I take the opportunity in section 2.4 to step back a bit, and examine somewhat schematically Plotinus’s apophatic strategies in the context of explanation: apophasis or negation/denial; aphairesis or subtraction/abstraction; locutions featuring the term “hyper”; locutions featuring the term “epekeina”; and silence. This discussion serves to introduce to the reader two key strategies that are necessary to help understand what makes Plotinian apophasis so extreme (the content of chapter 3): practices of apophasis and aphairesis. In sections 2.5 and 2.6, I address a couple of questions surrounding the family of statements that have sometimes been construed to function apophatically through the use of paradox. Although Plotinus does make statements that have the grammatical form “the One is P and not P”—and therefore may prima facie have the appearance of paradox—I contend that such statements are more accurately rendered by recourse to his metaphysical convictions. Section 2.6 presents reasons in support of the view that Plotinus’s conception of the simplicity of the One ought not to be understood in terms of eminence or virtuality.
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 of chapter 3, we reach what I believe to be the heart of Plotinian negative theology. Here I argue that what finally makes Plotinian apophasis with respect to the One so radical and extreme is Plotinus’s conviction concerning the absolute independence of the One. Although the One is in fact the origin of all things, there is a sense in which it is not their origin. Part of the task of the analysis of Plotinus’s discussion of the free will of the One is to show that his emphasis on the absolute independence of the One implies that the One does not have to produce anything at all; second, the One is completely unrelated to anything, because it is what it is “before” them.27 In section 3.2, I discuss Plotinus’s rationales for conceptualizing the One as solitary and utterly unrelated to anything. From the perspective of explanation, the absolutely simple, independent, and unique reality of the One is such as to demand conceptualizing it as alone and unrelated to anything else. Only in this way, Plotinus believes, can one truly recognize, acknowledge, and appreciate the incomparable reality of the One. It turns out, however, that anything one can think or say at all pertains to what is posterior to the One. This is why Plotinus emphasizes the need to “take away everything!” This raises two questions: If what Plotinus says here is the case, then what do our thoughts and words refer to when we speak or think about the One? What does conceptualization of the One amount to, if we take away everything?
In section 3.3, I respond to the first question by examining the way that Plotinus takes mystical union to authorize speech concerning the One. I frame the discussion by roughly and heuristically deploying two philosophical conceptualities: first, the distinction between discourse de dicto and discourse de re; second, Bertrand Russell’s distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. The conclusion I claim Plotinus would have us draw is this: mystical acquaintance with the One is what allows one to speak de re about the One. In section 3.4, I examine the cognitive and trans-cognitive functions of negation in preparing the soul for union with the One. I propose that the injunction to “take away everything” functions to transpose the soul from the order of discourse to that of noetic, intellectual, contemplation at the level of Nous, and finally to that of union with the One. What is finally required is the cessation of noetic activity on the part of the soul, by taking away everything and negating negation. But is it consistent to advocate a negation of negation, since it looks like doing so involves the kind of noetic activity that needs to cease in order for union to occur? I identify a passage supporting the view that taking away everything and negating the negation ultimately does not involve another noetic act. Rather, “taking away everything” and negating negation at this level takes the form of letting go of everything. In section 3.5, I close chapter 3, and Part One, by offering a few concluding remarks on Plotinian apophasis.
Because apophasis is best and more concretely understood as an essential component of Dionysian theological practice, I begin by sketching Dionysius’s understanding of the nature, function, and practice of theology in section 4.1 of chapter 4. I explicate what Dionysius calls the “dual aspects” of theology: the exoteric, philosophical dimension; and the esoteric, mystagogical dimension. Although Dionysius views both dimensions as necessary components of a theology that involves anagogy—i.e., the uplifting of the soul towards God—it is the ultimate task of mystagogy to enact union with God by situating the soul in the presence of God. I explicate the kinds of views that Dionysius opposes. This brings out the importance Dionysius attaches to an accurate understanding of God’s reality as beyond being, his contention that people who hold such views are unfit and unprepared for mystagogical initiation, and his conviction that “outside” assistance is necessary not only throughout the process of mystagogy, but especially at its culmination: union with God. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present the way in which the rationales and roles of negation are contextualized by theological practice understood in terms of symbology and anagogy. Symbology is the discursive practice of properly employing, interpreting, and understanding the symbols of God for the sake of the soul’s being uplifted to union with God. The practice of properly rendering biblical symbols of God also functions doxologically as a way of praising God. Dionysius’s understanding of God’s reality as beyond being requires the use of negation with respect to interpretation and doxology. I also describe theological practice as anagogy with a view to union with God: negation enables the soul to cease from transacting with beings, dis-orienting it away from beings, and re-orienting it towards God.
Chapter 5 deals with two, important preparatory issues: the isomorphism between Dionysius’s texts and metaphysics; and the question of Proclus’s influence on Dionysius. Section 5.1 clarifies Dionysius’s understanding of a biblical symbol. The conclusion Dionysius would have us draw is that using a created entity to symbolize something about God requires both the user and the interpreter to acknowledge that all such entities are related to God as their source and cause. For Dionysius, symbology has a kind of negative or apophatic function, insofar as symbols can both reveal and conceal. I show how the metaphysical dynamic and hierarchical structure of all reality are mirrored in Dionysius’s texts: The Theological Representations; The Divine Names; The Symbolic Theology; and The Mystical Theology.28 According to Dionysius, the first three texts can be taken as one extended argument of affirmative theology that explicates the various biblical names, symbols, concepts, and attributes of God. The argument of The Mystical Theology reflects the way(s) in which all created things return to God. Because the soul is moving towards the transcendent God, the relatively increasing proximity to God implies the increasing inadequacy of language and concepts. For human souls desiring union with God, the return to God involves a corresponding reversal of the affirmations previously made, by means of negation and denial. The implication is that God’s reality as beyond being governs in specific ways the role of negation with respect to both properly interpreting symbols of God and the soul’s anagogical ascent.
Section 5.2 addresses the crucial hermeneutical question of Proclus’s influence on Pseudo-Dionysius. I acknowledge Proclus’s influence on Dionysius, even as I also acknowledge the difficulties of determining the precise nature, location, and degree of that influence. The approach I take is to work more concretely from the ways in which Dionysius actually uses the conceptualities he adopts from Proclus. Because of some of the ramifications of Dionysius’s appropriation of certain Proclean conceptualities, however, I offer a few, relevant remarks on Proclus’s understanding of the triad remaining/procession/reversion in the Appendix, taking statements in The Elements of Theology as representative of his view.
Chapter 6 examines negation in the context of explicating the names of God, focusing on The Divine Names. In section 6.1, I begin by acknowledging the seeming aporia of explicating the names of God in light of God’s transcendent reality. The question is: what is it about God that not only allows us to speak about God, but also requires such speech to be qualified by means of negation? Section 6.2 develops Dionysius’s response to this question, by examining divine causation as the basis on which God is initially understood. Taking the conceptual name “Beauty” as an example, I show that God is named “Beauty”