The object of this alliance was defined to be the expulsion of French troops from North Germany, the assured independence of the republics of Holland and Switzerland, and the restoration of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont; 500,000 men were to be provided for the war by Russia and such other continental powers as might join the coalition. Great Britain, instead of furnishing troops, was to supply £1,250,000 a year for every 100,000 men engaged in the war. After the close of the war an European congress was to define more closely the law of nations and establish an European federation. At the same time the allies disclaimed the intention of forcing any system of government on France against her will. It will be observed that the number of troops specified was far in excess of what Russia alone could place in the field; such numbers could only be obtained by the adhesion of Austria and of either Prussia or some of the smaller German states to the coalition. So far as Austria was concerned, Napoleon's Italian policy rendered war inevitable. Already in November, 1804, the Austrian court had entered into a secret agreement with Russia to make war on France in the event of further French aggressions in Italy. The coronation of Napoleon as King of Italy and the annexation of Liguria were, however, more than aggressions; they were open violations of the treaty of Lunéville which had guaranteed the independence of the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics. Austria hereupon determined on war, and secretly joined the coalition on August 9, 1805. Sweden, which was not a member of it, concluded separate treaties of alliance both with Great Britain and with Russia. Greater difficulties had to be surmounted in the case of Prussia. Frederick William III. cherished no enthusiasm for European liberty, and vacillated under the influence of Napoleon's offer of Hanover on the one hand and his numerous petty insults on the other. Prussia in consequence remained neutral throughout the most decisive period of the ensuing war.
NELSON AND VILLENEUVE.
Long before the coalition was ready Napoleon's mind had recurred to his venturesome project for the invasion of England. An army, the finest that he ever led to victory, which, even after it had been transferred to another scene of action, he still saw fit to call the "army of England," was encamped near Boulogne. It was constantly exercised in the process of embarking on board flat-bottomed boats or rafts, which were to be convoyed by Villeneuve, admiral of the Toulon fleet, and Gantheaume, admiral of the Brest fleet, for whose appearance the French signalmen vainly scanned the horizon. In the meantime, Nelson had been engaged for two years, without setting foot on shore, in that patient and sleepless watch, ranging over the whole Mediterranean, which must ever rank with the greatest of his matchless exploits. At last, he learned in the spring of 1805, that Villeneuve, following a plan concerted by Napoleon himself, had eluded him by sailing from Toulon towards Cadiz, had there been joined by the Spanish fleet, and was steering for the West Indies. Nelson followed with a much smaller number of ships, and might have forced an action in those waters, but he was misled by false intelligence and missed the enemy, though his dreaded presence was effectual in saving the British islands from any serious attack.
The combined fleets of France and Spain recrossed the Atlantic and in accordance with Napoleon's plans made for Ferrol on the coast of Galicia. After being repulsed with some loss off Cape Finisterre by Sir Robert Calder, who was court-martialled and severely reprimanded for neglecting to follow up his victory, they put in first at Vigo, and then with fifteen allied ships at Coruña. But, instead of venturing to carry out Napoleon's orders by challenging Admiral Cornwallis's fleet off Brest, and making a desperate effort to command the channel, Villeneuve now took advantage of his emperors recommendation to return to Cadiz in event of defeat, and set sail for that port in the middle of August. Nelson, ignorant of his movements, had vainly sought him off the Straits of Gibraltar, and came home to report himself at the admiralty. Arriving at Spithead on August 18, he was in England barely four weeks, most of which he spent in privacy at Merton. During this brief respite he received a general tribute of admiration and affection from his countrymen, which anticipated the verdict of posterity. On September 15 he sailed from Portsmouth, with a presentiment of his own fate, after having described to Sidmouth the general design of his crowning sea fight: he would, he said, break the enemy's line in two places; and he did so. He joined Admiral Collingwood off Cadiz on the 29th, and on October 19 he received news that Villeneuve, smarting under the prospect of being superseded, had put to sea with the combined fleet. Complicated naval manœuvres followed, but on the 21st the enemy was forced to give battle, a few leagues from Cape Trafalgar, and Nelson caused his immortal signal to be hoisted – "England expects that every man will do his duty".
THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.
The French and Spanish fleet comprised thirty-three ships of the line, of which eighteen were French and fifteen Spanish; the British had only twenty-seven, but among these were seven three-deckers as against four on the side of the allies. It had the additional advantage of superior discipline and equipment, to say nothing of the genius of its commander. The British fleet advanced in two divisions, Nelson leading the weather division of twelve, and Collingwood the lee division of fifteen ships. According to Nelson's plan Collingwood was to attack the rear of the enemy's line, while he himself cut off and paralysed the centre and van. Both divisions advanced without regular formation, the ships bearing down with all the speed they could command and without waiting for laggards. Collingwood in the Royal Sovereign, steering E. by N., broke through the allies' line twelve ships from the rear, raking the Santa Ana, Alava's flagship, as he passed her stern, with a broadside which struck down 400 of her men. For some fifteen minutes the Royal Sovereign was alone in action; then others of the division came up and successively penetrated the line of the allies, and engaging ship to ship completely disposed of the enemy's rear, their twelve rear ships being all taken or destroyed.
Meanwhile, Nelson in the Victory, who had reserved to himself the more difficult task of containing twenty-one ships with twelve, held on his course, advancing so as to keep the allied van stationary and yet to prevent the centre from venturing to help the rear. He designed to pass through the end of the line in order to cut the enemy's van off from Cadiz, but, finding an opportunity, changed his course, passed down the line and attacked the centre. He passed through the line of the allied fleet, closely followed by four other ships of his division, and the five British ships concentrated their attacks on the Bucentaure, Villeneuve's flagship, the gigantic Spanish four-decker, the Santísima Trinidad, which was next ahead of her, and the Redoutable, which supported her. The centre of the allies was crushed and the van cut off from coming to the help of the rear, which was being destroyed by Collingwood.
Before the battle ended, the naval force of France, and with it Napoleon's projects of invasion, were utterly and hopelessly ruined. Eighteen prizes were taken, and, though many of these were lost in a gale, four ships which escaped were afterwards captured, and the remainder lay for the most part shattered hulks at Cadiz. By this battle the supremacy of Great Britain at sea was finally established. Nelson, who, during the ship-to-ship engagement which followed his penetration of the enemy's line, was mortally wounded by a sharp-shooter from the mizzen-top of the Redoutable, died before the battle was over, though he was spared to hear that a complete victory was secure. His death is among the heroic incidents of history, and his last achievement, both in its conception and its results, was the fitting climax of his fame. The plan for the battle which he drew up beforehand for the instruction of his captains, and the changes which he made in it to meet the conditions of the moment are alike worthy of his supreme genius as a naval tactician. His arrangements were carried out by men who had learned to love and trust him, and who were inspired by the fire of his spirit, and hence it was that the allied fleet of France and Spain perished at the "Nelson touch".29
Very different were the fortunes of war in central Europe, where Napoleon himself commanded the "army of England". It was not until the end of August that Napoleon knew that Villeneuve would be unable to appear in the Channel, but no sooner did he abandon his project of invasion in despair than he resolved on a campaign scarcely less arduous, and gave orders for a grand march into Germany. Pitt, as we have seen, had successfully negotiated an alliance with Russia and Austria, whose armies were converging upon the plains of Bavaria and were to have been reinforced by a large Prussian contingent.