In the first case (1), the participation relation [P] is understood in terms of both dependence and likeness: For A to be like F = (i) for A to resemble F and (ii) for A to depend on F for that resemblance. Plotinus explains, however, that there are two kinds of resemblance/likeness:
[O]ne requires that there should be something the same in the things which are alike; this applies to things which derive their likeness equally from the same principle. But in the case of two things of which one is like the other, but the other is primary, not reciprocally related to the thing in its likeness and not said to be like it, likeness must be understood in a different sense; we must not require the same form in both, but rather a different one, since likeness has come about in this way.36
The first type of likeness [L1] obtains between any two things that share an attribute, such that that attribute can be predicated of both items. In this way, the fact that both things are alike is due to the prior37 fact that the property in question derives from the same principle: namely, the Form in which both objects participate. So A is like B and B is like A, because A and B depend on and resemble F. The second type of likeness [L2] characterizes the participation relation [P] discussed above. In addition to dependence and resemblance, Plotinus further articulates participation by (iii) emphasizing the non-reciprocity of the relation: For A to participate in F is for A to depend on and resemble F, but not for F to depend on or resemble A. Plotinus seems to draw this distinction in order to avoid the problems of an infinite regress and of self-predication with respect to the Forms raised in the Parmenides.38
The consequences of this view are significant: for example, someone is virtuous on account of resembling and depending on the Form of virtue, by “the presence (parousia) of virtue.”39 On the one hand, insofar as that person possesses the property of being virtuous—i.e., participates in the Form of virtue as an imitation—she possesses virtue.40 On the other hand, insofar as the Form itself is concerned—that is, as eternal, immutable archetype, apart from its being participated in—it is not virtue.41 The Form of virtue is distinct from any of its instantiations, even though those instantiations are like the Form of virtue, and thereby, are like one another. Put differently, the Form of virtue is different from any of its instantiations, even as it explains the likeness between (3) the instantiations themselves and (4) between any/all instantiation(s) and the Form that it/they resemble(s). In this way, the Form of virtue is the principle and proximate source of virtue in any/all of its participants, without itself being like virtue as it inheres in any/all of its participants.42 Speaking of the double metaphysical status of the Form of virtue, Plotinus puts it this way: “this one and the same reality which when we possess it as an imitation is virtue, but There, where it exists as an archetype, is not virtue.”43 The Form of virtue (Fv) does not possess virtue (fv); nor is it virtuous (fv). Rather, it is something like the rational criteria according to which its participants are virtuous (fv).44 Therefore, we can call the Form because of which any particular entity A possesses the attribute of virtue—and on account of which we predicate of that entity that it “is virtuous,” or state that it “has virtue”—“the Form of virtue” (Fv), but what we mean by such a locution is that it is the principle and proximate source of virtue (fv) in that particular entity (Afv).
Hence, a further set of corollaries follows from the explanatory role of these archetypal Forms. The Form (Fx) is “present” to—i.e., participated in by—all of its participants insofar as, and as long as, they possess the corresponding property or attribute (fx). That is also to say, as possessed by particular, spatially-locatable objects, it must be present “everywhere” there are such objects that participate in it.45 Yet as archetype (Fx), it must also be separate from—that is, transcend—any such instantiation (fx), and therefore, cannot be spatially or temporally located. Qua paradigm, the Form (Fx) must persist immutably in order for it to account for its various instantiations. Cristina D’Ancona Costa correctly observes that the “permanence of this principle”—that is, what Plotinus speaks of as the Form’s remaining in itself (=Fx)—is what is required if the Forms are to function “as the ‘formula’ of all its different kinds of instantiation.”46 In Ennead VI.5.8, Plotinus goes on to explain that what it means for a Form (Fx) to remain in itself is its “not being scattered,” its “being one thing.”47 What Plotinus wants to avoid suggesting is that the participation of multiple entities in a Form (Fx) somehow divides up that Form in piecemeal fashion. Instead, it is the very indivisibility and unity of the Form (Fx) that somehow accounts for all of its various instantiations in particular entities (Afx, Bfx, Cfx, etc.). Plotinus’s view here is an expression of the deep intuition that the many are explained by appeal to a one—i.e., a unity. As we will soon see, this one-over-many intuition also finds expression in the second way in which, for Plotinus, we are to understand entities in terms of the conditions of their dependence.
Unfortunately, there is an ambiguity in Plotinus’s construal of participation [P] just at this point: given the double status of the Form (Fx and fx), what is the relationship between Fx and fx? Plotinus sometimes speaks of parousia or presence in these situations, but it is never perspicuous how parousia explains the precise nature of the relationship between Fx and fx.48 The relation of A participating in Fx is supposed to explain why the particular entity A has the attribute in question: because, insofar as it participates in Fx, A is like Fx and A depends on Fx for fx. So, insofar as Fx is present to A—i.e., insofar as A participates in Fx—A “has” or “is” fx, and therefore depends on and is like Fx. But Fx is distinct from, unlike, and independent of Afx—i.e., the particular entity that participates in Fx.49 My point here is that Plotinus’s appeal to the notion of parousia does not resolve the ambiguity concerning the precise relationship between Fx and fx.50 Rather, I suggest that the notion of presence metaphorically represents something like the power, influence, or “causal” efficaciousness of the Form with respect to any of its instantiations.51 Conversely, the notion of presence also highlights the dependence of entities on their corresponding Form. More importantly, we can already discern that participation [P] relations call for dialectical ways of thinking and speaking. As we will later see, it is the non-reciprocity of P relations that Plotinus appeals to when explaining the relationship of dependence between the One and its sequents.52
The second, more commonly discussed formulation (2) of dependence germane to understanding Plotinian negative theology is based on the view that any entity is a composite of constituents. As with (1) above, this second formulation is an expression of Plotinus’s conviction that the many are explained by appeal to a one. A basic statement of this view is that the “elements from which an individual thing is composed are prior to it.”53 There are, however, several, crucial points underlying and following from this notion. First and most important, any and every composite entity is dependent upon the things of which is composed.54 Hence, the priority of constituents over composites includes the orders of both explanation and metaphysical dependence. Any given entity’s components explain what it is and why it is what it is. As such, the entity is dependent on those constituting elements in various ways, both distributively and collectively. Second, some of those components will be constitutive of the entity essentially, without which it would not be what it is. The entity, its properties, and its very existence are, therefore, dependent upon its constituents. In the case of a particular human being, for example, such components will be understood in terms of soul/body, or more abstractly, in terms of various forms shaping some chunk of matter. In the case of non-material elements, the entity—e.g., a given particular human being—will possess its components in virtue of participating in, among other things, various eternal and immutable Forms.55
On this line of reasoning, the components of a compound are simpler, and therefore less dependent, than the compound that they constitute. Although they are relatively more simple and less dependent than the composite that depends on them, such constituents are nonetheless not what ultimately explain the nature and