Intelligence Relating to Intentions during a Crisis
During the period preceding a crisis, intelligence agencies watch for indicators that may show a change in the behaviour of their perceived opponent. A change in attitude may indicate to the intelligence community that national security and the interests of the state, as they are perceived and defined, may be jeopardized by the actions or decisions of the opponent state. The focus should remain on identifying the significance of every indicator, or of the accumulation of these indicators and their impact on short-term and medium-term bilateral relations. Professor Kam argues that the enemy produces indicators through his behaviour. Intelligence analysts seek to identify the most useful threat assessment indicators (e.g. demarches of diplomats, troop mobilisation and deployments, new high ranking military appointments and ultra-nationalist remarks by politicians.) The challenging issue that arises is whether the analysts, in this case the Greek intelligence community, are focusing on the correct indicators for the situation at hand.40
Information on the real political and military intentions of the opponent in a rapidly changing situation constitutes the core requirement of intelligence in a crisis. Ben-Zvi makes a distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘immediate’ intentions. Basic intentions have a long-term, strategic essence and are assessed regularly by various sources (i.e. diplomatic, military). There is an anticipation of the opponent’s style of behaviour in international organisations, in military exercises and in diplomatic relations with allies and adversaries. However ‘basic’ intentions may be difficult to define because deception and secrecy as well as flaws in analysis (i.e. mirror imaging, ethnic stereotypes, trend analysis on historical events and the prediction of an opponent’s behaviour in the future), may interfere. In contrast, ‘immediate’ intentions refer to the perception of how the enemy may behave and how he might implement his policies in the tactical environment of a crisis. Analysts formulate short-term military and diplomatic-political expectations about the opponent’s decisions and observe the opponent’s deployment of capabilities and the armed forces operational status. However uncertainty remains a factor to be counted in all assessments.41 As discussed in Chapter V, during the Greek-Turkish crisis in 1996, Ankara challenged the sovereignty of two islets within Greek territorial waters. In Athens, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MoD considered this to be the first time Turkey had undertaken such an initiative since the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. As a result, the realisation that ‘something changed’ in the behaviour of a ‘revisionist’ Turkey considerably influenced the contemporary Greek assessment of the crisis.
In addition, warning is divided into three main categories: political, strategic and tactical. Political warning refers to the history of bilateral tensions that officials assume could lead to a crisis at any moment. A crisis may be the pretext or the cause of resorting to arms. As Professor Richard Betts argues, ‘strategic warning covers issues of developing military assets according to a preconceived attack plan of the opponent state’.42 A warning requires a prompt analysis and a decision that ultimately leads to action. This action creates indicators that are picked up by the opposite side, thus initiating the ‘cycle of warning’ process (i.e. warning-analysis-decision-action). The opponent’s reaction creates another warning which begins the process again. During international crises, this two-party process takes place within days, hours or minutes. The interaction of the cycles of warning directly affects the assessments of both opponents. Intelligence agencies must establish if the opponent has optioned for a ‘decision stairway’. This process shows that the other party is seriously considering ‘all options’ (i.e. resorting to the use of force) and making operational and political contingency plans. Thomas Belden, a CIA analyst, talks of the decision stairway being a military-political-intelligence process that is affected by the other party’s initiatives and decisions.43
As shown through the analysis of the research undertaken, the concept of cycles of warning is directly relevant to the way Greek reactions were shaped during the crises in 1987 and 1996. With regards to Turkish intentions, as examined in Chapter IV, Ankara did not intend to initiate military action against Greece during the crisis of 1987. The deployment of Turkish forces was limited and not positioned offensively. Moreover, during the crisis in January 1996, Ankara only mobilised naval units around the disputed area and decided against involving the Turkish land forces (with the exception of a small commando team), thus indicating an intention to manage the crisis rather than implement plans for war.
Professor Betts argues that intelligence failures in a crisis are due to a total absence of warning, very late warning, or a lack of appreciation for the information provided to the decision-makers. The warning is either ‘factual-technical’ or ‘contingent-political’. The factual-technical warning is based on the intelligence gathered regarding the enemy’s capabilities in a given area (e.g. military movements on mainland Turkey, naval movements in the Aegean international waters and Greek-Turkish air dogfights). The contingent-political warning depends on the analysis of the information gathered and on the hypothetical construction of the opponent’s intentions.44
In his study of the role of intelligence in a crisis, Thomas Belden offers four general principles of what he calls ‘probability statements’. Firstly, one should bear in mind that very precise predictions (of dates and hours) have a low probability. One cannot be sure that at X time, on Z date an offensive/provocative action will take place. Secondly, the greater the number of estimated data/information elements (e.g. movement of ships, troops, politicians’ statements within a short period of time and the influence of international organisations and diplomacy upon the opponents), the lower the probability of a predicted event. Many categories of data increase the number of possible scenarios. Thirdly, the long time span of a prediction negatively affects the probability of an event. Other political-military variables may affect the opponent’s political and military behaviour, plans and intentions, causing the opponent to act differently than expected.45 As shown in Chapter II and III, Belden’s probability estimates helped to evaluate the strategic threat assessment by Greek intelligence.
This study will focus on the analysis of the contingent-political warning and will provide evidence showing that Athens obtained a secret warning on possible Turkish contingency plans in response to a possible Greek initiative on the continental shelf in 1986-1987. In comparison to Betts’s and Ben Zvi’s theses on warning, the Greek warning was not related to a surprise offensive, but involved possible Turkish diplomatic intentions toward Greek sovereign rights and claims in accordance with the international law. Chapter V presents the Greek intelligence analysis of the 1996 crisis and demonstrates that the mobilisation of the Greek military for surveillance purposes around the Imia islets and the landing of Greek civilians on one islet may have caused the landing of Turkish journalists and, in general, the provocative Turkish actions towards Greek sovereign rights over the area.
The ‘Rules of the Game’
States engaged in confrontations over a long period of time learn a great deal about each other’s military behaviour from experience. A number of unwritten ‘rules of the game’ develop over the years. Any deviation from this unofficial body of rules causes second thoughts about each other’s tactical, operational and strategic intentions.46 In the case of Turkey and Greece, the rules of the game refer to the movement of aircraft and warships, the military exercises in the Aegean and the violations of their national airspace and international airspace regulations. Greece and Turkey found themselves facing intelligence analysis challenges linked to each other’s legal and political positions on the issues of airspace and sea boundaries. As examined in Chapter IV on the Greek-Turkish confrontation, quantitative studies, (e.g. how many Turkish violations of regulations in airspace take place annually) and qualitative studies (i.e. types of weaponry and pilots’