Limits of Science?. John E. Beerbower. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: John E. Beerbower
Издательство: Ingram
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Жанр произведения: Математика
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isbn: 9781499903645
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not because of a new theory’s closer relationship to reality, but because of factors inherent in the human mind or arising through society and culture. For example, it is possible that the feeling of revelation occurs when a proffered theory happens to support or vindicate a prejudice or bias that one already has based upon emotional grounds or subconscious perception of self-interest.34

      A somewhat different theory about the nature and source of scientific insight postulates that the human mind is wired to respond to certain types of logic and structure, so that some of secrets of the Universe are part of our very physical being. Therefore, as scientific thinking more closely approaches the underlying structures of the Universe, we respond with recognition. This type of explanation occurs sometimes in connection with logic and mathematics, and it has been used by some mathematicians to explain the appeal and forcefulness of mathematics.

      One interesting inference from this line of thought is that, perhaps, there is some part of a reality in the Universe that is reflected or embodied in the human mind, so that our search for understanding can and does or, at least, tends to lead us toward the truth and that that process can be pursued through thought as opposed to (or, in addition to) observation and experimentation.35 This embodiment could be, for example, the result of the inherent structure of the mind, as part of the Universe, or as an adaptive development, occurring by chance (or otherwise) and enhancing the survival of the species.

      In contrast, on the other hand, it is possible that the pervasive role of the workings of the mind and mental constructs in our efforts to comprehend our physical environment inevitably intrude into or “taint” the process so that we will always see some of ourselves in any structure that we can create to model the Universe, even if such forms do not really exist in the universe being modeled. Admittedly, these thoughts are pretty speculative.

      Biological limits to understanding?

      A contrasting, but equally speculative argument would assert that the human mind evolved to meet the needs presented by its environment and that one cannot, therefore, expect man to have the capabilities to understand phenomena that were completely irrelevant to man’s ability to reproduce and survive. Thus, it may be that there are inherent limitations on our ability to comprehend the Universe beyond our parochial niche. I quote various well-known scientists speculating as to some such limitations in the Introduction.

      This pessimistic view is strongly opposed by David Deutsch, who asserts, with no actual support, that man’s ability to continue to expand his knowledge of the broader universe is unlimited. He responds to the supposed evolutionist’s reasoning in particular by arguing that “the reach of human adaptations does have a different character from that of all other adaptations in the biosphere. The ability to create and use explanatory knowledge gives people a power to transform nature which is ultimately not limited by parochial factors … .” The Beginning of Infinity, p.56. He observes that the evolution of culture and knowledge occurs much more rapidly and with much broader reach than biological evolution. A good illustration of man’s ability to transcend the formative influences of his biosphere and biochemistry is his demonstrated ability to survive in environments that are inhospitable to human life (or, even, to any life as we know it) such as the Moon.

      Of course, Deutsch cannot prove that man’s mind has the capability ultimately to understand everything in the Universe. There could be relationships or facts that simply cannot be grasped by mankind because of physical characteristics of the brain. Cf. id., pp.60–61. In other words, we do not and cannot know. After all, as Deutsch repeatedly asserts, that yet to be discovered is currently unknowable. See, e.g., id., pp.193, 197.

      Cultural limits to understanding?

      In addition, and certainly more corrosive to the classic view of scientific methodology, it may be that science in a fundamental sense is inherently culturally or species based, with only a tenuous or, even, coincidental connection to truth. It may be that our efforts to create theories that provide explanations tend more to reinforce cultural prejudices or simply to reflect the structure and operations of our minds than to uncover objective truths. This critique of science resonates with doctrines that emerged and flourished in the last third of the twentieth century in areas ranging from law to literature to political theory, as well as to philosophy and ethics, and to investigations that explore moral and cultural relativism and questioned the existence of objective truths and fundamental values.

      An example might help make the underlying point that science is at least influenced by culture. Certain propositions set forth or assumed in such theories are often called scientific laws. Such “[a] law is not a cause; yet it is more than merely a description. It is true because it is beautiful and simple; yet it is never quite true at all.” Gleick, Introduction, in Feynman, The Character of Physical Law (1994), p.ix. It has been argued that the progress of science in the Western civilizations was facilitated by the Judeo-Christian tradition which made the concept of notion of laws nature available to the Western mind, as an expected implication of a Supreme Being. For example, the concept of God as the Lawgiver can be said to imply natural laws that have been dictated by Him. Barrow, Theories of Everything, pp.12–13, 27. Perhaps, a pantheistic or holistic Eastern religious tradition would not only not have suggested the existence of laws of nature, but could be viewed as inconsistent with the existence of such laws.

      The Laws of Nature

      I have not focused so far on the concept of Natural Laws or Laws of Nature in the discussion above (although, I do come back to certain issues related to the so-called Laws latter). It seems to me to be of more interest to explore the concept of causality without that traditional baggage. A related and perhaps more typical form in which to present the philosophical questions at issue here is to ask: Are there invariable Laws of Nature and, if so, what are they? This approach, however, presents a variety of controversies that do not seem to me to be necessary for the undertaking here and seem to present a potentially significant diversion, with attendant distractions.

      The Laws of Nature, if they exist, have been assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science to be constant and unchanging both in space (throughout the Universe) and in time (over billions of years). In addition, the Laws of Nature are assumed to incorporate or be based upon certain “constants” of nature that also do not change in space or in time (like the speed of light, the gravitational constant, etc.). See Barrow, The Constants of Nature (2003). The assertion is made that “[i]n fact, it is not logically possible for all the Laws of Nature to be changing. Either there are no laws at all or there are invariant laws.” Barrow, Theories of Everything, p.27.36 This statement, however, turns on the definition of Law, so it is essentially circular and almost vacuous.

      Indeed, not all scientists have accepted the assumption that the Laws of Nature are constant and eternal. Theoretical physicist Lee Smolin unambiguously asserts (with no evidence) that physical laws have evolved and will continue to evolve through time. Time Reborn: From the Crisis of Physics to the Future of the Universe (2013), p.xxv. He claims a long tradition for this view, providing quotations from Paul Dirac, John Archibald Wheeler and Richard Feynman that at least acknowledge the possibility that the Laws of Nature change and, perhaps, evolve.37 Similar points can be made about the supposed “constants” of nature, the numerical values of the constant factors contained in many natural laws which we shall discuss below—things like G (the gravitational constant), c (the speed of light) and h (the Planck constant). The laws of nature often set forth an algebraic relationship between two entities that includes a constant factor that is assumed to be the same for all examples, regardless of when or where they might be found.

      There are other types of constants as well, numerical ones. “The laws of science, as we know them at present, contain many fundamental numbers, like the size of the electric charge of the electron and the ratio of the masses of the proton and the electron. We cannot, at the moment at least, predict the values of these numbers from theory—we have to find them by observation… .” Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time, p.125. In other words, the theories do not generate the numerical values of the constants; the