Professor Ben-Zvi refers to ‘motivated’ and ‘unmotivated’ sources of misperception and how it may influence the decision-maker. In some instances, leaders exhibit insensitivity toward new intelligence. They may disregard intelligence and foreign policy advice which identify current policy weaknesses, or a need to change their policies (and thus potentially lose credibility in the eyes of the electorate.) Decision-makers may also disregard the interests, aspirations and plans of their opponent’s foreign policy. On the other hand, they may overestimate and overstate the perceived threat in order to justify their own policies.28 There is a distinction between motivated and unmotivated perception bias in intelligence perception. Three types of interrelated variables affect the way of thinking and decision-making:
Cognitive variables (i.e. perceived values, biases, overconfidence, lack of empathy). Strategic variables (i.e. long/short-term bureaucratic or personal perceptions of the opponent’s strategy). Domestic political variables.29
The theses of MacArthy and Ben-Zvi are directly relevant to the Greek experience in the 1980s and 1990s. According to the historical evidence and testimonies, the key members of the first socialist administration under Andreas Papandreou were hostile toward the tenured officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MoD and intelligence (considered to be rightists and ex-Junta supporters or sympathizers). Administration officials, strongly motivated by Papandreou’s socialist ideology, chose to rely on their own abilities to analyse intelligence and world affairs when assessing the Turkish threat to Greece. In addition, they were loyal and always adjusted their views in line with the opinions of Papandreou who had an authoritarian style of leadership within both his administration and his party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK).30 Finally, it can be argued that the literature of Anglo-American and Israeli authors on the relationship between intelligence and leadership has been influenced by a number of modern conflicts which have experienced the threat of imminent conflict and the fear of strategic surprise. Conversely, later chapters demonstrate that Greek leaders and their staffs in the 1980s and 90s closely studied Turkish foreign and defence policy but they did not anticipate an imminent Greek-Turkish conflict. This meant that they took a more cool and detached attitude towards assessments debates and politicisation.
Intelligence and Crisis Management
The analysis of Greek-Turkish crises constitutes an integral part of this book. Professor Phillip Williams defined an international crisis as ‘a confrontation of two or more states, usually occupying a short time period in which the probability of an outbreak of war between the participants is perceived to increase significantly’.31 Similarly Michael Brecher describes a crisis as a ‘situational change in the external or internal environment that creates, in the minds of the incumbent decision-makers of an international actor, a perceived threat from the external environment to the “basic” values to which a responsive decision is deemed necessary’.32 In operational terms a crisis has four elements:
Perceived change in the external environment. Threat to basic (or non-basic) interests. High awareness of the eventuality of resorting to the use of force. The realization that the decision-makers have a finite/limited time framework to establish and implement a strategy for response.33
Williams refers to two main approaches in the discipline of crisis management. The first approach claims that crises occur in the international system like some sort of a ‘disease’ that no inter-state relations could avoid. The main task of crisis management is the avoidance of war and the formulation of diplomatic options to resolve the dispute in a mutually acceptable fashion. In contrast, the zero-sum approach regards crisis management as an opportunity for the advancement of national interests. Confrontation, coercion and the communication of any threats are integral parts of good crisis management and the main aim of skilful leadership is to get the opponent to back down.34 The zero-sum approach promotes a ‘zero-sum mentality’. The intentions, capabilities and behaviour of the opponent are always interpreted as hostile. This approach induces an increased sensitivity to threats, both real and imagined and may lead to counter-action and a further escalation of the crisis. In contrast, the understanding that crises are inevitable ‘diseases’ promotes a framework of interpretation or mindset which decreases threat sensitivity. The actions and decisions of the opponent are interpreted as initiatives primarily directed toward avoiding armed conflict and it is assumed that both sides share a mutual interest in the avoidance of war. Both approaches shape the analysis of intelligence during a crisis.
According to the principles of crisis management, one of the most important axioms is the limitation of objectives. The limitation and specification of foreign policy objectives during a crisis encourages restraint, builds mutual trust and as a result, the opponents may opt for restraint in their military and diplomatic responses. In parallel, the intelligence agencies identify the policy opportunities generated by the crisis, whose exploitation may lead to the advancement of the country’s interests. Another accepted principle of crisis management is the improvement of communication between policy makers and intelligence personnel (i.e. analysts and senior collectors). Moreover, crisis response needs to have legitimacy by promoting the legal and political positions of the parties involved to the international community and to world opinion. Force restraint is a crucial component of the strategy of legitimacy and of avoiding escalation.35
The aforementioned principles of crisis management should be considered a selective description of Cold War crisis management and not a rigid theory that covers every international confrontation. They are the products of scholarly and professional research in the West, primarily in American political science. It can be assumed, with a certain degree of safety, that officials in Turkey and Greece, as members of NATO and familiar with the US military training system for senior officers, understood and absorbed these well-known principles, despite the aggressive and nationalistic rhetoric and propaganda employed during a bilateral crisis. Indeed, a retired general admitted to the apparent ability of Turkish officers to adapt their operational military thought to NATO doctrines and practices. However they were also characterised by a blind obedience towards their superiors and exhibited a lack of initiative, especially within the middle ranks.36 Yet, each party may interpret the crisis management principles differently. For example, a Greek General or a Turkish ambassador may honestly have different ideas of what is crisis management and how to ‘save face’ during a crisis negotiation. There exists the danger of mirror imaging in the interpretation and application of these principles and ultimately, the Turks may understand the crisis management principles differently to the Greeks.
Scholarly research in leadership studies has identified two main types of intelligence-policy relations, the mono-centrist and the poly-centrist. A mono-centrist approach involves a lack of consultation between decision-makers and intelligence staffs and, the formulation of an elite group. This closed group is often isolated from the intelligence bureaucracy and employs it to deliver, rather than analyse, any information. Gradually, this elite team is affected by what is termed ‘groupthink’ which serves to constrain creative thinking and rigorous intelligence analysis in a crisis. Groupthink refers to the stereotyped views of enemy leaders and opponents’ policies and of the inherent morality with which the decision-makers feel for themselves. It also incorporates the exertion of direct pressure on other officials to agree with the prevailing policy options and assessments.37
In most cases, intelligence personnel are kept out of this policy making group. The groupthink phenomenon refers to the situation when political, military and intelligence officials follow the same patterns of thought, interpretation and analysis. This can lead to a disregard for parameters and hypotheses that could aid the understanding of the crisis situation as a ‘dynamic intelligence reality’. CIA analyst Frank Watanabe warns that total agreement among decision-makers during the analysis of the opponent’s intentions, especially during a crisis, ‘may be an indicator that something in the estimate is probably wrong’.38 In contrast, the poly-centrist approach seeks to prevent the emergence of groupthink and favours rigorous cross-bureaucratic communication and consultations among various ranks, including direct competition for the most accurate and precise intelligence assessment.39