The history of Greek military intelligence assessments of Turkey will be preceeded by a brief- but vital- section on military intelligence and crisis analysis concepts, so as to enable the reader to compare the evolving Greek and Anglo-American understanding of intelligence and crisis management.
Key Concepts in Military Intelligence
What is ‘intelligence’? Many prominent intelligence scholars and practitioners offer definitions. There is now a broad consensus as exemplified by the following definitions: ‘Intelligence is knowledge. Intelligence is both a process and an end product’ argues Sherman Kent, the famous CIA scholar of the late 1940s in his Yale Review article in 1946 and in his book Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, 1949).2 ‘Intelligence is the information – questions, insights, hypotheses, evidence – relevant to policy’ as H. L. Wilensky defines it in Organizational Intelligence (New York, 1967). Robert R. Bowie, former head of US National Foreign Assessment Centre, argues that intelligence is ‘knowledge and analysis designed to assist action’. Policy makers must ‘appraise’ the intelligence available and make relevant decisions. The appraisal encompasses intelligence collection, analysis and the method of presenting the data to the policy makers. Information always has to be relevant to the politicians’ or top military officers’ priorities and requirements for long-term foreign policy, current policy or for international crisis management.3
However amongst Greek academia there is no equivalent debate of the meaning of ‘intelligence’. In Greek, ‘intelligence’ means information (pliroforia); the intelligence service is called ypiresia pliroforion. The word pliroforia has no conceptual link to espionage, analysis, process, or the product of confidential status or security, as the English term ‘intelligence’ may imply. The word pliroforia as a term does not refer at all to the source, public, official or secret. Touching upon the issue of secrecy, Michael Warner, a CIA staff historian, wrote that intelligence by necessity requires confidentiality of sources and methods of collection and of assessments produced; thus ‘intelligence is a secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities’.4
Throughout this research, the definitions offered by Kent, Bowie and Warner were the most pertinent to analyse how Greek intelligence works.5 Throughout the interviews, diplomats and politicians who were unfamiliar with literature on intelligence studies, downplayed the importance of ‘analysis’ and of ‘information to assist action’; by ‘intelligence’ they meant just to receive information and not the whole process of estimation. In contrast, military officers and former NIS (Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion, National Intelligence Service) directors had a very good conceptual grasp of military intelligence, but remained hesitant to speak more freely or to explain their arguments and views in greater depth. (This was not surprising as they were unaccustomed to research interviews for academic purposes.) In addition, espionage (kataskopia) is a word with very negative connotations and the attitude of interviewees changed upon hearing this term. Conceptually, pliroforia and kataskopia or analysi (analysis) have no connection. Upon hearing the word kataskopia, some interviewees became more hesitant to speak even when it was made clear that only contemporary assessments and analyses were required and not the cloak-and-dagger details about kataskopia.
Whilst the interviewees were reluctant to discuss collection methods and espionage, the hunt for facts and plans plays a crucial role in the intelligence process. As the US congressional intelligence specialist Angelo Codevilla writes ‘‘evidence of enemy plans sought by intelligence agencies is either ‘static’ or ‘dynamic’. Geography, climate, demography, culture, political and economic institutions and the personalities of key military and civilian officials constitute ‘static’ facts. In contrast, the ‘dynamic’ data encompasses military capabilities and ever-changing political intentions’.’6 However Codevilla ignores the possibility of false or misinterpreted facts and forecasts. One example of false static intelligence analysis was the 1975 CIA estimate of the future of the Cypriot Republic after the Turkish invasion. The paper warned that Greek Cypriots would face severe economic problems as the majority of the agricultural production came from the Turkish occupied areas. The major copper mines and tourist resorts were also located in the occupied zone. CIA analysts argued that the continuation of the occupation would result in mass unemployment, a decrease in the average per capita income and a ‘deep economic crisis’.7 However, since the late 1970s, the economy of the Cypriot Republic has developed rapidly and as a result, became a European Union member state in 2004. Meanwhile, the Turkish occupied area has been suffering from unemployment and underdevelopment and Ankara continues to give ongoing financial support to the Turco-Cypriot regime.
As demonstrated in Chapter II, Greek estimates referred to Turkish arms procurement trends, to perceptions of ‘Turkish grand strategy’ and to the long-term political and legal positions in the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean. Regarding the assessment of the military power of an opponent, a number of analytical components and variables are to be applied. Key areas of constant intelligence research concern are the quantity and quality of weaponry, the composition of military units, support and logistics mechanisms and the training, morale and leadership quality of military personnel. The nature of arms procurement programmes is directly affected by current and predicted assessments of the geographical and geopolitical environment.8 In estimating the military threat, analysts proceed to a ‘net assessment’, which includes the comparison of quality and quantity of the opponent’s forces with those of their own country. In parallel, they define military threats (mainly in the form of surprise attacks and full scale invasions) and estimate to what extent new technologies and weaponry could change the balance of military power. Analyses tended and still tend to be focused on military capability. Interestingly, a British government view during the Cold War claimed that political intentions ‘may change rapidly whereas military capabilities can only be altered over a long period’.9 In evaluating the Turkish threat, Greek intelligence also adopted this line of reasoning (see Chapter II).
However the analysis of capabilities does not always reveal the hostile intentions of potential foes. Capabilities can be assessed by quantitative and qualitative analysis, whereas intentions are assessed by a multi-layered analysis of tactical, operational, strategic and political factors and goals. Intelligence officers have to pay constant attention to the interrelation and fluctuation of the intentions and capabilities of the opponent state, examining its current and future aims, not just its past military and political behaviour.10
Estimates of the development of military capabilities contribute directly to assessments of political and strategic intentions. As a result, Greek intelligence was required to clearly define the military and political challenge posed by dynamic Turkish arms procurement programmes. In general, information on enemy military objectives, exercise scenarios and changes in military capability could indicate long-term political intentions despite the interference of ephemeral and circumstantial evidence during strategic intelligence analysis.11 The analysis of the arms procurement strategy of a state perceived as a threat has to directly address the issue that the purchase of expensive weaponry may be the side effect of inter-departmental or inter-service struggles within governments that lack effective central controls on spending or that suffer from poor financial planning, or corruption. The assumption of a centrally controlled long-term strategy against other states requires rigorous testing and cannot be inferred from propaganda sources or the analysis of long-term arms procurement trends only.12 Greek Prime Ministers and secretaries, especially Andreas Papandreou, believed strongly in a centrally directed and long-term Turkish strategy against Greece and thus interpreted any Turkish diplomatic and military decision and action as premeditated and tightly controlled by the Turkish General Staff (TGS).
It is worth citing that Kam, in Surprise Attack, warns that information on foreign military capabilities is always ‘false, inaccurate, obsolete, incomplete’ at the strategic level.13 Even in cases where authentic top-secret information on how the opponent perceives his own capabilities is available, assessments are to be approached with caution. Strategic assumptions could be based upon constantly changing information and an understated or overestimated view of the opponents’ assets and intentions may develop.14
In assessing the opponent’s intentions, it is very difficult to discover strategic, political, operational and tactical ‘rationality’.