After that there was another meeting in the coach of Keitel, who was then Chief of the OKW, and in the course of this meeting Keitel summarized and commented on the general political directives issued by Ribbentrop. He then mentioned several possible solutions for the handling of the Polish problem from the point of view of foreign policy—this can happen, or something else can happen; it is quite possible. In this connection he said:
“You, Canaris, have to promote an uprising with the aid of the Ukrainian organizations which are working with you and which have the same objectives, namely, the Poles and the Jews.”
And then a third discussion, or rather, a very brief remark at the end of a very short conversation between the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Canaris was made in connection with this subject, after the intention had been made quite clear. It was about how the uprising was to be carried out and what was to happen. I remember this so well, because he demanded that the farm houses must burn. Canaris discussed the matter with me in detail later on and referred to this remark.
That is what happened, as I have described it. This was the sequence: Directives from the High Command to Keitel; then passed on by Keitel to Canaris at this meeting; then repeated to Canaris in the form of a remark which I remember so well because it contained the words about farm houses in flames, which is rather an unusual thing to say.
THE PRESIDENT: It would assist the Tribunal if one question at a time were asked and if the witnesses would answer “yes” or “no” to the question asked, and explain, if they must, afterwards. But questions and answers should be put as shortly as possible and only one question should be asked at a time.
DR. SAUTER: Now, witness, something else has struck me.
THE PRESIDENT: You heard what I said did you? Do you understand it?
DR. SAUTER: [Continuing.] Yesterday you said that these remarks of Ribbentrop are not in the diary, if I understood you correctly.
LAHOUSEN: No, this is not from the diary but has a connection with Canaris’ diary, by means of which I can make this remark.
DR. SAUTER: You said yesterday that this remark struck you as being rather surprising.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: And today you said that General Blaskowitz also made some striking statements. You also mentioned, however, that these statements of Blaskowitz were not entered in the diary.
LAHOUSEN: No.
DR. SAUTER: Now, it occurs to me—and I would like you to answer this question: Why, if this remark of the Defendant Ribbentrop surprised you, was it not entered in the diary?
LAHOUSEN: Regarding Blaskowitz, I have to say—or rather—repeat the following:
I said that I did not hear the Blaskowitz matter mentioned in this connection during the meeting, and I cannot assume that this subject came up concurrently, otherwise it would have been entered in these notes. It may be, of course, that the Blaskowitz matter was discussed at a time when I was not there. I have only put down what I heard or what Canaris told me to enter in the record.
DR. SAUTER: But did you yourself hear that from Ribbentrop?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, but the substance was not altered. Whether one speaks of extermination, elimination, or the burning of farms, they all amount to terroristic measures.
DR. SAUTER: Did Von Ribbentrop really talk of killing Jews? Are you sure you remember that?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I definitely remember that, because Canaris talked not only to me, but also to others in Vienna about this matter and called me time and again as a witness.
DR. SAUTER: You heard that too?
LAHOUSEN: That did not settle the matter, but these words of Ribbentrop’s were frequently discussed.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, something else. You have told us about murderous designs on which you or your department or other officers were employed or which you were charged to carry out. Did you report these to any police station as the law required? May I point out that according to German law failure to report intended crimes is punishable with imprisonment or in serious cases with death.
LAHOUSEN: Well, when you talk about German law, I cannot follow you. I am not a lawyer, but just an ordinary man.
DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, that is also punishable according to Austrian law.
LAHOUSEN: At that time Austrian law, as far as I know, was no longer valid.
DR. SAUTER: In other words, you never reported the intended crime, either as a private person or as an official?
LAHOUSEN: I should have had to make a great many reports—about 100,000 projected murders, of which I knew and could not help but know. You can read about them in the records—and about shootings and the like—of which of necessity I had knowledge, whether I wanted to know or not, because, unfortunately, I was in the midst of it.
DR. SAUTER: It is not a matter of shootings which had taken place and could no longer be prevented, but rather a matter of intended murder at a time when perhaps it could have been prevented.
LAHOUSEN: I can only answer: Why did the person who received this order at first hand not do the same thing? Why did he not denounce Hitler for instance?
DR. SAUTER: You, as a general of the German Wehrmacht, should have asked Hitler . . .
LAHOUSEN: I am sorry, you overestimate my rank, I had only been a general in the German Wehrmacht since the first of January 1945, that is, only for 4 months. At that time I was lieutenant colonel and later colonel of the General Staff, not in the General Staff.
DR. SAUTER: But in 1938, immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria, you at once made a request to be taken into the German Wehrmacht by Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: I did not make a request, and I did not have to do this. Wherever I was in the service, I was known for my special services. I was not a stranger. With the knowledge of the Austrian Government and also, in a restricted sense, with the knowledge of the German authorities (that is, of certain persons) I was working for the Austrian Government in a matter which exclusively concerned things outside the scope of Austrian internal policy. I co-operated with the Wehrmacht, as well as with the Italian and Hungarian Governments with the knowledge of the Austrian Government and the competent authorities. There were matters of politics which were not my domain.
DR. SAUTER: But I believe, Witness, your memory deceives you, because immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria, you called on the General Staff in Berlin and there you tried to get a commission in the German Wehrmacht, and you now deny this. You also filled in and signed a questionnaire, in which you declared your complete allegiance to the Greater German Reich and to Adolf Hitler; and shortly afterwards you took the oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, I did it just as everybody else who was in the position of being transferred from one office and capacity to another.
DR. SAUTER: Before, you said you did not apply for this appointment, and I have information to the contrary: That you, in the company of two or three other officers were the first to go to Berlin with the sole purpose of asking the Chief of the German General Staff Beck to take you into the German Army.
LAHOUSEN: I am very glad that you mention this subject, because it allows me to make my position perfectly clear. It was not necessary for me to make an application for my future position in the German Wehrmacht. I was known because of my military activities, just as any military attaché is known in the country where he is accredited.
Moreover, I can easily explain why my rise in office was so rapid. I have said that my activities and my co-operation with the Austrian Military Intelligence Service, which were not determined by me but by my superior Austrian office, were at that time directed against the neighboring country of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was the country that was next on