Despite concerns, Delhi believed its mediatory role and neutrality made it somewhat useful—and therefore important—to Beijing. As long as this was the case, Bajpai noted that China would not trouble India. Rather, it had given India assurances regarding the Sino-Indian border, with Zhou indicating that China “had no intention [of] making claims to or raising questions about boundary” and asserting that China wanted “cultivation [of] friendship” with India and Burma.251 Acheson, too, observed that China was not taking military action against Burma since it would upset India at a time when it was important for Beijing to stay on Delhi’s good side.252 But in summer 1952, when China had reneged on commitments to India on Korea, Nehru’s concern about broader implications was evident—against Panikkar’s advice, he thought India should explicitly raise the boundary issue with China.253 Even beyond China, Krishna Menon believed that India’s role as intermediary increased its global influence and importance.254
American officials had mixed feelings about the Indian role. Henderson, for example, believed India could be an “ameliorating influence” on Beijing.”255 Bowles, his successor, believed that even if US messages via India were not passed on to—or heeded by—China, using the India channel would help convince Delhi that, unlike Beijing, Washington was doing its part to seek peace.256 Dean Rusk, assistant secretary of state for Far East Asian affairs, found Indian contacts with Chinese officials useful for conveying warnings of potential US retaliation if China escalated.257 For Acheson, as long as the US had multiple channels, India’s good relations with China and its standing with other Asian countries made the continued use of this channel worthwhile.258
However, there were also serious doubts about India as a conduit.259 There were questions about India’s reliability and its officials’ judgment as to China’s intentions. The US Army chief believed Beijing was manipulating India.260 In addition, there was unease that Panikkar was proposing ideas or interpretations to Chinese officials that the US had not approved, while suggesting to Beijing that the proposals had resulted from close contact with Washington.261 There were also doubts about whether roving Indian envoys like Krishna Menon were even keeping Delhi in the loop on US views. Furthermore, there was concern that US officials did not know what Delhi was actually saying to Panikkar and what he was conveying to Chinese officials.262
Other officials worried that India would compromise principles and ignore US red lines in order to achieve any settlement.263 In Congress, Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ)—usually a moderate on India—worried that Delhi would try to force the US to make concessions to China in order to enhance Nehru’s image and influence in Asia.264 In discussions with Panikkar and Krishna Menon, American officials felt there was a lack of clarity about whether they were hearing those officials’ personal views or Chinese ones, or Indian preferences rather than Chinese ones.265 There were only more doubts when Chinese actions did not reflect Beijing’s apparent attitudes as assessed by Panikkar.266
These doubts about India as an intermediary led Washington to try to limit its role at times, which Indian officials resented. While Zhou indicated that China wanted India to be included in some negotiations, the US showed little desire to include India in groups like the Good Offices Committee (India, on its part, showed little desire to serve on the latter).267 And despite British urging, the US resisted consulting India on a sixteen-nation statement on Korea.268 The US also opposed Indian involvement in any Korean armistice conference, despite British and Canadian recommendations.269 In the case of prisoner repatriation, the US turned to the Indian channel because there were few, if any, alternatives.270 But, even in this case, US officials continued to pursue other viable alternate channels.271 They also tried to work around the Indian diplomats they neither liked nor trusted (Krishna Menon, Panikkar) and work with the ones they did (Narayanan Raghavan [N. R.] Pillai and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit).272 These efforts to restrict India’s role and influence would continue after the Truman administration.
What Have They Done for US Lately? (1951–1952)
In 1949, K. P. S. Menon had expressed the hope that “the differences in our approach to Communist China would not lead to mutual embarrassment.”273 A couple of years later, it was clear that his hopes had been misplaced. There were consequences beyond a reluctance to give India a seat at the table. India’s China policy, for example, was a key reason for the limited appetite in Congress for aiding India. While many members of Congress publicly attacked foreign assistance broadly, India continued to present a particularly ripe target, especially for members of the China bloc.
Focused on aiding allies, particularly militarily, in their FY1952 aid request, Truman and Acheson halved the amount of aid an interagency assessment suggested for South Asia. Congress subsequently authorized only $54 million of the $65 million requested for India.274 The subsequent Indian refusal to sign the Japan Peace Treaty—primarily, the administration believed, on the grounds that China and the Soviet Union had not been part of the negotiations—did not win it any friends in Washington.275 John Foster Dulles, the US negotiator for the treaty, pointed to Nehru’s belief in the communist propaganda line of “Asia for Asians” as the reason for Indian opposition.276 Even though Nehru publicly rejected this concept, the impression stuck.277 In 1952, Bowles’s push for an expanded $250 million FY1953 aid package for India faltered, in large part because the White House did not think it could get it through Congress.
Bowles unsuccessfully tried to convince administration officials and members of Congress that Nehru had lost any illusions about China and supported the US position on prisoner repatriation in Korea “100 percent.”278 He argued that losing India to communism would be worse than the loss of China, with global, regional, and political consequences.279 He had some support for his advocacy from junior officials on the Near East and South Asia bureau, as well as liberal legislators like Representative John F. Kennedy (D-MA) and Senator Humphrey on the grounds that aid could ensure that India remained noncommunist and secure. But in Congress there was continued criticism that India was not being helpful in Korea. Of the $115 million of assistance the administration requested for India, Congress approved only $45 million—a proportionally greater cut than to the overall aid request.
The apathy toward India was widespread in Congress—where India had not developed a major constituency—and among the public, as well as within much of the administration.280 In some sections, there was downright antipathy. Truman and Acheson understood the potential threat of the lack of economic development in India, but given the administration’s other priorities (Korea, Europe), the lack of an imminent threat (of communists taking over in India) or opportunity (of winning India over), they had no stomach to take on the apathy or antipathy.
Thus Acheson and Mutual Security Agency director Averell Harriman also turned down Bowles’s request in summer 1952 for a special appropriation for India. Given congressional views on India, they were concerned that such a request could adversely affect foreign assistance more broadly. The deputy director of the Mutual Security Agency furthermore asked, “Is it