But Dulles’s move was deliberate—he thought it would serve as a warning to China. Given the imminent fall of Dien Bien Phu, it could also help the weak French negotiating position at the conference. Eisenhower had been skeptical of the British and French belief in the value of negotiations with the communists—and disapproved of the influence India seemed to have with British policymakers on this question. Nonetheless, the president did not want to break with allies who hoped to reach a settlement at Geneva. So he agreed to send US representatives to the conference, even as Dulles hoped that the negotiations would “acrimoniously collapse.”53
India’s fallen stock as an honest broker shaped the American attitude toward its involvement in the Geneva conference that April. Dulles’s initial reluctance about such a summit was indeed partly due to any related elevation of India to a leading role in Asia.54 The US eventually succeeded in officially excluding India from the conference. Nonetheless, as the Indian embassy in Beijing noted, India “was more than present”—the result of Nehru sending Krishna Menon to Geneva.55
The conference did not alleviate Nehru’s doubts about the US approach. Unlike Dulles, the prime minister did not think the participating Chinese premier was “uncompromising” or merely following Moscow’s lead at the conference. He believed that any rigidity on Zhou’s part stemmed from American behavior—a sense exacerbated by Zhou’s assertion to Nehru that the US attitude basically was “to obstruct any settlement in the Conference.”56
Nehru thought the options in Southeast Asia were clear: (1) a settlement that accepted and stabilized the status quo and essentially prevented Chinese expansion, or (2) a lack of agreement, which meant continuation of military activity that would benefit China and the Vietminh. He was concerned that US policy was leading to the latter, which, in turn, would eventually lead to war.57 Seeking a settlement, Nehru proposed a peace plan in conjunction with other Asian leaders and sought British support for it. Furthermore, egged on by British foreign secretary Anthony Eden, Nehru urged Zhou to cease large-scale attacks in Indochina, even getting the Chinese premier’s public endorsement in principle of noninterference in Southeast Asia.58
Nehru had not expected much to come from the Geneva conference but was relatively pleased with the result.59 Krishna Menon’s shuttle diplomacy facilitated the achievement of a settlement. India subsequently agreed to chair the International Control Commission, created to supervise ceasefires in Indochina. The US, on the other hand, refused to sign the agreement. It had been pleased neither with the settlement nor with Krishna Menon’s shuttling.
The US-India differences on Indochina only added to negative American perceptions of India’s role in Asia. An unnamed US policymaker lamented publicly that “the Chinese Communists in a sense hold a veto over India.”60 During congressional hearings on the foreign assistance program, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee questioned India’s attitude. Representative John Martin Vorys (R-OH) asserted that India was a “neutral that isn’t even neutral.” Representatives Ralph E. Church (R-IL) and Walter Judd (R-MN) commented that continued assistance to an unsupportive India adversely affected the US position with supportive partners in Asia. Representative Donald Jackson (R-CA) pointed out that India had actively put up “stumbling blocks” for the US.61
One of those obstacles was Nehru’s reiteration that foreign forces en route to Indochina would not be permitted to fly over India. Representative Frances P. Bolton (R-OH) wondered if Indian policymakers realized that their attitude on Indochina was going “to bring communism right to their own doors.”62 Appropriations Committee chairman Senator Styles Bridges and others said the US should keep in mind Nehru’s refusal when considering aid to India. Senator Homer Ferguson (R-MI) added that India’s action “gave aid and comfort to the communist world.”63
Congressional criticism had an impact in India—but not the kind intended. Nehru said that while “it would be grossly unfair … to judge the United States by the speeches of some Senators … inevitably there are reactions in India to speeches and writings in the press.”64 Reports indicated that even Indian friends of the US and critics of Nehru were disappointed by the outburst against India in Congress.65 The prime minister also expressed doubts to his ambassador in Washington about accepting American aid since the two countries were at such loggerheads.66
There would be further doubts, as the US turned to a different approach to contain communism in Asia: collective security. US ambassador to India George V. Allen told Congress this was the source of the “biggest difference” between the US and India.67 And when the administration subsequently announced the consideration of a collective security organization in Asia—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)—this only further exacerbated US-India tensions.68
Problematic Partnerships (1953–1955)
Like Acheson before him, Dulles noted that the US and India did not necessarily have differences on ultimate interests or objectives. The real crux of the problem was India’s method of achieving those goals.69 One key example of its different approach was the Indian engagement of China. India, too, saw Eisenhower’s chosen means as increasing India’s difficulties. This was particularly true of collective security, which made Pakistan part of the solution from Washington’s perspective, rather than part of the problem as Delhi saw it.
US-Pakistan: Collective Security or Creating Insecurity? (1953–1954)
The US would have liked to see India as part of its evolving collective security plans. Dulles was even willing to consider including nonaggression principles—of the Sino-Indian Panchsheel sort (discussed later in the chapter) that some were arguing for—if it would bring India and Burma into SEATO.70 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their part, wanted to exclude India and focus on the Pacific.71 But the State Department considered, with Eisenhower’s approval, the idea of organizing a smaller group on military matters and another on economic development that could attract states like India.72 Defense Secretary Charles Wilson thought Britain and India should take the initiative for any Southeast Asian consortium.73 Wilson and National Security Adviser Robert Cutler favored an Asian economic grouping more than a US-sponsored military one, but Dulles thought the US had come too far to jettison the latter.74 The US eventually dropped the idea of a dual-track group since neither Japan nor India were joining, and nonaligned countries were unlikely to participate in an economic grouping associated with the military treaty.75
Nehru’s general belief that pacts “brought insecurity” meant he had no interest in SEATO.76 He told parliament that the motivation for its creation—to ease the fears of countries in the region—might be good, but the approach was wrong.77 It could only be seen as anti-China, he said at the Bogor conference that preceded the Bandung summit.78 Nehru disagreed with the American view that China posed a clear and present danger in Southeast Asia. In another instance of mirror imaging, he told American ambassador George Allen that China did not have aggression on its mind; rather, like India, China wanted peace so that it could focus internally. Moreover, he disagreed with the Eisenhower administration’s military approach, arguing that it increased rather than alleviated insecurity. He stated that the US should accept Chinese assurances that they would not indulge in aggression and, in turn, assure Beijing that it would not try to invade China or overthrow the communist regime. In what had become a familiar retort, however, Allen argued that, given its apparent expansionist tendencies in Korea and Indochina, China needed to reassure the US first.79
While India had no interest in SEATO, its neighbor Pakistan did. News of Pakistani negotiations with the US for military aid, which began in spring 1953, had become public in November 1953. Subsequently, in February 1954,