NAPOLEON AT ERFURT.
Notwithstanding a peremptory declaration from the tsar after the seizure of the Danish fleet, Russia had nothing to gain by war with Great Britain. She was bound to France by the prospect held forth to her at Tilsit of the conquest of Finland and the partition of Turkey, but she was inwardly desirous of peace with Great Britain. Napoleon, on the other hand, saw in the partition of Turkey an opportunity of striking at India, and had actually given orders for naval preparations to be made in Spain, when all thought of eastern conquest had to be postponed owing to the success of the Spanish patriots. After a conference between Napoleon and the tsar at Erfurt a secret convention was signed on October 12, by which France sanctioned Russian conquests in Finland and the Danubian provinces, and Russia recognised the Bonaparte dynasty in Spain and promised to assist France in a defensive war against Austria. The two powers despatched a joint note to Great Britain inviting her to make peace, on the principle of uti possidetis. Canning replied that he was prepared to negotiate if his allies, especially Sweden and the Spanish patriots, who were at that time in actual possession of almost the entire country, were included in the peace. On November 19 Napoleon expressed his willingness to treat with the British allies, but not with the Spanish "rebels," as he styled them. Alexander took up a similar position, speaking of the Spanish "insurgents," and expressly recognising Joseph as King of Spain. Thus ended these pacific overtures, and on November 3 the official exposé, annually issued in Paris, described Great Britain as "the enemy of the world".
The year 1808 is memorable in English history for the active intervention of Great Britain in the affairs of Spain which developed into the "Peninsular war".37 This intervention was rendered possible and effective by the organisation of our army system in 1807, which was due to Castlereagh, though he received little credit for it. Under this system, the old constitutional force of the militia was made the basis of the whole military establishment. By the militia balloting bill and the militia transfer bill, that force, largely composed of substitutes, and bound only to home-service, was practically converted into a recruiting-ground for the regular army, and proved sufficient to make good all the losses incurred during the long campaigns in Portugal and Spain. The army thus raised contained, no doubt, many soldiers of bad character, whose misdeeds, after the furious excitement of an escalade, or under the heart-breaking stress of a retreat, sometimes brought disgrace upon the British name. But these men, side by side with steadier comrades, bore themselves like heroes on many a bloodstained field; they quailed not before the conquering legions of Austerlitz and Wagram; they could "go anywhere or do anything" under trusted leaders; and they restored the military reputation of their country before the eyes of Europe. To have forged such an instrument of war was no mean administrative exploit. To have maintained its efficiency steadily on the whole, though sometimes with a faint-hearted parsimony, and to have loyally supported its commander against the cavils of a factious opposition superior in parliamentary ability, for a period of seven years, must be held to redeem the tory government from the charge of political weakness.
PARLIAMENTARY ZEAL.
At the beginning of 1809, however, the interest of parliament was less concentrated on Sir Arthur Wellesley's first campaign in Portugal, or even on the convention of Cintra, than on the scandals attaching to the office of commander-in-chief, held by the Duke of York. Though an incapable general, the duke had shown himself, on the whole, an excellent administrator, and in the opinion of the best officers had done much for the discipline and efficiency of the British army. Unfortunately, Mrs. Clarke, his former mistress, had received bribes for using her influence with the duke to procure military appointments. Colonel Wardle, an obscure member of parliament, to whom Mrs. Clarke had temporarily transferred herself after being discarded by the duke, animated by a desire to damage the ministry, came forward with charges directly implicating him in her corrupt practices, and incidentally brought similar accusations against Portland and Eldon. The government foolishly agreed to an inquiry on the Duke of York's behalf, and it was conducted before a committee of the whole house, which sat from January 26 to March 20. In the course of this inquiry, Sir Arthur Wellesley bore strong testimony in his favour, and the duke addressed a letter to the speaker, declaring his innocence of corruption. Though Wardle and his associates pressed for his dismissal, Perceval ultimately carried a motion acquitting him not only of corruption but of connivance with corruption. The majority, however, was small, and the duke thought it necessary to resign on March 20, whereupon the house of commons decided to proceed no further. A curious sequel of this case was an action against Wardle by an upholsterer, who had furnished a house for Mrs. Clarke by Wardle's orders, in consideration of her services in giving hostile evidence against her former protector. The plaintiff obtained £2,000 damages, and the law-suit was the means of producing a reaction in popular feeling in favour of the duke.
This scandal in high places quickened the zeal of parliament for general purity of administration, and led to a disclosure of some grave abuses. One of these, connected with the disposal of captured Dutch property, dated as far back as 1795. Others were found to exist in the navy department and the distribution of Indian patronage; others related to parliamentary elections. Perceval brought in a bill to check the sale and brokerage of offices, nor did Castlereagh himself escape the charge of having procured the election of Lord Clancarty to parliament by the offer of an Indian writership to a borough-monger. A frank explanation saved him from censure, especially as it appeared that the offer had never taken effect. The charge was renewed, in a different form, against both him and Perceval, and their accusers moved for a trial at bar. But as it turned out that undue influence rather than corruption was their alleged offence, and as the avowed object of the resolution was to force on parliamentary reform, it was negatived by an immense majority. Nevertheless, the object was not wholly defeated.
The removal of the Duke of York from the command of the army was singularly inopportune, for Sir David Dundas had scarcely been appointed as his successor when a juncture arose specially demanding a combination of energy and experience. The British government, already engaged in the Peninsular war, had at last resolved to take a vigorous part in the new and desperate struggle between France and Austria in Southern Germany. The latent spirit of German nationality, aroused by Napoleon's ruthless treatment of Prussia, and quickened into a flame by sympathy with the uprising in Spain, was embodied in the secret association of the Tugendbund; and Austria, smarting under a sense of her own humiliation, mustered up courage to assume the leadership of a national movement. South Germany, governed by old dynasties, which profited by the French alliance, displayed as yet no symptoms of disaffection to France; but in North Germany the old dynasties had been either humbled or deposed, and the general ferment among the people, needed, as the Austrians believed, only the presence of a regular army to break out into a national revolt against the foreigner. Prussia, it is true, was still unwilling to move, because Russia was hostile; but the Austrian court knew well the lukewarmness of Russia's attachment to France, and hoped that a national upheaval would carry the Prussian government along with it. No one, in fact, had played a more active part in rousing Northern Germany than the Prussian minister, Stein, whom Frederick William, by Napoleon's advice, had called to his councils after Tilsit, and who was now compelled to resign his office and take refuge in Austria.
NAPOLEON IN AUSTRIA.
The British government was aware of the situation in Germany when it received a request in January, 1809, for the despatch of a British force to the mouth of the Elbe. Austria was, however, still nominally at war with Great Britain, and George III., perhaps not unreasonably, refused to give her active military assistance till peace was concluded. Meanwhile a subsidy of £250,000 in bullion was despatched to Trieste, and inquiries were set on foot as to the means of supplying such a military expedition as Austria desired.38 On March 22, Dundas, who had only been a few days in office as commander-in-chief, reported that 15,000 men could not be spared from home service, and, in consequence, no extensive preparations were made until the muster rolls in June showed that 40,000 troops might safely be employed abroad. This convinced the government that a large force could be sent without interfering with home defence,