Moreover, it is certainly not obvious that the laws and constants that we have observed on Earth are equally applicable throughout the Universe. Many of these laws and constants have been extensively tested and measured empirically on Earth and within our Solar System. The theories of which they are part are normally presumed to apply everywhere. And, generally, there is nothing in the theories that would suggest otherwise. However, as we shall see, we currently know that many laws of our observable macro-world (like Newton’s laws of motion) as well as many of our maxims of common sense do not apply at very small scales, the so-called quantum world. The world of the atom is some ten orders of magnitude smaller than our observable world. The Universe is estimated to be some 14 orders of magnitude larger than our Solar System. See, e.g., Alexander Unzicker and Sheilla Jones, Bankrupting Physics: How Today’s Top Scientists Are Gambling Away Their Credibility (2013), pp.57, 60–68.38 How can we be sure that the same Laws apply to the very large scale phenomena, when they do not apply to the very small scale?
Indeed, one of the great discoveries of Einstein was that Newton’s Laws of Motion would not accurately describe the behavior of bodies everywhere in the Universe. Einstein’s theory of General Relativity has wider application than Newton’s Laws, covering a broader set of circumstances, most of which are quite remote from our own experiences. “[F]ar out in space lie environments differing hugely from our own. We should not be surprised that commonsense notions break down over vast cosmic distances, or at high speeds [approaching the speed of light], or when gravity is strong.” Rees, Just Six Numbers, p.37.
Even if one does not use the word Law, there are interesting questions as to whether our perception of regularities and rules may simply be an illusion (that possibility does not seem very likely, since the existence of regularities within the portions of the Universe we can observe seem beyond dispute) or whether our speculation that there are laws reflects a misinterpretation of the evidence (for example, these regularities could be a mere coincidence of our rather small part of the Universe). See, e.g., Barrow, Theories of Everything, pp.24–26.
These issues obviously become important when one gets to astrophysics and cosmology. However, it is not clear to me that our understanding of the world we can perceive with our senses is enhanced by the issues that arise in connection with theories about the Universe. For example, suppose that we were able fully to set out the rules that govern physical phenomena in our temporal and spatial location (say for the 2 billion years on either side of now and in the space that is within 5 billion light years of Earth). Such “rules” might not be “Laws,” because they might not apply to the very beginning and end of the Universe or across the vastness of space, but they would undoubtedly be highly useful to us in our world and would seem to constitute a pretty successful scientific achievement. The same comments apply to the assumed “constants of nature.”
To the cosmologist, it matters greatly whether these constants always were and always will be the same. For most of us, however, the conditions at the ends of the Universe—both temporal and spatial—may not be of very much concern.
Endnotes
1 Perhaps one could fashion an “understanding” of the natural world based upon the existence of patterns and regularities, without introducing causality. At a minimum, it seems clear that science could not have arisen if the Universe had not been characterized by regularities and constants. (Actually, forget science. Life as we know it could not have existed without such regularities.) And, perhaps mere recognition of the existence of regularities or patterns would have sufficed for purposes of survival. But, I think that normal conception of understanding implies causal explanations—e.g., at least, why there are regularities that make certain events predictable.
2 Arkes, citing writings by Professors Lewis White Beck and Jeffrie Murphy, describes this argument as asserting “the most decisive part of Kant’s answer to Hume: viz., that Hume’s own argument becomes intelligible only on the basis of Kant’s understanding.” Id. Hume is discussed in some detail below.
3 Some current research has indicated that the human mind is “hard-wired” with modules that are suitable for quite specific purposes. We may be born with “domains of intuitive knowledge” that govern particular areas of cognition. Both the facility for and the resulting structure of language seem to be of such a nature. Certain models that arise in psychology, biology and physics may also be intuitive. Adam Frank, About Time (2012), pp.7–8. It has even been suggested that the evolution of the processes for moving information among the modules gave rise to analogy and metaphor, thereby boosting human creativity. Id. We return to some of these ideas in more detail in a later chapter.
4 A different but related point is that the senses necessarily restrict and the mind necessarily simplifies and orders the information received—if such restrictions and simplifications did not exist, a person would be reduced to helpless confusion by the unmanageable, overwhelming volume of data received. As Professor Barrow wrote, “The mind is the most effective algorithmic compressor of information that we have so far encountered in Nature. It reduces complex sequences of sense data to simple abbreviated forms which permit the existence of thought and memory. The natural limits that nature imposes upon the sensitivity of our eyes and ears prevent us from being overloaded with information about the world.” Theories of Everything, p.11.
5 This analogy of a theory being like a pair of spectacles suggests another point of relevance to the discussion here. As with a pair of spectacles, it is difficult to look at a theory (the spectacles) and through it at the same time. See Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding (1961), p.101. So we face a challenge in our efforts to understand science because the theories that constitute an integral part of that science shape not just our understanding of the science but also the vocabulary with which we discuss it. See also, Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity, p.199.
6 A similar line of thinking gave rise to a substantial debate among philosophers of science, under the heading of “incommensurability.” See, e.g., Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), pp.147–50, 170–73; Paul Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism,” in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), Scientific Explanation, Space and Time (1962) at pp.28–97. Kuhn argued that the new paradigms, following each revolution, were not directly comparable to the prior theories because the concepts, as well as the vocabulary, were different. Feyerabend asserted that the conceptual incompatibility of successive theories created a conservative bias favoring the existing theories, partly because the development of a new theory generally required a new way of thinking and of seeing. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories” (revised March 5, 2013).
7 “Scientific” theories generally fall into one of four major and ostensibly different patterns of explanation: (i) the deductive model in which the event to be explained is a logically (mathematically) necessary consequence of the explanatory premises; (ii) probabilistic relationships, which often resemble deductive models but include statistical premises; (iii) teleological or functional explanations, which identify the functions or role played by various agents in events and (iv) “genetic” explanations in which phenomena emerge from the events preceding them. See Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (1961), pp.20–26.
8 Rudolph Carnap described the deductive construction of the logician as “a skeleton of a language rather than a language proper, i.e., one capable of describing facts. It becomes a factual language only if supplemented by descriptive signs.” “Foundations of Logic and Mathematics,” International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (1939), No. 3, p.32. He also quoted Einstein as saying, “So far as the theorems of mathematics are about reality they are not certain;