More specifically, I will exhibit the way in which apophasis is generated by and deployed because of the particular metaphysical and explanatory role that the One and God play in Plotinus’s and Dionysius’s respective philosophical and theological reflections.2 In both cases, claims concerning the incomprehensibility and ineffability of the One or of God are, in turn, supported by lines of thought concluding to the peculiar metaphysical status of the One or of God as beyond being. Because being and knowledge are understood to be coextensive, that which is beyond being is, the reasoning goes, also beyond knowledge, speech, and discourse. Furthermore, understanding the metaphysical and explanatory lines of thought with respect to the One (Plotinus) and God (Dionysius) lays the necessary foundation for understanding Plotinian and Dionysian semantics where the One and God, respectively, are at issue. In turn, a basic understanding of Plotinian and Dionysian metaphysics and semantics enables the reader to better understand the content and function of negative statements concerning the One (Plotinus) and God (Dionysius).
It turns out, however, that in the cases of both Plotinus and Dionysius, the project of metaphysical explanation, while crucial as an end in itself, also serves the broader goal of preparing the soul for mystical union with the One (Plotinus) or with God (Dionysius). So while apophasis is initially deployed to emphasize the unique metaphysical status of the One or of God in the context of explanation, it is also employed as negative, cognitive and trans-cognitive strategies that prepare the soul for mystical union.3 Moreover, the metaphysical convictions that guide the practice of negation in the context of explanation—in view of the One’s (Plotinus) or God’s (Dionysius) reality and metaphysical status—also inform the practice of negation in the context of mystical union. An important, though unemphasized presupposition and conviction of the approach this study takes is that the structures, rationales, and internal “logics” of Plotinian and Dionysian apophatic theologies, as well as their richness and sophistication, are best exhibited by taking into account both the key, operative metaphysical conceptions and the broader context of the soul’s ascent toward mystical union.
While it may seem prima facie that this study of Plotinian and Dionysian apophases is motivated strictly by interests in the philosophy and theology of late antiquity, that is not in fact the case. Rather, this investigation is motivated by systematic interests in the distinctive nature, character, structure, function, and rationale of apophasis as deployed in different philosophical, theological and religious reflection(s). Indeed, one motive of the task of this project is to understand the “deep” background of what I take to be the relatively recent revival of interest in apophasis and negative theology, exemplified for example in the works of, and conversation between, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion. It should be noted that the works of, and conversation between, Derrida and Marion have their beginnings, respectively, in the late 1960s (Derrida), and in the late 1970s/early 1980s (Marion). In his highly influential essay, “Différance,” Derrida distinguishes “différance,” for instance, from “the most negative of negative theologies.”4 In Marion’s case, his first two books—The Idol and Distance and God Without Being—contain analyses and deployments of apophatic strategies, influenced in large part by the theology of Pseudo-Dionysius.5
The “conversation” can be construed to begin with Marion’s text The Idol and Distance, in which Marion attempts to read Dionysius in a way that circumvents or eludes both the nihilism and conceptual atheism of the “death of God” philosophy as well as Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as onto-theo-logical.6 The “conversation” can be understood to continue with Derrida’s essay, “How to Avoid Speaking,” in which Derrida not only (deconstructively) analyzes and evaluates Dionysian negative theology, but also indirectly presents that analysis and evaluation in response to Marion’s interpretation of Dionysius.7 At a conference at Villanova University in 1997, Derrida and Marion engaged in a public dialogue over several issues surrounding their respective work (as well as their “conversation”), one of which involved disagreement over the nature and status of negative theology and mystical theology in the texts of Pseudo-Dionysius.8 More recently, Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenological investigations into the nature of phenomenality and into what he identifies as saturated phenomena have led him to revisit the role and status of apophatic theology and mystical theology in the texts of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite.9
This “revival” of interest in apophasis and negative theology exemplified in the work of Derrida and Marion—as well as in that of scholars engaging the constellation of issues engendered by their work—raises questions about its (i.e., apophatic/negative theology’s) historical background.10 If, as I believe it to be, the debate between Derrida and Marion is primarily, though not exclusively, rooted in the deeper question(s) of whether or not (and in what respects) Dionysian apophatic and mystical theology is finally susceptible to Heidegger’s critique that philosophy-qua-metaphysics is onto-theo-logically constituted (as well as being susceptible to the implications of that critique, such as, for example, the issue of “presence” vis-à-vis consciousness that Derrida emphasizes), then it would be extremely beneficial for anyone interested in these kinds of issues to examine again the texts of Pseudo-Dionysius in order to exhibit and articulate as explicitly as possible the character, structure, function, and rationale of the apophatic and mystical theology of Dionysius.
To state the benefit of reexamining the apophatic and mystical theology of Dionysius in that way is not to be committed to the position that its importance lies merely in the ways that it has been recently treated of or appropriated. One long-range goal of the present project is to determine whether and in what respects the type of apophatic and/or “mystical” moves made by certain contemporary thinkers is finally sustainable without the kinds of conceptual and explanatory machinery employed by figures such as Pseudo-Dionysius and Plotinus, particularly when those moves involve, for instance, a retrieval and appropriation of Dionysian apophatic and mystical theology.
Consider, for example, Jean-Luc Marion’s multi-faceted retrieval and appropriation of Dionysius’s apophatic and mystical theology. Consider, more broadly, Marion’s non-metaphysical interpretation of Dionysian theology in The Idol and Distance.11 Part of Marion’s strategy is to read Dionysius’s texts in such a way that Dionysian theology does not fall prey to Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as onto-theo-logically constituted.12 Such an interpretation would presumably be the first step in retrieving and appropriating Dionysian theology for his (Marion’s) own contemporary project. Without close analysis, however, it is not immediately clear whether Marion’s non-metaphysical interpretation is ultimately sustainable without the conceptual, explanatory, and metaphysical machinery that I contend is fundamental to and constitutive of Dionysian theology (including Dionysian apophatic and mystical theology).
Consider, more specifically, Marion’s recent reflections on what he calls “saturated phenomena.” According to Marion, there is class of phenomena that does not operate under the antecedent, enabling conditions which have heretofore been identified as the basis for the “appearance” of phenomena: namely, saturated phenomena.13 What makes saturated phenomena unique is that there is an excess of intuition with respect to any corresponding concept (rather than either an adequation between an intuition and a corresponding concept, or a deficiency of intuition with respect to a corresponding concept). Marion formulates his conception of saturated phenomena by appealing to Kant’s schema: Kant identifies four ultimate types—namely, Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality—and uses them to derive his table of judgment, and thereby, the twelve categories or pure concepts of the understanding/Verstand.14 Marion argues that saturated phenomena are phenomenalized in such a way and at such a fundamental level—that of the four ultimate types rather than at the more “derivative” level of the concepts of the understanding—that the typical process of the constitution of knowledge is disrupted. What Marion emphasizes about this epistemic condition is that the incapacity to constitute knowledge on the part of the human, knowing subject is due to an excess, rather than deficiency, of intuition.
Marion initially classifies four kinds of saturated phenomena according to the respects in which he understands such phenomena to exceed normal phenomena governed by each of the four, Kantian ultimate types. However, he goes on to identify a fifth kind of saturated