MILCH: Yes, for that purpose.
DR. LATERNSER: Within the Air Force, is it true that this circle of people included those officers who had held the position of Chief of Staff of the Air Force or commander of the Air Force or of an air fleet during a certain period? I have a list here of those generals of the Air Force who belonged to that group, and I should like to ask you, with regard to a few of them, what rank and position these generals had when the war started. What was the rank of General Korten at the outbreak of war?
MILCH: I believe either colonel or lieutenant colonel, but I am not quite sure.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know what position he held?
MILCH: I believe he was Chief of Staff of the Munich Air Fleet.
DR. LATERNSER: Then, from August to October 1944 General Kreipe was Chief of Staff of the Air Force. What was this officer when the war started?
MILCH: I presume major or lieutenant colonel.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. Do you know what position he had?
MILCH: No, at the moment I could not say exactly. It may be that he was chief of staff of an air corps.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And what rank did he have at the time as Chief of Staff of an air corps?
MILCH: From major to colonel; that depends.
DR. LATERNSER: General Koller also was Chief of Staff of the Air Force for a short time. What was this officer when the war started?
MILCH: I believe lieutenant colonel.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I have only a few more names. Do you know what rank and position Dessloch had at the outbreak of war?
MILCH: I do not remember exactly; perhaps major general or colonel. I do not know exactly.
DR. LATERNSER: And General Pflugbeil?
MILCH: The same.
DR. LATERNSER: General Seidel?
MILCH: Seidel, I believe, was already Major General at the outbreak of war.
DR. LATERNSER: And what position did he have at that time?
MILCH: He was Quartermaster General in the General Staff.
DR. LATERNSER: What rank did that position have compared with commander, commander-in-chief, divisional commander. . . ?
MILCH: Corps commander is about the same as a quartermaster general.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I have a few more questions concerning the Air Force itself and the highest military leaders. From your testimony it is to be concluded that in 1939 the Air Force was not fully prepared for war. As to this point, could you state the reasons for this unpreparedness of the Air Force for war?
MILCH: During the few years between 1935 and 1939—I gave the figures for industry before—it would have been impossible for any soldier in any country to build an air force equal to the tasks with which we were faced from 1939 on. That is impossible. It is not possible to create the units nor to establish the schools and furnish them with adequate teaching staffs; nor is it possible to develop the planes which are necessary, and then to build them by mass production. Nor is it possible in that short period to train or produce air crews sufficiently qualified to meet the high technical standards necessarily demanded for modern aircraft. Likewise, it is impossible in such a short time to produce ground crews which are technically highly qualified and to put them at the disposal of the Air Force and also of the aviation industry. At the same time also. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: He said that it is impossible. It should not be necessary to go into this detail on this subject.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more specific questions.
[Turning to the witness.] Did the Air Force expect resistance against the invasion of Austria?
MILCH: No. We knew definitely that there would be no resistance. We did not take any arms with us.
DR. LATERNSER: How was the reception there?
MILCH: So friendly that it could not be more so in our own country.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you, as Field Marshal, informed in advance that war was to be declared against the United States?
MILCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: In this Trial there are serious accusations against German soldiers and their leaders on account of cruelties committed. Was not every soldier sufficiently informed and instructed about the regulations of international law?
MILCH: Yes. Each soldier had a pay book. On the first page of the pay book were pasted ten commandments for the soldier. They included all these questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Can you give me examples of points contained in this memorandum?
MILCH: Yes. For instance, that no soldier—no prisoner, should be shot; that looting was not permitted. By the way, I have my pay book here. Treatment of prisoners of war; Red Cross; civilian population inviolable; attitude of soldier when himself prisoner of war and, in conclusion, the threat of punishment for offenses.
DR. LATERNSER: If it became known that soldiers had committed offenses or outrages against the civilian population, did the commanders concerned, so far as you know, interfere with the severity necessary?
MILCH: I know of some cases, I knew of some cases, where that was definitely the case, even the death penalty being imposed.
DR. LATERNSER: So the commanders always strove under all circumstances to maintain the discipline of the troops?
MILCH: Yes. I can give a notable example. A general of the Air Force had appropriated jewelry which belonged to a foreign lady. He was sentenced to death and executed. I think it was in 1943 or 1944.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in particular during the critical days of 1939 you were in close official contact with Defendant Göring. Did you ever hear through him about a large-scale plan for waging an extensive war?
MILCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: In your opinion, did the other high military leaders hear or would they have heard more about it?
MILCH: No. All measures taken by Hitler—beginning with the occupation of the Rhineland—came very suddenly, as a rule after only a few hours’ preparation. That applies to Austria; that also applies to Czechoslovakia and to Prague. The only time that we were told anything beforehand was the affair with Poland, which I mentioned before, where we had a conference on 23 May.
DR. LATERNSER: In all other cases, therefore, it was rather a surprise to the high military leaders?
MILCH: Yes, a complete surprise.
DR. LATERNSER: Now I have one more question: What was the possibility of resignation for high military leaders during the war?
MILCH: That has been told several times. I have also experienced it myself—one was not permitted to hand in one’s resignation. It was said if there was a reason for anyone to leave, he would be informed by his superiors. In an authoritarian state the subordinate, the citizen has no right to resign on his own initiative, whether he be a soldier or a civilian.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until Monday morning.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 11 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]
SEVENTY-EIGHTH DAY
Monday, 11 March 1946
Morning Session