Section 6.3 goes into further detail concerning Dionysius’s conception of divine causation, examining Dionysius’s view that divine causation operates not only as a kind of formal cause, but also as a kind of efficient or productive cause. Since God is the sole cause of everything besides Godself, everything else must be explained and understood on the basis of divine causation. Given Dionysius’s view that God is the sole cause of everything produced, how does God create a multiplicity and diversity of things so as to be named accordingly? I first show that, at least with respect to being/existence and essential natures, God’s causation is direct with respect to created entities. Dionysius’s view of the non-reciprocal relations between divine cause and created effect, as well as the need to preserve divine simplicity, lead him to reject an Aristotelian conception of efficient causation. Dionysius’s solution is to accept the idea that a cause cannot be utterly devoid of what it produces, but neither must it actually possess what it produces or gives. I suggest that it is this solution that gives Dionysius’s view of God its distinctive character, and bears not only on the God–world relation, but also upon the rationale and character of negation with regard to the divine names. I conclude section 6.3, by introducing the concept Dionysius ultimately appeals to in order to explain God’s ability to produce what God does not actually have: divine superabundance.
Section 6.4 examines the connection between divine causation understood in terms of superabundance and the semantics of negation. The point of the analysis is to exhibit the way in which the typical, creaturely semantics of negation is inadequate when applied to God. Although the precise nature of divine superabundance remains unclear, because it bears on Dionysian theology, I attempt to conceptualize divine superabundance against that which is not superabundant—i.e., the created order. God is or has a hyperbolic excess of whatever resources and means are necessary to create all things. Therefore, anything attributed to God must, even when understood in terms of divine causation, acknowledge the superabundant and hyperbolically excessive character of God’s reality. The important implication of Dionysius’s conception of superabundance is that God remains incomprehensible and ineffable with respect to human beings. In section 6.5, I take the opportunity to discuss very briefly Dionysius’s view of the connection between divine superabundance and divine eros, and in so doing, use the discussion to segue more explicitly into the ramifications of Dionysius’s appropriation of a key, Proclean metaphysical conceptuality.
Section 6.6 contains an analysis of the ramifications of Dionysius’s appropriation of Proclus’s triad: remaining/procession/reversion. Generally, Dionysius employs this triadic pattern to describe the relationship between creatures and God: all things flow forth from God, revert to God, even as they remain “in” God. In order to show the ways in which this appropriation impacts Dionysius’s negative theology, I discuss the ramifications in regard to three, theological loci: the God–world relation and the doctrine of creation; the incarnation; and the Trinity. Subsection 6.6.1 shows how the non-reciprocal relationship between God and creatures implies that the created order is not identical to God. Since, for Dionysius, God is knowable only by way of divine processions, which are also modes of divine self-revelation, God is knowable only on the basis of divine processions and reversions, and then, only on the basis of non-reciprocal relatedness. Subsection 6.6.2 examines the way in which Dionysius’s adoption of the Proclean conceptuality bears on his understanding of the incarnation. I conclude that assertions affirming the humanity of Jesus Christ have to be negatively rendered so as to de-orient one’s understanding away from Jesus’s humanity and particularity, and then re-orient one’s understanding to his transcendent divinity. Subsection 6.6.3 presents an analysis of the way in which Dionysius’s appropriation may give reason to suppose that a “deeper” apophasis is called for: not between God and the world, but between the persons of the Trinity and an undifferentiated divine ground. I acknowledge a few of the difficulties involved in teasing out this line of Dionysian thought, so that the analysis is predominantly speculative and thus must be tentative.
Chapter 7 focuses on Dionysius’s negative strategies with a view to the soul’s union with God, as presented primarily in The Mystical Theology. I begin by contextualizing such strategies: cognitive acts of negation for the sake of mystical union presuppose not only mystagogical initiation, but also a great deal of philosophical and theological understanding of the kind exemplified in The Divine Names. Section 7.1 explicates the content and apophatic function of Dionysius’s opening prayer to the Trinity. On the one hand, such imagery reflects not only the soul’s epistemic/noetic relationship to God, but also the way in which God’s hyperbolic reality affects that relationship. On the other hand, the contemplation of such imagery presumably enacts a kind of cognitive disorientation, which disengages the person from relating to sensible or intelligible objects. In section 7.2, I examine Dionysius’s statements in The Mystical Theology which further clarify the relationship between affirmations and negations, in light of divine causation. What Dionysius does here that he does not in The Divine Names is explicitly state that the relationship between affirmations and negations is not oppositional.
Section 7.3 contains an analysis of Dionysius’s conception of aphairesis, and its contribution to the process of anagogy: the denial of all beings is a necessary condition for mystical union, particularly because it enables the soul to be de-oriented away from beings and re-oriented towards God. I contend that the denial of all beings ought not to be understood abstractly: as a negative propositional attitude with respect to an abstract object. Instead, Dionysius’s understanding of aphairesis is—in the context of anagogy—much more concrete and complex, and must be understood as functioning according to the metaphysical structure and dynamic of reality, which establish the parameters for both assertion and denial. In section 7.4, I examine Dionysius’s clarifications concerning the ordered denial of aphairesis. I conclude by explicating the way in which aphairesis is methodologically dependent upon the practice of assertion in kataphatic theology, and therefore, dependent upon the fact that God is the causal source of everything else. Section 7.5 rehearses the practice of aphairesis with Dionysius, by expounding on representative statements in the final two chapters of The Mystical Theology that exhibit the complexity of aphairesis by showing how the stated denials presuppose both the metaphysical and semantic considerations and conclusions previously drawn.
Section 7.6 takes up the limitations of aphairesis and the significance of Dionysius’s use of the concept hyper. I conclude that while the denial of all beings is sufficient to distinguish God’s transcendent reality from everything else, it does not reflect divine superabundance. It is this limitation, I contend, that in part leads Dionysius to employ the term “hyper,” which conveys the “beyond beingly” mode of God’s transcendence, functions to re-orient the soul away from any and every entity that would otherwise serve as on object of assertion or denial, and serves to remind the person that his or her own cognitive effort by means of aphairesis is inadequate to attain mystical union: divine assistance is perhaps most needed at the penultimate level preceding actual union with God. Section 7.7 concludes the substantive portion of chapter 7 with an examination of the connection between hyper and the ecstasy of mystical union: hyper suggestively speaks of the ecstatic condition of the soul while united to God. Finally, section 7.8 offers concluding remarks on Dionysian apophatic theology and several points of contrast with Plotinian apophasis.
1. A note about terminology: In the broadest sense, I use “apophasis,” “apophatic theology,” and “negative theology” more or less synonymously. My rationale is primarily one of convenience: I would like to avoid the overuse of neologisms. Clearly, in Plotinus’s case, although he does use the term “theos” in various contexts, it would perhaps be more precise to speak of an apophatic or negative “henology” where the One is at issue. While it may be more precise to use the term “apophasis” to specifically denote the discursive practice of negation, I use the terms above to denote the discursive, cognitive, and trans-cognitive practices of negation and denial where the One (Plotinus) or God (Dionysius) is concerned.
2. For the sake of clarity,