DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel is anxious that I should put the question to you, whether, when this order for the bombing of Warsaw was made known he did not stress the fact that this was to be put into effect only if the fortress of Warsaw did not surrender after the demand made by the bearer of the flag of truce, and even then only after an opportunity to evacuate the city had been given to the civilian population and the diplomats.
LAHOUSEN: I cannot recall the precise words he used but according to my knowledge of the situation at that time it is quite possible, indeed probable, that the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, did make this remark.
DR. NELTE: Do you know that the Commander-in-Chief of the army at that time, Von Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, before the Polish War began, categorically objected to the use of Gestapo and SD Kommandos, maintaining that these were unbearable in the Wehrmacht, and in this connection asked for Hitler’s concurrence and received it?
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not know that, and could not have known it because of my subordinate position at that time. Please do not overrate the importance of my position at that time.
DR. NELTE: As we are also concerned here with taking cognizance of a document, which, I take it, was transmitted to all departments and sections of the OKW, I thought you might remember. They were the so-called directives, were they not? And these directives, mentioned in connection with the campaign against Poland, in contrast to what happened later . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think you were going a little bit too fast.
DR. NELTE: I said that in connection with these military actions, the decrees and directives were always transmitted to the various offices of the OKW in the form of carbon copies—I mean the offices which were in any way concerned. I thought, therefore . . .
LAHOUSEN: Yes, but these were things which did not concern my particular department, I stress the word “particular,” I did not even see them.
DR. NELTE: As later on in the conversation you were drawn into the discussion on these questions—it is true you did stress that you did not know the actual wording of the orders . . .
LAHOUSEN: Orders which I did not see and read. Of course, I knew a great many things, because I came to hear of them.
DR. NELTE: For that reason, I want to ask you whether you recall that the Gestapo and SD had interfered behind the advance in connection with Poland, contrary to the intentions expressed in the orders of the military leaders?
LAHOUSEN: I cannot recall that today. I can only refer to what I heard and what is recorded in the files on this matter, namely, the remark of Hitler’s, which was passed down by Keitel, who was chief at that time, and which was to the effect, that if the armed forces objected to these measures, the armed forces as well as the high command—that is apparently what you mean—would have to put up with it if the Gestapo and the SS went ahead with these things. That is all I can tell you. I know that because I was present at these discussions.
DR. NELTE: During this conversation, were you not told that General Blaskowitz—in other words, the Army—had made a complaint about the methods of the SS and the SD?
LAHOUSEN: Whether or not this question was brought up at this conference, I cannot recall. I can hardly assume that it was brought up, because otherwise this question would have been recorded in the notes of that conference, particularly since the complaint came from General Blaskowitz, whose attitude in such matters was quite clear and well known. But apart from this conversation in the Führer’s train, I do recall something about the matter just mentioned, that is, the objections raised by Blaskowitz. I cannot say today how these objections were made, whether in writing or by word of mouth, neither do I know the occasion on which they were made. While I do remember the substance of the matter, I cannot recall whether it came up for discussion at the meeting where I was present.
DR. NELTE: What appears to me to be important in this matter, is the fact that the Wehrmacht, the troops, really did protest, or at least refused . . .
LAHOUSEN: That the Armed Forces did object, is, of course, quite evident.
DR. NELTE: That is what I wanted to know. Who gave the order . . .
LAHOUSEN: One moment, please. When I say “the Armed Forces,” I mean the masses of common soldiers, the ordinary simple men. Of course, there were in these Armed Forces other men whom I wish to exclude. I do not wish to be misunderstood. The concept “Armed Forces” does not include everybody, but it does include the mass of simple men with natural feelings.
DR. NELTE: When using the term “Wehrmacht” I only wanted to bring out the contrast between the broad masses of the soldiers and the SS and SD, and I think we are agreed on this.
LAHOUSEN: I think we have ample and fairly conclusive proof of this contract in the conditions prevailing and the methods used at that time, which in that form and scope were then for the first time shown openly enough to become apparent to the broad masses of the Wehrmacht—quite apart from anything I can say about it in this short, extremely short exposition.
DR. NELTE: Who gave the order regarding the collaboration with the Ukrainian group? You spoke yesterday . . .
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have to go back somewhat farther. First of all I must say that this group was composed of citizens from various countries, that is, Hungarians, Czechs, and afterwards Polish citizens, who because of their attitude of opposition, had emigrated or gone to Germany. I cannot say who gave the order for the collaboration, because at the time when these things happened—it was some time back, I remember quite clearly it was in 1938 or even earlier—I was not even working in the Amt Ausland Abwehr and was not in touch with the Department, which I did not take over until the beginning of 1939. It was already on a firm footing when I took it over.
In this connection I must add, since it was also touched upon yesterday, that these Ukrainians, at least the majority of them, had no ties whatsoever with Germany. I can say definitely that a large proportion of these people with whom the Amt Ausland Abwehr had contact at that time were in German concentration camps, and that some of these people were fighting for their country in Soviet partisan groups. That is a fact.
DR. NELTE: Did Admiral Canaris not tell you that the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, when informed by the SS of the demand for Polish uniforms and military equipment, had given the clear order that the Abteilung Abwehr should have nothing to do with this game?
LAHOUSEN: As I stated yesterday, this matter was handled very mysteriously and secretly also in our circle. Not only myself, but the others also, knew absolutely nothing about the game which was being played until after it actually happened. The War Diary of the Department makes this very clear. It records that one day, quite suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, a demand was received, by order of Canaris, for so and so many uniforms for an undertaking known as “Himmler”. My amazement and my enquiry as to how Himmler came to have anything to do with an undertaking which required Polish uniforms is also recorded in the War Diary, not by me, but by the officer who kept this diary. In reply I was merely told that these articles of equipment would be picked up by a certain person on a certain day, and no further explanation was given. And there the matter ended. Of course, when the name of Himmler was mentioned, besides being mysterious, the thing immediately began to appear suspicious to us. By us, I mean everybody who had to do with it in the course of his duty, right down to the ordinary sergeant, who, of course, had to procure these uniforms by some means or other and deliver them to a certain Hauptsturmführer SS—the name is recorded in the War Diary. These people had their misgivings. That was a thing which could not be forbidden.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday you also made statements about the treatment of prisoners of war. In what way was Abwehr II concerned with prisoner-of-war questions?
LAHOUSEN: That is quite simple. Abwehr II was naturally very interested in an objective way that prisoners of war should be treated as well and as decently as possible, and the same applies to any intelligence service in the world. That was