This chapter explains why strong states pursue FIRC in militarily weak states whose leaders should be relatively easy to coerce into settlements. I argue that the targeted leader’s domestic opposition not only gives that leader cause to resist the stronger state but also gives the stronger state reason to believe regime change will be relatively cheap. Much like Reza Shah, targeted leaders often resist making concessions that will jeopardize their political power. In many instances, strong states can increase their threats to compel these leaders to accept some form of settlement, but strong states must make their threats credible to do so. They may have to mobilize an army or apply limited force to convince the leader to concede, or they may have to soften their terms to let leaders like Reza Shah save face. To ensure the leader upholds the terms of the deal, the stronger state may also have to maintain a credible threat to renew hostilities if the leader reneges. These measures can entail a variety of costs for the stronger state that range from military and economic expenses to diplomatic and domestic political costs. But rather than bear the costs of these measures, policymakers may see it as less costly to exploit the targeted leader’s domestic vulnerability and oust that leader from power. Targeted leaders may resist a foreign power’s demands for reasons other than domestic political pressure. A lack of domestic opposition in the target state will, therefore, not necessarily ensure a deal on the foreign power’s terms. But when targeted leaders face domestic opposition, the foreign power has both a motive and opportunity for regime change. The opposition causes the targeted leader to resist or renege on the settlement, thus giving the foreign power reason to oust the leader, while simultaneously providing the foreign power a means to replace that leader.
In this chapter’s first section, I explain more fully why domestic opposition would cause a militarily weak leader to resist or renege on an agreement with a stronger state. I then explain how the strength of the targeted leader’s domestic opposition affects the stronger side’s costs of obtaining and enforcing a settlement with that leader. Finally, I explain why policymakers in the stronger state are more likely to estimate low regime-change costs when the targeted leader faces domestic political opposition. I also address how leaders respond to the threat of regime change and explain when such threats might exacerbate so-called rogue-state behavior. I end by examining alternative arguments for FIRC and derive from them hypotheses that I later test against my argument. A formal model of my argument can be found in Appendix 2.
The Logic of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change
The Leader’s Incentive to Resist
When a more powerful state demands a settlement that will strengthen the hand of the domestic opposition, the targeted leader will have a strong incentive to resist. The settlement terms could strengthen one or both types of domestic opposition that leaders face. The first, the internal opposition, consists of the leader’s political rivals who operate within the existing political system. These rivals compete for some of the same supporters as the leader does.11 In dictatorships, internal opponents may include rivals within the ruling party or junta seeking to supplant the leader. In democratic systems, internal opponents may head opposition parties that compete for power in elections or may be members of the ruling coalition vying to lead it.
The internal opposition is most likely to gain political advantage when the stronger power demands policy change that could hurt the targeted leader’s supporters. The leader’s rivals can then point to those concessions as a sign of the leader’s weakness. If the rivals’ claims that they can avoid making the same concessions appear credible, the rivals might be able to lure the leader’s supporters away and assume power.12 For this reason, targeted leaders may resist or violate international agreements that could give their internal rivals opportunity to garner supporters.13 For example, although the Serbian government had conceded to Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1909, it did little to uphold that pledge in the years that followed. One reason was the political power of ultranationalists, whose role in the 1903 coup earned them influence in the Serbian government. By stoking pan-Serbian sentiments, the ultranationalists made it politically costly for Serbian government officials to comply with Austria-Hungary’s demands. The activities of the ultranationalists would eventually lead to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and, subsequently, to World War I.14
The second type of domestic opposition that leaders face is external opposition. This type of opposition includes domestic groups excluded or disadvantaged by the existing political system. External opposition groups may or may not be living in exile. In autocratic systems, the external opposition might include members of a majority group that would benefit from majority rule, or a minority group looking to supplant another. In contrast, under democratic systems, external opponents might be elites who prefer an authoritarian leader to protect their interests.15 The state’s political institutions help the leader manage threats from the external opposition. Leaders may rely principally upon coercive agencies, such as secret police and domestic spy bureaus, to repress external opposition groups, or they may use politically inclusive measures, such as holding elections or offering bureaucratic appointments, to buy off their external opponents.16 In either event, the stronger these institutions, the better able the leader is to keep external domestic threats at bay.
Because the regime’s domestic institutions help the leader manage the external opposition, when foreign powers make demands that will weaken those institutions, the external opposition stands to benefit. Dictators that comply with demands to limit repression or implement reforms could risk losing power. Panama’s Manuel Noriega, for example, could not comply with the Reagan administration’s demands for free and fair elections without giving up his power and influence.17 Likewise, leaders who are forced by a foreign power to grant influential bureaucratic appointments or legislative seats to the opposition could increase their risk of a coup. Once the external opposition holds influence within the system, it can use its proximity to the leader or new-found political power to mount an internal challenge.18 Communists, for example, were able to seize power in Poland after World War II with the help of Moscow, which pushed for the creation of a communist-dominated government. Despite the communists’ initial lack of popular support, once they attained political influence, they were able to rig elections and persecute their enemies to consolidate power and assure communist rule.19
How resolved a targeted leader will be in resisting a foreign power’s demands depends on the strength of the opposition the leader already faces. The stronger the opposition is, the better it can exploit the opportunity provided by the leader’s concessions to challenge the leader. Autocratic leaders might be able to comply with foreign demands to hold elections when their external opposition is too weak to win, but when the opposition is strong, such concessions could imperil the leader’s survival. Similarly, leaders who already have broad popular support might be able to trade on their popularity and concede to unpopular policy changes. Leaders without such support, however, could face a coup or rebellion when making similar concessions. The stronger the opposition is relative to the leader, the greater the risk to the leader of accepting demands that will further strengthen the opposition; as a result, the more determined the leader will be to resist the stronger state’s demands.
Targeted leaders often have good reason to prioritize their domestic enemies over their foreign ones, despite the foreign power’s greater military capabilities.20 First, a foreign enemy might put only a moderate value on the issue at hand, whereas domestic enemies are often highly