The US soon found its hands tied. A communist proposal on May 7 envisioned a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) with Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as India as the chair. Despite pressure from South Korean leader Syngman Rhee to exclude India and Clark’s concerns about it having the swing vote, Robertson realized the US had been put in a spot—the communists would use any US exclusion of India for propaganda purposes. Along with pressure from NATO allies, especially Britain, this left the administration with little choice but to accept Indian chairmanship of the commission.20
In a twist, the US then backed India for a crucial role that Delhi was reluctant to play. A May 13 UN Command proposal envisioned only India—and not every commission member—as having troops on the ground to supervise the POW repatriation process. For Nehru, the UN Command proposal was “most unhelpful.” Zhou told Indian ambassador to China N. Raghavan it was unacceptable, being too much of a departure from the Chinese proposal.21 Nehru did not want India to take on any responsibility that did not also have Beijing’s buy-in.22 The UNC revised its proposal, but, resisting a Chinese demand, still insisted that India have sole military supervisory authority.23 Nehru did not think China would agree. Its eventual acquiescence led the prime minister to praise Beijing’s “very statesmanlike attitude.”24 He noted publicly that China could now return to nation-building, which had been disrupted by a war in which it had been reluctantly “brought … in” by the fear of US attack.25
Nehru’s tendency to give China credit and the benefit of the doubt created resentment among American officials. But he was not above giving the US the benefit of the doubt at times. When Rhee released North Korean prisoners instead of turning them over to the NNRC—a move that threatened to torpedo the Korean settlement—Nehru told Raghavan that the Eisenhower administration had not incited the move.26 With Zhou accusing the US of being “undependable,” Nehru suggested that Washington take steps to assure Beijing that it could control the situation. Simultaneously, he urged the Chinese premier not to back out of armistice talks.27 In order to prevent this and strengthen Eisenhower’s hand, Nehru pushed for the reconvening of the UN General Assembly as soon as possible. This interjection, however, annoyed Dulles, who believed that bringing more parties into the discussions would only complicate the matter.28
With India as chair of the NNRC, Indian policymakers, as Nehru’s biographer put it, felt they were in a “thankless position” with “both sides accusing India of partisanship.”29 American observers charged that India accepted Chinese and North Korean allegations that Taiwan was instigating anticommunist prisoners to riot, while ignoring US allegations about the communists doing the same.30 Senate majority leader Knowland accused India of giving in to all Chinese demands; in response, Dulles indicated the administration’s displeasure with some of the NNRC’s functioning.31 China, on the other hand, criticized India for not using force to coerce Chinese and North Korean POWs to return to their home countries.32 It then vociferously condemned the Indian chair’s announcement that the NNRC would return unrepatriated POWs to their captors by January 22, 1954.33 Even some in the US who wanted India to release all unrepatriated POWs complained about that step.34 Delhi was not pleased when the US subsequently released them.
The Eisenhower administration’s move to exclude India from the postarmistice political conference also did not win it any friends there. Nehru had expected that India would be asked to participate.35 But, despite Australian, British, and Canadian support, the US refused to endorse Indian participation, largely because of the objections of South Korea, which accused India of “trafficking with the Communists.”36 India critic Knowland told Robertson that India’s “dubious” record should take it out of contention.37 The US subsequently announced that it would vote against extending India an invitation.38 China, on the other hand, supported Indian participation and even suggested Delhi as a possible venue for the conference—thereby scoring propaganda points with India.39
To save face and the conference, Nehru withdrew India from consideration. He stated that the US step was one more example of the West excluding Asians from decisionmaking that affected Asia. Asian countries, he asserted, would no longer be “ignored or bypassed, certainly not sat upon.”40 It was around this time that Indian policymakers also started publicly indicating a desire to play a leadership role in Asia.41 Citing how crucial it was to keep India “out of the communist orbit,” Dulles’s deputy for the political conference had warned about Korea-related anti-India opinion damaging US-India relations.42 And he had been proved correct.
In Washington in the aftermath of the Korean War, there was an effort to downplay any Asian leadership role for India and Nehru—a role many in the US had earlier advocated. Knowland, criticizing India for “yielding” to China, dismissed Nehru as the spokesman for all of Asia.43 Dulles told Eisenhower that the US should avoid actions that would “establish Nehru as the leader of all South and Southeast Asia.”44 And American diplomats reported with satisfaction when differences between Nehru and other South Asian leaders on communism were apparent.45
Even beyond Washington, the Korean War and Delhi’s mediatory role between China and the US took its toll on American public opinion of India. In January 1951, a quarter of those polled had said India could not be counted on to cooperate with the US; by April 1954 this number had climbed to 42 percent. In January 1952, 57 percent of those polled believed that India was neither on the American nor the Russian side; in April 1954, only 28 percent thought India was neutral, with 7 percent believing the Indian government was communist and 26 percent considering it to be pro-communist.46
Indochina: Dueling Approaches (1953–1954)
Korea was not the only Asian conflict that caused US-India strain; there was also the situation in Indochina, where Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh was taking on US ally France. US and Indian objectives in Southeast Asia were not entirely disparate. Eisenhower and Dulles believed that after the loss of China to the communist world, a loss in Vietnam—to the China-backed Vietminh—would be crippling. Even with an upswing in Sino-Indian relations, however, India had no interest in greater Chinese influence in the region.47 And American officials acknowledged that Delhi desired neither a return to colonialism nor a turn to communism in the region nor “a further consolidation of external communist power.”48
But, while their goals in Southeast Asia might have been similar, once again, India and the US had different ideas about the right approach. Nehru was critical of Washington’s “purely military approach in aid of a colonial power.” Communists were no doubt taking advantage of the situation, but, he believed, at its root this was about nationalism. He understood American motivations—anti-communism and the desire not to abandon ally France—but he thought its approach was counterproductive, creating the opportunity for communists in Indochina.49
The differences were evident in spring 1954 as a settlement conference was being discussed. Dulles gave what came to be called his massive retaliation speech, and also made clear American reluctance to participate in a conference. Furthermore, he publicly dismissed criticism of the US nonrecognition of the Chinese communist regime. Dulles insisted this policy was “soberly rational” given Beijing’s “consistently and viciously hostile” behavior toward the US. He argued that communist promises were unreliable and outlined the administration’s preferred alternative of united action against the Chinese threat.50
Nehru found it “rather odd” and unhelpful that, ahead