MILCH: No, he was ill at the time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Can you tell us briefly what happened?
MILCH: During Speer’s illness, requests reached the Führer from other quarters that Speer should be relieved of construction work. Difficulties arose owing to the fact that whereas in theory Speer still remained in charge of building, in practice the work was nearly all taken out of his hands. He was no longer able to have any say in construction work, since it had been decided that the construction department of the Todt Organization should receive orders direct from Hitler. Thus, Speer was excluded more and more from this sphere of activity. A great deal was said at that time about large-scale constructions, but very little work was actually done on them.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did Hitler give a written order to Herr Dorsch, and did he have it shown to Speer? Do you know anything about it?
MILCH: As far as I can remember, such a written order was given and it was also sent to Speer. I have a vague recollection that Speer once showed me such an order.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: One last question on this matter. In this way, Dorsch, who had been directly commissioned by the Führer, took over the responsibility for these buildings and the necessary manpower?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you were a member of the Central Planning Board. Can you tell me if the Central Planning Board was authorized to make decisions on the use of foreign or German labor and its allocation?
MILCH: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did the Central Planning Board ever make decisions of this kind?
MILCH: The Central Planning Board had been set up for the distribution of raw materials only; but a certain control over transportation devolved upon it. However, the matter of transportation was independent of any activity concerning allocation of raw material. It had no say in the allocation of labor. If the Central Planning Board attempted to obtain some influence as to the allocation of workers, it was because it was at the same time responsible for armaments, and therefore best able to judge the existing requirements. But here, too, considerable difficulties were encountered, and this branch of the Central Planning Board’s work had to be dropped.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: So no decision was ever reached? We have records before us which show that labor problems were sometimes discussed by the Central Planning Board.
MILCH: Yes, very frequently, as the armament offices which were represented on the Central Planning Board were greatly concerned with labor problems; but these discussions mostly concerned food supplies and extra rations for the workers.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And now—one last question on the subject. Did the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in any way look upon the Central Planning Board as authoritative, that is, as the final arbiter in the total plan for the utilization of manpower?
MILCH: No, he could not do that, as he himself represented that authority.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were there any reserves of German workers in 1943 or 1944, and did Speer request the utilization of this German manpower instead of foreign labor?
MILCH: Yes, again and again Speer made strong representations that any German labor still available, even if difficult to mobilize, should be brought in and put to work. This reserve consisted mostly of female labor, women of professional circles and social stations who in wartime had nothing to do apart from domestic work.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you have already told us that the Defendant Speer was a sick man in 1944. Could you tell us approximately when his illness began and when it ended?
MILCH: His illness started in February, and I think it lasted until about June.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. Do you know anything about this long illness being exploited in order to undermine severely his influence and authority? Can you tell me who was primarily interested in doing that?
MILCH: His influence was undermined in the above-mentioned building projects. It is very difficult for me to name here the individuals who probably hoped to succeed him.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did matters improve, or did they become worse after 20 July?
MILCH: Actually, as time went on they became worse. Speer’s position became more difficult than ever, as the whole of Speer’s views differed more and more from Hitler’s official opinion.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. Now, may I remind you of something else? In February 1945, by a Hitler order, the Defendant Speer was entrusted with the distribution of motor vehicles; and you, if I am correctly informed, were appointed as his representative. Can you tell me what the transport situation was like at that time, and to what extent the armaments output depended on the transport situation?
MILCH: In those days, the transport situation was so deplorable, owing to the American daylight raids, that the transport system was no longer able to carry even the most essential commodities and armament materials. Our great forge, the Ruhr district, was particularly hard hit, as well as the transport system carrying products from the Ruhr to the finishing industries in Central Germany, Berlin, and Saxony. If very stringent measures had not been taken and extraordinary powers granted, total collapse, due solely to transport difficulties, would have become only a matter of hours. That was the situation at that time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Could Speer, in his position, be expected to give preferential treatment to armaments when available transport was allocated? What did he actually do?
MILCH: No; Speer, like myself, saw quite clearly that the whole armament question could no longer influence the situation at that stage. Therefore, acting on his own initiative, he gave priority to the movement of food supplies for the population. The most urgent job was to remove the foodstuffs from the German territory in danger of being lost to the enemy.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were these measures only taken to safeguard the current food supply, or were they long-term measures?
MILCH: The intention was to move all available and transportable food to a place of safety.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, motor transport was a particularly difficult problem at the time. Was the number of trucks and the quantity of fuel to drive them cut down when transport was allocated to the armaments industry; and what orders regarding trucks did Speer issue in mid-February? Do you know?
MILCH: I know that trucks were always in such short supply in the armament industry that not even essential orders could be filled. All kinds of alternative transport had to be found, such as electric trains, a great number of horse carts, and other vehicles. But, as far as my knowledge goes, here too, Speer used this means of transport for the benefit of the German population in order to maintain some sort of food distributing organization.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Fuel was, at that time, one of the most serious bottlenecks, was it not?
MILCH: It was, in fact, the most serious bottleneck of all.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, do you happen to know that after February 1945 Speer granted priority to repair work on nitrogen factories producing fertilizers for agriculture, which meant that repairs to fuel producing plants had to take second place?
MILCH: Yes, I do know, because Speer discussed with me in great detail the emergency measures to be taken, now that we were faced with imminent and inevitable collapse. He was of the opinion that first and foremost everything that was still possible should be done to help the German people to get through the very hard times which would follow the collapse. These first measures dealt with food supplies, salvage of food supplies, and transport for distribution.
Secondly, he sought to avoid the destruction of the German factories still in our possession, which was in direct opposition to Hitler’s “scorched earth” tactics.
Thirdly, he discussed the switch-over from war to peacetime production of such factories as might still be standing. First of all, he had in mind agricultural machinery and spare parts, and