In February 1982 the PASOK administration introduced Law 1415/1982 which put KYP under the direct authority of the Prime Minister. Until 1982, KYP had been under the authority of the Secretary of the Presidency of the Government (Ypourgeio Proedrias tis Kyverniseos). Moreover, Article 1 par. 3e stated that the Prime Minister could assign ‘the parliamentary authorities on KYP issues’ to a Secretary. In effect, Papandreou could avoid answering controversial intelligence questions by sending one of his ministers to attend the parliamentary sessions in his place.
In 1986 the PASOK administration introduced Law 1645/1986. NIS (Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion/ National Intelligence Service – previously the KYP) constituted ‘an autonomous civilian service’, remaining under the direct authority of the Prime Minister. According to Article 2, NIS was assigned ‘the collection, processing and dissemination to the component authorities of information pertaining to the country’s national security’. NIS also undertook the tasks of ‘protecting national communications, co-ordinating intelligence collection and disseminating information to all government intelligence services’. Essentially, in time of war, NIS would become the government’s ‘intelligence staff’. The nature of the relationship and links between NIS and MoD would be decided by classified orders. Therefore, scholars cannot document to what extent NIS, MoD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared intelligence in the 1980s and 1990s. However a former head of Turkey and Cyprus Affairs Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that he was not on the dissemination list of top secret NIS intelligence. Only political figures were entitled to secret intelligence and, in general, the sharing of secret intelligence was only at a political and not at a departmental level.73
Article 6 of Law 1645/1986 established closer co-operation between high ranking intelligence officials by assigning the presidency of the ‘Intelligence Council’ to the NIS director. This included members from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff and the State Security Directorate of the Police. The council would meet every two months or during a crisis and the NIS director could invite other public officials if necessary. In 1986, UnderSecretary Kapses gave verbal orders to a top diplomat to attend occasional Chiefs of Staff and NIS meetings at the MoD. The diplomat requested the issue of a formal appointment to these meetings but Kapses, who sought to keep the MoD, NIS and Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracies separate, thought it ‘unnecessary’.74
In the mid 1990s, NIS was placed under the authority of the Home Office. The conservative administration of Constantinos Mitsotakis introduced Law 360/1992 which reorganized the personnel structure and training within the NIS. The most important aspect of legislation appeared in Article 3 par. 4c. Accordingly, ‘the NIS director was the Prime Minister’s advisor on issues of his responsibility and informed him on any issue pertaining to the national security of the country’. This article established for the first time a clear intelligence advisory relationship between the NIS director and the head of the administration.
Later, under the authority of Law 395/2001, NIS was transferred to the Ministry of Public Order. The Secretary of Public Order supervised both NIS and State Security; in British government terms this amounted to being assigned MI5, Special Branch and MI6. Law 395/2001 did not replace 1645/1986 as it is considered the legal foundation of the civilian intelligence service.
Having provided key information on the institutional development of NIS, it is necessary to examine the legal framework for decision-making within the government council. The key documents are Laws 660/1977, 1266/1982 and 2292/1995. Law 2292/1995 is the most detailed legal document regarding the responsibilities and assignments of KYSEA and it makes particular reference to the role of the Defence Secretary, the chief of the General Staff and of the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force during a crisis. A close analysis of these three documents reveals that both the NIS director and NIS as an institution are insufficiently integrated into the advisory structure of KYSEA. The MoD and the chiefs are in a powerful position, able to provide intelligence to decision makers. In contrast, the NIS director is not considered of equal rank to the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force Staff. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy does not have either position in KYSEA.
In the post-Junta years the Karamanlis administration sought to establish political control over the General Staffs of the Army, Navy and Air Force and aimed to strengthen the operational role of the chief of the National Defence General Staff (GEETHA – Geniko Epitelio Ethnikis Amynas). The need for the centralisation of authority in the armed forces derived from the 1950s and 1960s, in which Junta brigadiers and colonels were able to form loyal groups within the armed forces and KYP and were able to organise the 21 April coup and establish their military rule.75 Karamanlis’s intention was to centralise authority in the armed forces in order to ensure political oversight of the military and avoid internal conflict. However even until the mid 1990s, the staff chiefs retained considerable operational responsibilities in comparison to the chief of GEETHA. This was first addressed by Law 660/1977 which restructured the organization of the MoD and provided the chief of GEETHA with more operational authority. Its main aim was to ensure the flow of intelligence to facilitate rapid decision-making in times of war. As an institutional body GEETHA was considered the military services’ co-ordination hub and the chief of GEETHA installed as the first military advisor to the Secretary of Defence. However the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force retained their advisory roles to the Secretary. The MoD has since admitted that Law 660/1977 did not adequately strengthen the role of the Chief of GEETHA in comparison to the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force.76
Regarding decision-making at a political level, Law 660/1977 established the ‘National Defence Supreme Council’ (Anotato Symvoulio Ethnikis Amynas) under the presidency of the Prime Minister. The council included the Vice-President of the Administration, the Secretary of Defence, the Secretary of Co-ordination of the administration, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Public Order and the Chief of the General Staff. All members had voting rights and the Prime Minister could call on ‘any public sector official’ in order to be provided with information’ (article 2 par. 5); there is no explicit reference to the NIS director. In times of war, the National Defence Supreme Council would be renamed ‘War Council’ and would be the only government body which could declare a state of emergency and mobilise the armed forces (Article 3, par. 1c). Surprisingly, there is no mention of NIS’s supporting role within the Supreme Council. Only Article 5 par. 4c stated that the Defence Secretary ‘in co-ordination with the Secretary for Public Order could set the general directions for homeland defence planning for NIS and for the other Security Services’ (i.e. Police and the Coast Guard). Article 10 par. 4d entitled the Chief of the General Staff to receive ‘all government services intelligence’. Paragraph 5a required the chief (after a relevant Council decision) ‘to exercise full control over NIS and Police intelligence services in times of war or general military mobilisation’. This demonstrates that the Karamanlis administration did not seek to upgrade the institutional status of NIS in information collection and analysis and instead emphasised the roles of the MoD and the chief of General Staff. Law 660/1977 referred to ‘general mobilisation or war’ and not to the arrangements of crisis management.
In February 1982 Andreas Papandreou renamed the Supreme Defence Council, the ‘Foreign Affairs and Defence Council’ (Kyvernitiko Symvoulio Eksoterikon kai Amynas, KYSEA). KYSEA was led by the Prime Minister and consisted of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the two MFA Undersecretaries, the Secretary and the Undersecretaries of Defence, the Secretary for the Presidency of the Government and the Secretary for Public Order (Article 11 par.1). The Chief of the National Defence General Staff retained his voting rights and membership according to Law 660/1977 (Article 11, par.6). The Prime Minister ‘could call