Thus, each admiral made air power the cornerstone of his strategy. Admiral Andrews intended to fight at sea only within range of his air support and Admiral Kalbfus intended to destroy his foe’s air power before confronting him at sea.
Fleet Problem XX commenced at 0600, 20 February 1939.
No contacts were made on the 20th.
The 21st was a gray day, and the wind blew sprinkling black squalls across a choppy, slate-colored sea. Despite the bad weather, Admiral Andrews’ scout cruisers managed to launch float planes, and several of the reconnaissance aircraft located the lead White ships and got off contact reports before being shot down by an angry swarm of chunky fighters from the Lexington. The Black cruisers sped eastward to try to regain contact with the enemy.
Meanwhile, throughout the morning, White planes from the Enterprise and Yorktown flew strike missions in search of the Ranger, the Black fleet’s only carrier, disdaining the cruiser targets scouting below. As Vice Admiral King, unhappy at the tight leash thus far held on his carriers by Admiral Kalbfus, gladly ordered his fliers: “Black carrier will be the primary objective for all attacks.” But King’s men could not find the Ranger, which was lurking to the west and north.
Soon three of the Black scout cruisers, the Northampton, Salt Lake City, and Pensacola, sighted the White convoy at long range. They were promptly taken under fire by three matching White heavy cruisers of the escort, the San Francisco, Quincy, and Tuscaloosa, and a running battle developed, with the Black ships firing at long range while dodging in and out of rain squalls. Then seventy-two Yorktown planes, returning in dark humor from the futile search for the Ranger, found the Northampton and Pensacola and bombed the twisting, firing cruisers, sinking both. The Salt Lake City, damaged in the gun battles, ran out of the dripping shelter of a squall in an attempt to circle the White cruisers and get in some distant shots at the convoy; but the San Francisco headed her off, and Salt Lake City was sunk by gunfire. The remainder of the scout cruisers also fared badly. Enterprise and Lexington planes sank the Philadelphia and Savannah and heavily damaged the Brooklyn and Nashville.
Admiral Andrews, learning of the massacre of his scouts, decided to send the Ranger after the White convoy, then reconsidered. He could not send one carrier against three. The Ranger was directed to come north, and the White convoy reached Green unharmed. The cost of overturning the Monroe Doctrine was three White heavy cruisers damaged and 39 carrier aircraft lost.
The ordeal of the picket cruisers showed that the airplane had deprived the modern cruiser of its traditional functions in naval warfare, scouting and quick thrusts against the enemy’s line of communications; more than the battleship, whose guns could still prove useful for shore bombardment and antiaircraft defense, the cruiser was obsolescent.
Despite his early successes, Admiral Kalbfus understood that in order to secure Green he must defeat the Black fleet and establish an advanced base in the Puerto Rico-Virgin Islands region from which to support future operations in the Western Hemisphere. But he knew that he could not achieve either objective until his forces destroyed Black shore-based aviation. Thus, on the 22nd, White submarines poked about the bays and inlets of the Puerto Rican coast, looking for the Black aircraft tenders. A landing party from the submarine Salmon discovered that with the Black fleet out at sea the tenders and patrol planes were vulnerable. The White force destroyermen then conceived of a series of hit-and-run raids designed to reduce Black air strength.
Four ships of Destroyer Division 3 running close offshore of the Leeward Islands were nearly overlooked by Black patrol bombers searching for larger ships in deeper waters; when they were sighted, lowering clouds and slow pilot reactions prevented successful attacks. At 0256 on the morning of the 23rd, Drayton and Flusser sneaked into Culebra harbor past the somnolent picket destroyer Hopkins. Inside, the two destroyers sank the small tenders Sandpiper and Lapwing with torpedoes and gunfire and shot up four of the moored PBYs. The Hopkins tried to intervene, but the four-stacker was no match for the modern ships and she went down in an unlucky thirteen minutes.
The two destroyers went on to San Juan, Flusser to attack, Drayton to cover her. Two Black guardships were patrolling outside the entrance to the harbor; the Flusser steamed boldly for the channel and tried to slide between the split defenders, but in the increasing daylight, one of the ships sighted her and winked out a challenge. Flusser cleverly flashed the same challenge to the second enemy ship, got the correct response in return, then flashed it out to her own inquisitor. But daylight meant planes. Soon, the Flusser was attacked by a patrol of Marine scout bombers and fighters and was damaged. In the harbor, she attacked a tender and an oiler, but hit neither. She then wandered into a minefield and was ruled sunk. Outside, the Drayton, wearing a false bow number, deceived one Black ship, but was attacked by the second picket ship, Elliot, damaged in a running fight, and finally finished off by the Marine dive bombers and stubby fighters.
Fleet Problem XX—the Lexington, Ranger, Yorktown, and Enterprise
The other two destroyers of DesDiv 3, Lamson and Mahan, found no tenders at St. Thomas, so went on to San Juan to see if the hunting was better there; it was, but the quarry was now alert and snarling as a result of the earlier attacks and the coming of daylight. Both destroyers were sunk off San Juan by the Marine planes and the two picket ships.
The destroyers had fought well, doing some damage and creating much confusion in the enemy camp; but all four were sunk, and they had wrecked but four of the patrol planes. Such dramatic sorties were too dangerous in the age of the airplane. Although some of the destroyermen insisted that the surprise factor would make hit-and-run tactics valuable in war, there could be no surprise in waters dominated by enemy planes.
On the morning of the 23rd, Admiral Kalbfus told Ernie King what his fliers were waiting to hear: it was up to them to take out the Black air force. So the Lexington and Enterprise and their plane-guard destroyers formed up in an independent task force with three heavy cruisers and seven destroyers and steamed toward “Indian country.”
To help the impending air strikes, two destroyers were detached from the carrier task force on the 24th to try another raid on the Black seaplanes and tenders. One of the raiders, the Cushing, entered San Juan harbor at 0220 on the 25th, and discovered six ships and thirty-six patrol bombers asleep. The Cushing found too much cold meat on her table, tried to devour everything, and in eating indiscriminately deprived herself of the choicest fare. She fired torpedoes at three of the ships and brought five others and the planes under fire in a wild half-hour of reckless fighting; then she bumped a dummy mine and sank. The Cushing had damaged several of the ships, but she did not get any of the vital patrol planes. The Preston searched St. Thomas and Culebra vainly, then investigated off San Juan, where she was caught unawares by the Elliot, torpedoed, then finished off by gunfire.
Meanwhile, several of the White submarines scouting off Puerto Rico were damaged in attacks by the now more vigilant Black PBYs, and one was sunk. But off San Juan, the Perch torpedoed and sank the Reuben James, which was listlessly patrolling the harbor entrance. Thereafter, Black destroyers were ordered to maintain speed and zigzag when on patrol.
Admiral King meanwhile decided to strike the Black patrol plane bases with aircraft off the Enterprise, while planes from the Lexington searched for the Black fleet’s lone carrier, the Ranger. But his plan necessitated shifting a Lexington scout bomber squadron to the Enterprise in exchange for the Enterprise fighter squadron; the plane trade would increase the power and scope