But Napoleon had not awaited the deliberations of British statesmen. Hurrying back from Spain, he remained in Paris only long enough to organise a campaign in South Germany, and left the capital to join his armies on April 13. A week earlier, the Archduke Charles, having remodelled the Austrian army, issued a proclamation affirming Austria to be the champion of European liberty. On the 9th Austria declared war against Bavaria, the ally of France, and her troops crossed the Inn. On the 17th, when Napoleon arrived at Donauwörth, he found the archduke in occupation of Ratisbon. His presence turned the tide, and, after three victories, he was once more on the road to Vienna. The most important of these victories was that of Eckmühl, and he regarded the manœuvre by which it was won as the finest in his military career. On May 13 the French entered Vienna, but the Archduke Charles with an army of nearly 200,000 men was facing him on the left bank of the Danube. Napoleon's army crossed and encountered the Austrians on the great plain between Aspern and Essling. He was repulsed and fell back upon Lobau, between which and the Vienna side of the Danube the bridge of boats had been swept away by a rise of the river and by balks of timber floated down by the Austrians. In this dangerous position he remained shut up for several weeks. He finally succeeded in throwing across a light bridge by which his army regained the left bank on the night of July 4. Finding their position turned the Austrians took up their stand on the tableland of Wagram. On July 6 another pitched battle was fought, which, in the number of combatants engaged and in the losses inflicted on both sides, must rank with the later conflicts of Borodino and Leipzig. A hard won victory rested with the French, but it was not such a victory as that of Austerlitz or Jena, though it secured the neutrality, at least, of Austria for the next four years. Her army retreated into Bohemia, and on July 12 an armistice was signed at Znaim in Moravia, which formed the basis of a peace concluded at Vienna on October 14.
THE WALCHEREN EXPEDITION.
Nothing remained for Great Britain but to abandon the auxiliary enterprise so long planned, but so often delayed, or to carry it through independently, with little hope of a decisive issue. The latter alternative was adopted. The very day on which the news of the armistice arrived witnessed the departure of the greatest single armament ever sent out fully equipped from the shores of Great Britain. The deplorable failure of the Walcheren expedition has obscured both its magnitude and its probable importance had it only proved successful. The command of the fleet was given to Sir Richard Strachan, a competent admiral; that of the army to Chatham, who sat in the cabinet as master-general of the ordnance, an incompetent general, who owed his nomination to royal favour. This was the first blunder; the second was the utter neglect of medical and sanitary precautions against the notoriously unhealthy climate of Walcheren in the autumn months. The armament sailed from the Downs on July 28, in the finest weather and with a display of intense national enthusiasm. It consisted of thirty-five ships of the line, with a swarm of smaller war-vessels and transports, carrying nearly 40,000 troops, two battering-trains, and a complete apparatus of military stores. Its destination, though more than suspected by the enemy, had been officially kept secret at home. Castlereagh must be held largely responsible for the delays and for the unwise choice of a general which marred its success, but he showed true military sagacity in designating the point of attack. Inspired by him, the British government, distrusting the national movement in North Germany, had decided to strike at Antwerp, which Napoleon had supplied with new docks, and which, now that the mouth of the Scheldt had been reopened, threatened to become the commercial rival of London. The town was entirely unprepared, and a blow dealt here seemed the best way of doing as much harm as possible to France and at the same time gaining a national advantage for Great Britain.
Chatham had received very precise instructions from Castlereagh, the objects prescribed to him being, (1) the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, either building or afloat at Antwerp or Flushing, or afloat in the Scheldt; (2) the destruction of the arsenals and dockyards at Antwerp, Terneuze, and Flushing; (3) the reduction of the island of Walcheren; (4) the rendering of the Scheldt no longer navigable to ships of war. These objects were named, as far as possible, in the order of their importance, and Chatham was specially directed to land troops at Sandvliet and push on straight to Antwerp, with the view of taking it by a coup de main. Napoleon, who clearly foretold the catastrophe awaiting the British troops in the malarious swamps of Walcheren, afterwards admitted that Antwerp could have been captured by a sudden assault. Chatham obeyed his general orders, but, instead of taking them in the order of importance, gave precedence to the objects which could most easily be accomplished. By prompt action the French fleet, which was moored off Flushing, might have been captured, but it was allowed to escape to Antwerp. By August 2 the British were in complete possession of the mouth of the Scheldt, and had taken Bath opposite Sandvliet, while Antwerp was still almost unprotected. But Chatham concentrated his attention on the siege of Flushing, which surrendered, after three days' bombardment, on August 16, contrary to Napoleon's expectation. Antwerp had meanwhile been put in a state of defence, and was now protected by the enemy's fleet, while French and Dutch troops were pouring down to the Scheldt. After ten days of inactivity, Chatham advanced his headquarters to Bath, found that further advance was impossible, and recommended the government to recall the expedition, leaving 15,000 men to defend the island of Walcheren. This advice was adopted, but the garrison left in Walcheren suffered most severely from fever in that swampy island. Eventually, on December 24, Walcheren was abandoned, the works and naval basins of Flushing having been previously destroyed. The destruction of Flushing was the sole result of this expedition.
The failure of the British to make any serious impression on the French either in the Low Countries or in Spain induced Austria to consent to peace with France. By the peace of Vienna, signed on October 14, she ceded Salzburg and a part of Upper Austria to Bavaria, West Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw, and a part of Carinthia with Trieste and the Illyrian provinces to France. A small strip of Galicia was ceded to the Russian tsar, who had rendered France some very half-hearted assistance and was further alienated by the extension of the duchy of Warsaw. Austria was enslaved to the will of Napoleon. She had abandoned the Tyrolese peasants whose loyal insurrection against the Bavarians was the most heroic incident in the war, and she now joined the other nations of the continent in excluding the commerce of Great Britain, which had made a powerful diversion in Spain and an imposing though futile diversion on the Scheldt to save her from national annihilation.
While the Walcheren expedition was preparing, two additions were made to the cabinet. Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, brother of the Marquis of Stafford, was admitted in June as secretary at war, and in July Harrowby, who was created an earl, became president of the board of control with a seat in the cabinet. After the fate of the expedition became known, though before its final withdrawal, a serious quarrel took place between Canning and Castlereagh. Personal jealousies had long existed between these two statesmen, both half-Irish, half-English, and of approximately the same age, yet widely different in character. Canning was the most brilliant orator of his day, and no less persuasive in private conversation than in public orations, gifted with an agile brain that leaped readily from one idea or one project to another, but cursed with a bitter wit which lightly aroused enduring enmities, and which, coupled with an excessive vanity, rendered him unpopular with his colleagues, and made it difficult for any one to take him seriously; while his rival, not less able, and much more steady and trustworthy, a skilful manager of men, was scarcely able to pronounce a coherent sentence. Early in April Canning pressed upon the Duke of Portland the transfer of Castlereagh to another office. Private communications followed between various members of the cabinet, and it was understood that Camden, as Castlereagh's friend, should apprise him of the prevailing view, which the king himself had approved under a threat of Canning's resignation. The duke, however, begged Camden to postpone the