NOTES
1 1 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy 1.10, 1.17–21, 1.34, 1.37, 1.55, 2.2, 2.30, 3.16, 3.49 (hereafter cited as D followed by the relevant book, chapter and paragraph numbers; Machiavelli 1996); Machiavelli, The Prince 3, 13 (hereafter cited as P followed by the chapter number; Machiavelli 1985). As to the dating of Machiavelli’s works, the question is a notoriously contentious one and beyond the scope of this chapter. All that can be said with certainty is that neither The Prince nor The Discourses on Livy was published ‘before 1530’, three years after Machiavelli’s death (Butters and Stephens 1982: 60).
2 2 In 1.9, just before the infamous rape of the Sabine women, Livy recounts with particular irony the words the Romans used to try to persuade their neighbours to permit them intermarriage: ‘Cities, they argued, as well as all other things, take their rise from the lowliest beginnings [ex infimo nasci]. As time goes on, those which are aided by their own worth [virtus] and by the favour of heaven achieve great power and renown.’ (Translations of Livy: Livy 1925–51.) For a more sanguine view of Livy’s Romulus, see Stem 2007.
3 3 Consider also the later example in the same chapter of Cleomenes III, and his reappearance in D 3.6.19 alongside the tyrants Caesar and Agathocles; cf. also Polybius, 2.47.3, 2.49.1–9.
4 4 Strauss’s discussion of ‘goodness’ as opposed to virtue is particularly helpful in this regard. See Strauss [1958] 1978: 234–265; Mansfield 1979: 64–65, 162–163.
5 5 Machiavelli writes in L’Asino: ‘So wonderful I thought it that I wished to meditate on the cause of variations in earthly things … Ability makes countries tranquil, and from Tranquility, Laziness next emerges, and Laziness burns the towns and villages. Then, after a country has for a time been subject to lawlessness, Ability often returns to live there once again. And it is and always has been and always will be, that evil follows after good, good after evil. One man, it is true, believes that a deadly thing for kingdoms – what brings about their destruction – is usury or some sin of the flesh, and that the causes of their greatness, which keep them lofty and powerful are fastings, alms and prayers. Another, more discreet and wise, holds that to ruin them such evil is not enough, and not enough to preserve them is such good’ (Machiavelli 1965c: 5.34–36, 94–97).
6 6 See also D 1.17, 1.43, 1.58, 3.21. That Machiavelli so insouciantly refers to the leader of a republic here and elsewhere as a principe calls into question Pocock’s assertion that ‘Il Principe is not concerned with republics’ (1975: 161).
7 7 Consider likewise P 8 and D 2.13. Machiavelli toys with the older notion of corruption as loss of poverty throughout the Discourses, but his criticisms of Sparta and Germany – which he accuses of being insufficiently desirous and capable of acquisition – highlight the problems with that argument (P 10, 23; D 1.6.4, 1.55.3–6, 2.3, 2.19.1–2, 3.22.6).
8 8 Sullivan discusses this problem in terms of the fathers and sons of D 1.2 (1996: 160–161).
9 9 On Scipio, the hero so admired by Petrarch, the father of Renaissance humanism, and Cicero, the ‘grandfather’ of the same (Ullman 1973: 123), consider P 14, 17; D 1.46, 3.16, 3.21–22; Machiavelli’s January, 1512 Letter to Soderini (Machiavelli 2004.
10 10 See Machiavelli’s January, 1512 Letter to Soderini and Capitolo di Fortuna: lines 114–120 (Machiavelli 1965d; 1965b). It is on a similar basis that Machiavelli agrees with Livy (9.17) about the superiority of Rome to Alexander the Great and Philip of Macedon. There may, however, be a counterargument to be made on behalf of Alexander: P 4; D 1.1, 1.26, 1.58, 3.11, 3.13.
11 11 Liv. 5.26, 5.37, 5.49. In 43.13.1–2, Livy writes: ‘I am quite aware that the spirit of indifference which in these days makes men in general refuse to believe that the gods warn us through portents, also prevents any portents whatever from being either made public or recorded in the annals. But as I narrate the events of ancient times I find myself possessed by the ancient spirit, and a religious feeling constrains me to regard the matters which those wise and thoughtful men [prudentissimi viri] considered deserving of their attention as worthy of a place in my pages’ (cf. 21.62, 27.23, 26.19, and 29.14 with Machiavelli, D 1.12.1, 1.56.1, 2.1.1, and P 25).
12 12 In 5.28, Livy speaks explicitly of Camillus capturing Falerii iustitia fideque (exemplifying Livy’s ideal fides Romana and iustitia imperatoris); Machiavelli, when discussing this event, wonders at how much the display of such virtues is ‘desired in great men by peoples and how much it is praised by writers and by those who describe the life of princes and by those who order how they ought to live’ (D 3.20.1). Cf. Prince 17 (end) and 18 (end).
13 13 For further thoughts on Christianity, see D 1.26–27, 1.43, 2.2, 3.1, 3.6, 3.43; P 3, 12–13, 21; and Machiavelli, Capitolo dell’Ambizione, lines 1.112–121 (Machiavelli 1965a).
FURTHER READING
Two modes of interpretation predominate in contemporary scholarship on Machiavelli. On the one side, J.G.A. Pocock (1975) and Quentin Skinner (1978, 1981, 1990), followed by Philip Pettit (1997) and Maurizio Viroli (1998) among others (see Bock et al. 1990), read Machiavelli as a more or less conventional Renaissance republican humanist, a man devoted to the free way of life, to liberty understood as non-domination and to his fatherland. On the other side, Leo Strauss ([1958] 1978), followed by Harvey Mansfield (1979, 1996), Vickie Sullivan (1996), Paul Rahe (2005) and Catherine Zuckert (2014a), read Machiavelli as an extraordinarily heterodox philosopher who set out to upend the traditional orders of ancient political philosophy and Biblical faith.
Between these two currents there are many who take something from each side – the finest examples are perhaps Victoria Kahn (1994, 2013) and Michelle T. Clarke (2015), who alike read Machiavelli as an unusually thoughtful critic of his fellow humanists and also the ancients they most admired (first of all Cicero). The most contentious recent interpretation has come from John P. McCormick 2011 (preceded to some degree by Miguel Vatter (2000) and followed in part by Hankins (2014)), who argues that Machiavelli was a radical and aggressive populist. McCormick’s argument has received criticism recently from Ryan Balot and Stephen Trochimchuk (2012) as well as Catherine Zuckert (2014b).
REFERENCES
1 Balot, R., and Trochimchuk, S. 2012. ‘The Many and the Few: On Machiavelli’s “Democratic Moment”.’ Review of Politics 74: 559–588.
2 Bock, G., Skinner, Q., and Viroli, M. eds. 1990. Machiavelli and Republicanism. Cambridge.
3 Briscoe, J. 1971. ‘The First Decade.’ In Dorey, T.A., ed. Livy. London,1–20.
4 Butters, H.C., and Stephens, J.N. 1982. ‘New Light on Machiavelli.’ English Historical Review 97: 54–69.
5 Clarke, M.T. 2013a. ‘The Virtues of Republican Citizenship in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy.’ Journal of Politics 75: 317–329.
6 Clarke, M.T. 2013b. ‘The Mythologies of Contextualism: Method and Judgment in Skinner’s