listen to their prayers.176

      Defeat of the Helvetii on the Saône.

      V. The Saône, which crossed the countries of the Ædui and the Sequani,177 flowed, then as now, in certain places with an extreme sluggishness. Cæsar says that people could not distinguish the direction of the current. The Helvetii, who had not learned to make bridges, crossed the river, between Trévoux and Villefranche, on rafts and boats joined together. As soon as the Roman general had ascertained by his scouts that three-quarters of the barbarians were on the other side of the river, and the others were still on his side, he left his camp towards midnight (de tertia vigilia) (see note 1 on page 69) with three legions, came upon those of the Helvetii who were still on the left bank, to the north of Trévoux, in the valley of the Formans, towards six o’clock in the morning, after a march of eighteen kilomètres, attacked them by surprise in the midst of the confusion of passing the river, and slew a great number. Those who could escape dispersed, and concealed themselves in the neighbouring forests. This disaster fell upon the Tigurini (the inhabitants of the Cantons of Vaud, Friburg, and a part of the Canton of Berne), one of the four tribes of which the nation of the Helvetii was composed, the same which, in an expedition out of Helvetia, had formerly slain the Consul L. Cassius, and made his army pass under the yoke.178

      After this combat, Cæsar, in order to pursue the other part of the enemy’s army, and prevent its marching towards the south, threw a bridge across the Saône, and transported his troops to the right bank. The barques which followed him for the conveyance of provisions would necessarily facilitate this operation. It is probable that a detachment established in the defiles on the right bank of the Saône, at the spot where Lyons now stands, intercepted the road which would have conducted the Helvetii towards the Roman province. As to the three legions which remained in the camp of Sathonay, they soon rejoined Cæsar. The Helvetii, struck by his sudden approach, and by the rapidity with which he had effected, in one single day, a passage which had cost them twenty days’ labour, sent him a deputation, the chief of which, old Divico, had commanded in the wars against Cassius. In language full of boast and threatening, Divico reminded Cæsar of the humiliation inflicted formerly on the Roman arms. The proconsul replied that he was not forgetful of old affronts, but that recent injuries were sufficient motives for his conduct. Nevertheless, he offered peace, on condition that they should give him hostages. “The Helvetii,” replied Divico, “have learned from their ancestors to receive, but not to give, hostages; the Romans ought to know that.” This proud reply closed the interview.

      Nevertheless, the Helvetii appear to have been desirous of avoiding battle, for next day they raised their camp, and, cut off from the possibility of following the course of the Saône to proceed towards the south, they took the easiest way to reach the country of the Santones, by directing their march towards the sources of the Dheune and the Bourbince. (See Plate 4.) This broken country, moreover, permitted them to resist the Romans with advantage. They followed across the mountains of Charolais the Gaulish road, on the trace of which was, no doubt, subsequently constructed the Roman way from Lyons to Autun, vestiges of which still exist; the latter followed the course of the Saône as far as Belleville, where it parted from it abruptly, crossing over the Col d’Avenas, proceeding through the valley of the Grosne to Cluny, and continuing by Saint-Vallier to Autun. At Saint-Vallier they would quit this road, and march towards the Loire to pass it at Decize.179

      Cæsar followed the Helvetii, and sent before him all his cavalry to watch their march. These, too eager in the pursuit, came to blows with the enemy’s cavalry in a position of disadvantage, and experienced some loss. Proud of having repulsed 4,000 men with 500 horsemen, the Helvetii became sufficiently emboldened to venture sometimes to harass the Roman army. But Cæsar avoided engaging his troops; he was satisfied with following, day by day, the enemies at a distance of five or six miles at most (about eight kilomètres), opposing the devastations they committed on their passage, and waiting a favourable occasion to inflict a defeat upon them.

The two armies continued their march extremely slowly, and the days passed without offering the desired opportunity. Meanwhile, the provisionment of the Roman army began to inspire serious uneasiness; wheat arrived no longer by the Saône, for Cæsar had been obliged to move from it in order to keep up with the Helvetii. On another hand, the Ædui delayed, under vain pretexts, sending the grain which they had promised. The harvest, too, was not yet ripe, and even forage failed. As the day for distribution approached, Cæsar convoked the Æduan chiefs, who were numerous in his camp, and overwhelmed them with reproaches. One of them, Liscus, occupied in his country the supreme magistracy, under the name of vergobret; he denounced Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, as opposing the sending of provisions; it was the same Dumnorix who had heretofore secretly negotiated the passage of the Helvetii across the country of the Sequani, and who, placed at the head of the Æduan contingent, had, in the last combat, by retreating with his men, led to the flight of the whole body of the cavalry. Cæsar sent for Divitiacus, a man devoted to the Roman people, and revealed to him the culpable conduct of his brother, which merited an exemplary punishment. Divitiacus expressed the same opinion, but, in tears, implored the pardon of Dumnorix. Cæsar granted it to him, and contented himself with placing him under surveillance. It was, indeed, good policy not to alienate the Æduan people by any excessive severity against a man of power among them.

      The Helvetii, after advancing northward as far as Saint-Vallier, had turned to the west to reach the valley of the Loire. Arrived near Issy-l’Evêque, they encamped on the banks of a tributary of the Somme, at the foot of Mount Tauffrin, eight miles from the Roman army. Informed of this circumstance, Cæsar judged that the moment had arrived for attacking them by surprise, and sent to reconnoitre by what circuits the heights might be reached. He learnt that the access was easy, and ordered Labienus to gain, with two legions, the summit of the mountain by bye-roads, without giving alarm to the enemy, and to wait till he himself, marching at the head of the four other legions, by the same road as the Helvetii, should appear near their camp; then both were to attack them at the same time. Labienus started at midnight, taking for guides the men who had just explored the roads. Cæsar, on his part, began his march at two o’clock in the morning (de quarta vigilia),180 preceded by his cavalry. At the head of his scouts was P. Considius, whose former services under L. Sylla, and subsequently under M. Crassus, pointed him out as an experienced soldier.

      At break of day Labienus occupied the heights, and Cæsar was no more than 1,500 paces from the camp of the barbarians; the latter suspected neither his approach nor that of his lieutenant. Suddenly Considius arrived at full gallop to announce that the mountain of which Labienus was to take possession was in the power of the Helvetii; he had recognised them, he said, by their arms and their military ensigns. At


<p>175</p>

To estimate the volume and weight represented by the provisions for three months for three hundred and sixty-eight thousand persons of both sexes and of all ages, let us allow that the ration of food was small, and consisted, we may say, only in a reserve of meal, trium mensium molita cibaria, at an average of ¾ of a pound (¾ of a pound of meal gives about a pound of bread); at this rate, the Helvetii must have carried with them 24,840,000 pounds, or 12,420,000 kilogrammes of meal. Let us allow also that they had great four-wheeled carriages, capable each of carrying 2,000 kilogrammes, and drawn by four horses. The 100 kilogrammes of unrefined meal makes 2 cubic hectolitres; therefore, 2,000 kilogrammes of meal make 4 cubic mètres, so that this would lead us to suppose no more than 4 cubic mètres as the average load for the four-wheeled carriages. On our good roads in France, levelled and paved, three horses are sufficient to draw, at a walking pace, during ten hours, a four-wheeled carriage carrying 4,000 kilogrammes. It is more than 1,300 kilogrammes per collar.

We suppose that the horses of the emigrants drew only 500 kilogrammes in excess of the dead weight, which would give about 6,000 carriages and 24,000 draught animals to transport the three months’ provisions.

But these emigrants were not only provided with food, for they had also certainly baggage. It appears to us no exaggeration to suppose that each individual carried, besides his food, fifteen kilogrammes of baggage on an average. We are thus left to add to the 6,000 provision carriages about 2,500 other carriages for the baggage, which would make a total of 8,500 carriages drawn by 34,000 draught animals. We use the word animals instead of horses, as at least a part of the teams would, no doubt, be composed of oxen, the number of which would diminish daily, for the emigrants would be led to use the flesh of these animals for their own food.

Such a column of 8,500 carriages, supposing them to march in file, one carriage at a time, on a single road, could not occupy less than thirty-two leagues in length, if we reckon fifteen mètres to each carriage. This remark explains the enormous difficulties the emigration would encounter, and the slowness of its movements: we need, then, no longer be astonished at the twenty days which it took three quarters of the column to pass the Saône.

We have not comprised the provisions of grain for the animals themselves: yet it is difficult to believe that the Helvetii, so provident for their own wants, had neglected to provide for those of their beasts, and that they had reckoned exclusively for their food on the forage they might find on the road.

<p>176</p>

De Bello Gallico, I. 11.

<p>177</p>

It is an error to translate Arar, quod per fines Æduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodamam influit, by the words, “the Saône, which forms the common boundary line of the Ædui and the Sequani.” Cæsar always understands by fines, territory, and not boundary line. He expresses himself very differently when he speaks of a river separating territories. (De Bello Gallico, I. 6, 83; VII. 5.) The expression per fines thus confirms the supposition that the territories of these two peoples extended on both sides of the Saône. (See Plate 2.)

<p>179</p>

Cæsar declares, on two different occasions, the fixed design of the Helvetii to establish themselves in the country of the Santones (I. 9 and 11), and Titus Livius confirms this fact in these words: “Cæsar Helvetios, gentem vagam, domuit, quæ, sedem quærens, in provinciam Cæsaris Narbonem iter facere volebat.” (Epitome, CIII.) Had they, for the execution of this project, the choice between several roads (the word “road” being taken here in the general sense)? Some authors, not considering the topography of France, have believed that, to go to the Santones, the Helvetii should have marched by the shortest line, from east to west, and passed the Loire towards Roanne. But they would have had first to pass, in places almost impassable, the mountains which separate the Saône from the Loire, and, had they arrived there, they would have found their road barred by another chain of mountains, that of Le Forez, which separates the Loire from the Allier.

The only means of going from the Lower Saône into Saintonge consists in travelling at first to the north-west towards the sources of the Bourbince, where is found the greatest depression of the chain of mountains which separates the Saône from the Loire, and marching subsequently to the west, to descend towards the latter river. This is so true, that at an epoch very near to our own, before the construction of the railways, the public conveyances, to go from Lyons to La Rochelle, did not pass by Roanne, but took the direction to the north-west, to Autun, and thence to Nevers, in the valley of the Loire. We understand, in exploring this mountainous country, why Cæsar was obliged to confine himself to pursuing the Helvetii, without being ever able to attack them. We cannot find a single point where he could have gained upon them by rapidity of movement, or where he could execute any manœuvre whatever.

<p>180</p>

The Romans used little precision in the division of time. Forcellini (Lex., voce Hora) refers to Pliny and Censorinus. He remarks that the day – that is, the time between the rising and setting of the sun – was divided into twelve parts, at all seasons of the year, and the night the same, from which it would result that in summer the hours of the day were longer than in winter, and vice versa for the nights. – Galenus (De San. Tuend., VI. 7) observed that at Rome the longest days were equal to fifteen equinoctial hours. Now, these fifteen hours only reckoning for twelve, it happened that towards the solstice each hour was more than a quarter longer than towards the equinox. This remark was not new, for it is found in Plautus. One of his personages says to a drunkard: “Thou wilt drink four good harvests of Massic wine in an hour!” “Add,” replied the drunkard, “in an hour of winter.” (Plautus, Pseudolus, v. I, 302, edit. Ritschl.) – Vegetius says that the soldier ought to make twenty miles in five hours, and notes that he speaks of hours in summer, which at Rome, according to the foregoing calculation, would be equivalent to six hours and a quarter towards the equinox. (Vegetius, Mil., I. 9.)

Pliny (Hist. Nat., VII. 60) remarks that, “at the time when the Twelve Tables were compiled, the only divisions of time known were the rising and setting of the sun; and that, according to the statement of Varro, the first public solar dial was erected near the rostra, on a column, by M. Valerius Messala, who brought it from Catania in 491, thirty years after the one ascribed to Papirius; and that it was in 595 that Scipio Nasica, the colleague of M. Popilius Lænas, divided the hours of night and day, by means of a clepsydra or water-clock, which he consecrated under a covered building.”

Censorinus (De Die Natali, xxiii., a book dated in the year 991 of Rome, or 338 A.D.) repeats, with some additions, the details given by Pliny. “There is,” he says, “the natural day and the civil day. The first is the time which passes between the rising and setting of the sun; on the contrary, the night begins with the setting and ends with the rising of the sun. The civil day comprises a revolution of the heaven – that is, a true day and a true night; so that when one says that a person has lived thirty days, we must understand that he has lived the same number of nights.

“We know that the day and the night are each divided into twelve hours. The Romans were three hundred years before they were acquainted with hours. The word hour is not found in the Twelve Tables. They said in those times, ‘before or after mid-day.’ Others divided the day, as well as the night, into four parts – a practice which is preserved in the armies, where they divide the night into four watches.” Upon these and other data, M. Le Verrier has had the goodness to draw up a table, which will be found at the end of the volume, and which indicates the increase or decrease of the hours with the seasons, and the relationship of the Roman watches with our modern hours. (See Appendix B.)