History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2. Napoleon III. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

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a hill belonging to the line of heights which separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune, where we now find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier.286 (See Plate 13.) This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north, the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000 paces (1,500 mètres) to the banks of the Sée. Viridovix came and took a position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle, without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But, not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence of being a deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of Cæsar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality, the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pursued by the cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately submitted.

      Cæsar and Sabinius received intelligence at the same time, one of the victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against the Veneti.287

      Conquest of Aquitaine by P. Crassus.

      V. Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached, as we have seen, with twelve cohorts and a body of cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which, according to the “Commentaries,” formed the third part of Gaul.288 He believed that he could not display too much prudence in a country where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus had lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries, and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during its march. Their horsemen were at first repulsed and pursued; but, suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (in convalle), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the battle re-commenced with fury.

      Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans. Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the oppidum of the Sotiates (the town of Sos), attempted to carry it by assault; but the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers, they made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation, Adiatunnus,289 supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty men of the class called soldures, attempted a sally from another side of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and, after a severe struggle, drove him back into the oppidum; nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.

      When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an oppidum fortified by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour and chiefs of the peoples of Citerior Spain, which joined upon Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out detachments on all sides, who intercepted his provisions. At last, as he saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council; which was of the same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.

      At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the camp and formed in two lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans: they demanded with loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate, the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more easy.290 He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in the battle, and to lead them by a long circuit to the place reported to be least defended. While the barbarians are solely occupied with the principal attack, these cohorts rush into the camp; on hearing the clamour which arises from this attack, the assailants, led by Crassus, redouble their efforts. The barbarians, surrounded on all sides, lose courage, rush out of the retrenchments, and seek their safety in flight. The cavalry overtook them in the open plain, and of 50,000 Aquitanians or Cantabrians, hardly one quarter escaped, who only reached the camp very late in the night.

      At the news of this victory, the greater part of the peoples of Aquitaine291 submitted to Crassus, and sent spontaneously him hostages; some, nevertheless, who were more distant, and reckoned on the advanced period of the season, refused to make their submission.292

      March against the Morini and the Menapii.

      VI. Towards the same time, Cæsar, in spite of the near approach of the end of the fine season, marched against the Morini and the Menapii, who alone, after the entire pacification of Gaul, remained in arms, and had not sent him deputies. These peoples had no towns: they dwelt in caverns293 or under the tent.294 Taught by the example of their neighbours, they avoided engaging in pitched battles, and withdrew into the recesses of woods and marshes. Cæsar, when he arrived in their country, was attacked by surprise at the moment he was beginning to fortify his camp. He drove them back into the woods, but not without experiencing some loss; then, to open himself a wider road in the forest which had become their asylum, he caused the trees between him and the enemy to be cut down, and, heaping them up to the right and the


<p>286</p>

This position is at the distance of seven kilomètres to the east of Avranches. The vestiges still visible of Chastellier are probably those of a camp made at a later period than this Gallic war, but we think that Sabinus had established his camp on the same site.

<p>287</p>

De Bello Gallico, III. 19.

<p>288</p>

Cæsar, after having said, in the first book of his “Commentaries”, that Aquitaine was one of the three parts of Gaul, states here that it formed the third part by its extent and population, which is not correct.

<p>289</p>

Nicholas of Damascus (in Athenæus, Deipn., VI. 249) writes in this manner the name of King Adiatomus, and adds that the soldurii were clothed in royal vestments.

<p>290</p>

This combat is remarkable as being the only one in the whole war in Gaul in which the Romans attack a fortified Gaulish camp.

<p>291</p>

Of this number were the Tarbelli, The Bigerriones, The Ptiani, the Vasates, the Tarusates, the Elusates, the Gaites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibusates, and the Cocosates.

<p>292</p>

De Bello Gallico, III. 27.

<p>293</p>

Pliny, Hist. Nat., III. x. 6.

<p>294</p>

Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 44.