In a constructive sense, MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p) shows how the perception of Christ is defined (… hoc est Christum cognoscere beneficia eius cognoscere …) and what “beneficium” ex positivo means and presupposes (vis peccati, lex, gratia). The “constructive potential” of Melanchthon’s theological proposition becomes most evident in the way in which he later on in the Loci explicitly refers to Paul and his letter to the Philippians (7.34; 7.90f.):
(a) In 7.33f., MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p) discusses the fact that justification is not yet reached completely. He refers to LutherLuther, Martin as well as to Augustine, Cyprian and Paul (RomRom 7:23; 12:2). Melanchthon claims: “… quatenus credimus, liberi sumus, quatenus diffidimus, sub lege sumus.”Melanchthon, Philip(p)6 In that context, he adds a reference – not a direct quotation7 – to Phil 3:12 in order to show that Paul himself was conscious about the continuous need of aiming for “perfection.” I cannot discuss here in detail how Melanchthon interprets the meaning of “law.” More importantly, the basic idea here is to shape in a noetic sense an “Existenzbeschreibung” that follows up the distinction between credimus = liberi sumus, and diffidimus = sub lege sumus.
In other words, MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p) develops a type of a Christ-believing Existenzbeschreibung in which the “law” has a constitutive function for the believer’s selfSelbst, self, selfhood-understanding. From this point of view, Melanchthon also approaches Phil 3:12 – a text that can be read differently from a modern exegetical perspective. When Paul talks about his imperfection in Phil 3, he points to his eschatological hope (Phil 3:14) as well as to his current personal situation: the biographical context in prison (Phil 1:7 etc.). Paul does not necessarily develop an anthropological statement but rather reaches an interpretation of his personal fortune, which might be of relevance for his “imitators” (see Phil 3:17) who are like himself emulators of Christ.
(b) Another example of how MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p) approaches Philippians via the hermeneutical key of iustitia ex lege, can be found in his interpretation of Phil 3:8f. The Pauline passage is still framed by Paul’s autobiographical narratio (Phil 3:4bff.). Herein, it refers to Paul’s selfSelbst, self, selfhood-understanding as a personal example to his readers. In his interpretation of that passage in the Loci (7.90f.), however, Melanchthon reads the Pauline statement in light of the theologoumenon of the iustitia ex deo est (per fidem est Christi). We, thus, get the impression that Melanchthon, again, narrows Paul’s thinking, such as in his letter to the Philippians, in that he makes it first of all to be a contribution to the theological discourse about iustitia and lex.
Is MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p)’s approach to Phil 3 legitimate in terms of hermeneutics? In a motific sense it is: In Phil 3:9 Paul talks about πίστις, νόμος, and δικαιοσύνη. However, in the argumentative frame of Phil 3 it becomes evident that the theologoumenon of justification does not really stand in the center of the Pauline argument but only supports Paul’s conceptualization of his own personal exemplumexemplum that he provides for his readers. In his interpretation of Phil 3 in the Loci Melanchthon thus narrows or even misconceives Paul’s crucial argument of apostolic selfSelbst, self, selfhood-reflection.
I shall add here a philological remark to Phil 3:9, where MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p) quotes the Pauline text, while he only alludes to it in the cases of Phil 3:8 and 3:12 (see above). In the case of Phil 3:9 the Pauline text obviously is of specific theological importance. It seems as if Melanchthon does not have the Vulgata-text in mind but that he himself translates the Greek text: Melanchthon’s Latin text is much closer to the Greek than contemporary Latin translations, especially when it comes to the complicated interpretation of the prepositions that are used here:
The Vulgata-text says: … sed illam quae ex fide est Christi quae ex Deo est iustitia in fide.
The Greek text, however, says: … ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει – a phrase that is much better expressed in MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p)’s translation in his Loci: … sed eam, quae per fidem est Christi, quae iustitia ex deo estMelanchthon, Philip(p)8 – per fidem equals διὰ πίστεως.
The art of Greek philology finally leads MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p) to a significant concept of “faith”: Melanchthon’s translation – even though it might reflect reformatory theology here – is much more than the Vulgata-tradition close to the Pauline Greek in a philological sense. Melanchthon’s expertise as a Greek philologist is an important contribution to the reformatory movement since it attests to the reformatory movement in humanism.Melanchthon, Philip(p)9
2.2. MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p)’s exegetical principles in his Loci in light of the “New PerspectiveNew Perspective”
In his interpretation of Pauline texts, such as Phil 3, MelanchthonMelanchthon, Philip(p) is in his Loci strongly influenced by a “Lutheran hermeneutics.” Melanchthon approaches his reading of Phil 3 through the lenses of the theologoumenon of justification by focusing his interpretation on lex, gratia and iustificatio as key terms. Even if Melanchthon is concise regarding matters of Greek philology, he tends to narrow Pauline thinking to the concept of justification. The suspicion regarding the paradigmatic of a “Lutheran readingLutheran reading of Paul,” raised by the representatives of the “New PerspectiveNew Perspective,” seem to be legitimate – it even applies to Melanchthon’s exegesis of Pauline texts.
Nevertheless, the NPP-critique of a “Lutheran Paul” that was dominating Protestant exegesis and its preunderstanding of Pauline texts in the sense of a “Western reading” falls much too short. This becomes evident in two points:
(1) The critique of the “Lutheran Paul” as articulated by the representatives of the NPP is not new. It is rather typical of protestant theology – in line with Lutheran tradition – to question its dogmatic and hermeneutical framework constantly. One of these selfSelbst, self, selfhood-critical debates took place in 1916 between Wilhelm BoussetBousset, Wilhelm (1865-1920) and Paul Wernle (1872-1939). Bousset – in his refutation of Wernle’s critical remarks about Bousset’s monograph “Kyrios Christos” – raised the issue of to what extent protestant theology as a hermeneutical key can legitimately lead Pauline exegesis.Gefühl(e)Bousset, Wilhelm1 As Bousset and Wernle, as well as all subsequent protestant theologians, are diverse interpreters of Paul and LutherLuther, Martin, the history of (protestant self-)critique still continues. Likewise, Ed P. Sanders and Krister StendahlStendahl, Krister have formulated their critique of previous Lutheran theologians and their approaches to Pauline exegesis.
Today we have to continuously work out how we can further develop our research perspective on Paul and Pauline reception history up to the reformation period and its impact on modern Paulinism. The task of interpreting LutherLuther, Martin and Paul is per definitionem infinite. Rudolf BultmannBultmann, Rudolf, who was himself frequently under suspicion as a representative of the so-called “Lutheran Paul,”2 was quite sensitive of the various dilemmas of the Paul-and-Luther-reception. Bultmann himself pointed out how Luther’s interpretation of Pauline texts does not only provide helpful insights into the interpretation of Paul’s letter-writing but also tends to narrow or even conceal Pauline thinking:Bultmann, RudolfLuther, Martin3 Before judging about Luther’s reading of Paul, we have to work on an appropriate understanding of Luther. The “Lutheran