Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

to criticize,” but merely wanted to note that they were counterproductive. Nehru also made sure to include the Warsaw Pact when he discussed the downside of alliances.⁵⁵ When the Eisenhower doctrine was announced in 1957, promising American assistance to Middle Eastern countries against communist aggression, Nehru internally expressed regret about the US emphasis on a military approach.⁵⁶ But he dismissed the idea of making a special statement, heeding the foreign secretary’s advice that it would serve no purpose.⁵⁷ He declined to offer a critical assessment of US policies when prompted by CBS.⁵⁸ And when there were press reports about problematic American statements, Indian Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt sought clarification directly from the administration instead of first reacting.⁵⁹

      The Eisenhower administration, in turn, understood that it was not realistic to expect full support from India. Some in Congress questioned whether the US should strengthen a country that disagreed with it. There was a strong sense in the administration, however, that it was in American interests to do so. From Delhi, the American embassy, now led by Ellsworth Bunker, suggested that the need to help India develop into “a democratic counterpoise to China” was a “compelling reason for our accommodating certain of our objections to Nehru’s policies and views.”⁶⁰ An interagency assessment instead emphasized important common interests, including limiting communist expansion—especially Chinese expansion in South and Southeast Asia—and encouraging cooperation between Asian and African noncommunist states.⁶¹ And the administration’s policy statement was clear that, despite some differences, the benefits of a “stable and influential” India outweighed the costs of a “weak and vulnerable” one. It could serve as an alternative to China and eventually have the ability to protect itself and South and Southeast Asia against China.⁶²

      The Development Race

      Nehru’s 1949 visit had damaged American hopes for India vis-à-vis China; his 1956 visit, on the other hand, helped consolidate the view in the administration that India, along with China, was “the leading political contender” in Asia. Concern about Chinese economic progress was evident in NSC 5701, the administration’s revised statement of its South Asia policy in early 1957. It emphasized that it was critical for India’s momentum to be maintained. Indian development had domestic and international implications—an Indian loss in the competition with China would adversely affect the free world cause across Asia and Africa.⁶³ While the concept of a Sino-Indian race was not new, this was the first time it was mentioned in an official document and linked with American security.⁶⁴

      Nehru sometimes criticized those who compared China and India and denied that there was a race between the two countries.⁶⁵ He, however, frequently made such comparisons himself. While noting the two countries were at similar stages of development and had some similar characteristics, he contrasted Beijing’s autocratic means with Delhi’s democratic ones. Nehru publicly acknowledged the “great test”: if his government did not “deliver the goods … democracy [would] then be in peril.… Then people may think of totalitarian methods.”⁶⁶

      In early 1957, with the Indian economy facing “a good deal of trouble,”⁶⁷ policymakers worried that they were not delivering. Some reversals for the Congress Party in the spring 1957 national and state elections suggested that voters felt the same way. Nehru feared that if the party failed to deliver, it would be disastrous for the country because there would be a “vacuum” that other democratic parties were incapable of filling.⁶⁸

      In one state at least, Kerala, communists had filled the vacuum. They formed the first democratically elected purely communist government in the world. Nehru blamed his party’s lack of delivery, and, like some in the US, worried that the communists might demonstrate a successful alternative.⁶⁹ Communist reaction abroad only exacerbated Indian policymakers’ concern. It ranged from cautious approval to triumphal predictions that Indian communists could expand their foothold.⁷⁰

      Confronted with continued criticism and charges that Indian development paled in comparison with that of China, Nehru tried to create a sense of momentum in India. He directed officials to make a greater effort to publicize the government’s development plans.⁷¹