THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I have before me now the order of the Tribunal of 26 February 1946, and Paragraph 4 of that order is in the following terms: “The following documents are denied as irrelevant,” and then the heading “Göring,” and the fourth of the documents is the speech by Paul Boncour on 8 April 1927; and the sixth is the speech by Lloyd George on 7 November 1927, which you have not read but which you have put into your trial brief. I would again call your attention, and the attention of all the Defense Counsel, to the fact that they will not be allowed to read any document which has been denied by the Tribunal. Go on.
DR. STAHMER: This quotation is as follows:
“. . . but it is also clear that if a world power such as France, by virtue of her sovereignty, can decide upon concluding military alliances of such vast proportions without having misgivings on account of existing treaties, another world power like Germany has at least the right to safeguard the protection of the entire Reich territory by re-establishing within her own borders the natural rights of a sovereign power which are granted all peoples.”
Before I take up the question of aggressive war in detail I have the intention, if I have the permission of the Tribunal, to call on the first witness, General of the Air Force Bodenschatz.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
[The witness Karl Bodenschatz took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
KARL BODENSCHATZ (Witness): Karl Bodenschatz.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. STAHMER: General Bodenschatz, since when have you known Reich Marshal Göring?
BODENSCHATZ: I have known Reich Marshal Göring since June 1918.
DR. STAHMER: In what capacity did you get to know him?
BODENSCHATZ: I came to know him when he was the commander of the Richthofen Squadron. I was at that time the adjutant of Rittmeister Freiherr von Richthofen who had just been killed in action.
DR. STAHMER: Were you taken into the Reichswehr at the end of the first World War?
BODENSCHATZ: At the end of the first World War I was taken into the Reichswehr as a regular officer and remained from the year 1919 until April 1933.
DR. STAHMER: When, after the completion of the World War, did you resume your connection with Göring?
BODENSCHATZ: In November 1918 I was with Göring at Aschaffenburg, at the demobilization of the Richthofen Fighter Squadron, and later in the spring of 1919 I was with him again for several weeks in Berlin. There our paths separated. Then I met Göring for the first time again at his first wedding, and I believe that was in the year 1919 or 1920. I cannot remember exactly. Up to 1929 there was no connection between us. In the year 1929, and until 1933, I met Hermann Göring several times here in Nuremberg where I was a company commander in Infantry Regiment 21. My meetings with Göring here in Nuremberg were solely for the purpose of keeping up the old friendship.
DR. STAHMER: And then in the year 1939, you entered the Luftwaffe?
BODENSCHATZ; In 1933 I reported to Hermann Göring in Berlin. At that time, Göring was Reich Commissioner of the Luftwaffe and I became his military adjutant.
DR. STAHMER: How long did you retain this post as adjutant?
BODENSCHATZ: I retained this post as adjutant until the year 1938. Later I became Chief of the Ministerial Bureau, 1938.
DR. STAHMER: And what position did you have during the war?
BODENSCHATZ: During the war, I was liaison officer between the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and the Führer’s headquarters.
DR. STAHMER: Were you at the headquarters, or where?
BODENSCHATZ: I was alternately at the Führer’s headquarters and at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe.
DR. STAHMER: When did you leave that position?
BODENSCHATZ: I left that position on 20 July 1944, because I was seriously wounded that day.
DR. STAHMER: And what was the cause of your being wounded?
BODENSCHATZ: The plot against Hitler.
DR. STAHMER: You were present?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: And what were your tasks at the Führer’s headquarters?
BODENSCHATZ: It was my duty in the Führer’s headquarters to report on special events, special matters, inquiries, and desires of the Reich Marshal if he were absent, and to transmit them. I also had to transmit inquiries from the Führer’s headquarters direct to Hermann Göring. Then I had to inform Hermann Göring early, that is, not through official channels, regarding all that took place in the Führer’s headquarters insofar as it was of interest to him in his capacity as Reich Marshal.
DR. STAHMER: Did you take part regularly in the conferences?
BODENSCHATZ: I was a listener at these conferences.
DR. STAHMER: From what time onwards did Reich Marshal Göring lose his influence with Hitler?
BODENSCHATZ: According to my personal opinion and conviction, Hermann Göring began to lose influence with Hitler in the spring of 1943.
DR. STAHMER: And what were the reasons?
BODENSCHATZ: That was the beginning of large-scale air attacks by night by the R.A.F. on German towns, and from that moment there were differences of opinion between Hitler and Göring which became more serious as time went on. Even though Göring made tremendous efforts, he could not recapture his influence with the Führer to the same extent as before. The outward symptoms of this waning influence were the following:
First, the Führer criticized Göring most severely. Secondly, the eternal conversations between Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring became shorter, less frequent, and finally ceased altogether. Thirdly, as far as important conferences were concerned, the Reich Marshal was not called in. Fourthly, during the last months and weeks the tension between Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring increased to such a degree that he was finally arrested.
DR. STAHMER: Do you know anything about this arrest? What was the cause?
BODENSCHATZ: I have no exact information about it. I can only tell you what I heard. I was at that time in Bad Reichenhall in the military hospital. I merely heard that Reich Marshal Göring had sent a telegram to the Führer, and in this telegram Göring requested that, since the Führer no longer had freedom of action, he might act himself. As the result of this telegram, which was sent by wireless to Berlin, the arrest took place. I would like to emphasize that I only heard that. I have no proof of any of these statements.
DR. STAHMER: And who made the arrest?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot tell you about that because I know nothing. I heard, however, that a Kommando of the SS from Obersalzberg made the arrest.
DR. STAHMER: Did Field Marshal Göring have any previous knowledge of the incidents against the Jews which took place during the night of 9 to 10 November 1938?
BODENSCHATZ: Göring had no previous knowledge of these incidents. I inferred that from his demeanor—how he acted towards me with regard to these incidents. He acted in the following manner: When he heard of these happenings he was dismayed and condemned them. A few days later he went with proof to the Führer and complained about the people who had instigated these incidents. Captain Wiedemann, the adjutant of the Führer, can give you further