The GPC designated Qaddafi as its general secretary and transferred most of its authority to him. At Qaddafi’s urging, on 2 March 1977 it approved the “Declaration of the Establishment of the People’s Authority” and proclaimed the birth of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya. The difficult-to-translate term jamahiriyya is generally rendered as “peopledom” or “state of the masses.” Under the system of “people’s congresses” all adults participated in the deliberations of their local Basic People’s Congress (BPC), whose decisions were passed to the GPC for consideration and possible implementation. In theory the BPCs were the ultimate source of government authority and decision-making power, thus illustrating Qaddafi’s belief that the people were capable of governing themselves.
Qaddafi also established a system of “revolutionary committees” staffed by young political zealots that were meant to supervise the people’s committees and congresses, to increase the population’s devotion to the revolution, and to protect the Jamahiriyya against opposition to and deviation from the official ideology. The systems of committees and congresses succeeded in producing higher levels of public participation. In March 1979 the GPC announced that power had been successfully transferred to the people. Soon after that Qaddafi abdicated his position as general secretary and adopted the title of “Leader of the Revolution” or, more simply, “the Leader.”36 All official claims to the contrary, the Libyan political system had become more authoritarian with Qaddafi exercising supreme power with the aid of a small coterie of trusted advisers. “Theoretically, this is genuine democracy,” wrote the Leader. “But realistically, the strong always rule.”37
Qaddafi’s remaking of the Libyan economy paralleled his efforts to reform the political structure. According to The Green Book, private enterprise, rent, and wages were forms of exploitation that had to be abolished.38 He urged Libyan workers to liberate themselves from the slavery imposed by the “wage owners” and to become full “partners, not wage earners” in the economy by taking control of “the public and private means of production.”39 Under his radical economic reforms workers formed self-management committees, and employees seized control of agricultural enterprises, service organizations, and private companies (except those in the oil and banking sectors). The ownership of private property was severely restricted, since Qaddafi believed that the accumulation of personal wealth in excess of one’s basic necessities could only be done at the expense of others. Owning more than one dwelling was prohibited, private retail stores were replaced by state-run discount “people’s supermarkets,” and access to individual bank accounts was restricted to provide funds for public projects. Qaddafi declared that all Libyans should have their basic needs satisfied and by 1980 virtually no citizen lacked food, clothing, education, medical care, housing, or transportation.40 “I have created a Utopia here in Libya,” he declared. “Not an imaginary one that people write about in books, but a concrete Utopia.”41
Qaddafi’s economic measures benefited the poor but created deep resentment among members of the enterprising and educated middle class, who began leaving the country in large numbers. By 1982 as many as one hundred thousand Libyans had emigrated, resulting in a critical shortage of skilled managers and experienced technicians. Some exiles formed highly visible groups opposed to Qaddafi’s increasingly autocratic regime and, in early 1980, Qaddafi launched a concerted effort to assassinate expatriate dissidents. Over the course of the year Libyan assassins carried out fourteen attacks in seven countries, resulting in the murder of eleven dissidents and the wounding of one.42 In a speech on 2 March 1981 Qaddafi called for the elimination of all opposition to his regime. “It is the duty of the Libyan people constantly to liquidate their opponents,” he declared. “The physical and final liquidation of the opponents of popular authority must continue at home and abroad, everywhere.”43
Inside Libya Qaddafi faced several disaffected groups. The property-owning middle class opposed his economic reforms; intellectuals castigated his ideology; and Islamic leaders denounced his nationalization of endowed Islamic properties, they condemned his rejection of the hadith—the sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad—as a source of sharia, and they denied his assertions that The Green Book was compatible with and based upon Islamic principles. The most serious threat to Qaddafi, however, came from the military and the RCC. In 1975 the ministers of foreign affairs and planning (both members of the RCC) with the help of about thirty army officers tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the regime. The two senior government officials vehemently disagreed with Qaddafi over the way in which the oil revenues were being spent. They sought to reduce spending for military equipment and foreign ventures in favor of internal development. In a severe crackdown on dissent the regime executed twenty-two of the accused army conspirators in 1977. After the attempted coup Qaddafi surrounded himself with a tight circle of loyalists and became increasingly isolated from the people, rarely mingling with crowds as once was his habit. He became so obsessed with his personal security that, for a time, he employed a cadre of female bodyguards because he believed that an Arab gunman would have difficulty firing at women.44
Qaddafi’s Foreign Policy
In the area of foreign affairs Qaddafi struggled ceaselessly to elevate Libya’s status from a relatively insignificant actor on the stage of Arab politics to a major force in the affairs of the Arab world and the Middle East. His foreign policy was preoccupied with Arab unity, support for the Palestinians and the need for front-line Arab states to confront Israel, the removal of outside influences from the Middle East and Africa, and support for liberation movements in all parts of the world.
After Nasser’s death in 1970 Qaddafi became the most outspoken proponent of Arab unity. He believed that the Arab nation was one homogeneous entity and that Arab power could only be attained through complete union. Furthermore, he was convinced that a unified Arab nation could not be achieved until Israel was destroyed and the Palestinian people returned to their homes in historic Palestine. He considered the creation of Israel the ultimate indignity wrought by the West upon the Arab nation. It is important to note, however, that he considered Zionism—the political movement born in Europe in the late nineteenth century—the real enemy of the Arabs, not the Jewish people as such. Nevertheless, under Qaddafi Libyan Jews suffered greatly, having been forced to leave the country shortly after the coup.
Over the years Qaddafi attempted unsuccessfully to merge Libya with a number of Arab countries, including Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, and Morocco. He argued that the unification process should start immediately and rejected the view of most Arab leaders that a union between two or more countries could only be attained through a long, gradual process. In April 1971 Anwar as-Sadat (Nasser’s successor), Qaddafi, and Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad proclaimed a union between Libya, Egypt, and Syria which they named the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR). Regarding the FAR as only the first step toward comprehensive Arab unity, Qaddafi proposed a full political merger between Sadat’s Egypt and Libya. Qaddafi believed that the combination of Libyan petroleum wealth and Egyptian military strength would make him the dominant leader in the Arab world and would invigorate the struggle against Israel. Sadat agreed to the proposal in principle but disagreed with Qaddafi over the pace of unification. Qaddafi pushed for immediate union, but Sadat urged an incremental approach. The Egyptian president realized that unification would be difficult to achieve considering the profound political, economic, and social differences between their two countries.
During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War the relationship between Qaddafi and Sadat took an unexpected turn. Qaddafi was furious that his FAR partners—Sadat and Asad—had excluded him from their prewar planning and had devised a stunning, two-pronged attack on Israel. He was further outraged that Sadat agreed to a cease-fire while Egyptian troops were still fighting on the east bank of the Suez Canal. He went so far as to call the Egyptian president a coward. In the years following the war their relationship deteriorated into a series of accusations and counter-accusations that effectively ended any possibility