The pivotal role of naval air power and carrier aviation in Fleet Problem XX strongly suggests that the peacetime Navy was far from indifferent to the uses of aircraft, as is too often alleged. Airplanes and carriers existed, and like it or not, officers had to take account of them and use them, or risk failure in a highly competitive profession; most did, and thus carrier task forces were used offensively and imaginatively in the training operations of the thirties and crews of all types of ships gained precious experience in working with carriers and a better understanding of the virtues and limitations of aircraft. Consequently, some of the early, crucial carrier battles of the Pacific War, such as Midway, were managed successfully by men who were not aviators. The efficient carrier operations of the early Pacific War were not mere frantic improvisations following upon the defeat of the battle fleet at Pearl Harbor; they were the merited legacy of the doctrines and techniques of carrier warfare generated by the training exercises of the thirtiesb
Throughout the exercise, the battleships had been tucked away in the positions of greatest security; hence, their antiaircraft potential was wasted. The airplane by ruling out long-range scouting by ships, was making the cruiser obsolete. The increasing size and augmented fighting power of destroyers was working toward the same end, as the minor action of the Conyngham and Reid against two heavy cruisers suggested. As the battles off the Solomons in the Pacific War showed, the cruiser was vulnerable to aircraft in daytime and not a match for destroyers at night or in confined waters.
Submarines lacked the speed to function effectively against major warships in the open sea; they were rarely able to achieve a favorable attack position. And as a result of training against large fleets of warships, submarine tactics grew too cautious, and since the submariners got no experience in attacking slow, vulnerable merchant convoys, they were largely untrained for their natural role in combat, a war on commerce; tactically, emphasis was on concealing the periscope and generally avoiding discovery rather than on attack tactics. Night surface tactics were unknown. These deficiencies, perhaps almost as much as the well-known inadequacies of torpedo performance, were responsible for the spotty record of the submarine service in the early period of the Pacific War, when the submariners struggled to create doctrine in a combat different from their training.
The destroyers were at their best in daring operations, such as the hit-and-run raids on the Black harbors, or the torpedo attack on the White battle line on the 27th. In more prosaic work, such as picket duty, they sometimes performed indifferently; the loss of the Reuben James was inexcusable. The antisubmarine escorts were ineffective not only because the high-speed operations with heavy warships both fouled the sonar gear with noise and made submarine attack less likely, but also because of the inexperience of the sonar men. As the Babbitt’s skipper observed, “Right now the sonic material is probably far in advance of the experience of the average listening personnel on destroyers.”6
Both the Problem and Flex 5 indicated the dire need for fleet auxiliaries. There being no tankers, destroyers had constantly to scurry to and from San Juan and St. Thomas, carrying oil to the ships at sea. The lack of cargo ships, transports, and specialized amphibious command vessels marred the Flex practices.
Flex 5 exposed other old weaknesses, such as the need for modern assault craft, tank lighters, and efficient ship-to-shore communications. It also illustrated the lack of killing power of current naval gunfire techniques. But what Admiral Johnson remembered best was the fighters strafing low over the vulnerable boats of the assault Marines. He wrote, “It is in fact doubtful if any beach landing, other than a night surprise, can succeed in the face of enemy air control.”7 Flex 5 reinforced the lessons of the Fleet Problem as to the need for bases in the Caribbean and the importance of aviation as the first defense against hostile landings on the southern approaches to the United States.
Thus, Fleet Problem XX, besides starting President Roosevelt down the long, winding road leading to the Destroyers-for-Bases transaction with Great Britain, symbolized the increasing significance of the Atlantic and Caribbean in American defense planning, and held a mirror to war to help thoughtful sailors better prepare their service for the uncertain future.
After remaining in the Caribbean for a time, the fleet settled into East Coast ports preparatory to concentrating for a majestic review in New York Harbor on 29 April 1939. The Pacific sailors looked forward to an imposing liberty in New York City.
Meanwhile, Admiral Johnson was writing a plea for more modern ships for the Atlantic Squadron, one soon to be heeded by the President:
Over and above the shore based aircraft which can be relied upon to turn back a hostile raid at the beaches, there is the larger problem of our naval power in the Atlantic. Even though we plan to guard against no more than a temporary raid, our Atlantic defenses must include naval ships numerous and fast enough to locate the raiders. A ready squadron sufficient to scout the passes into the Caribbean and sea areas adjacent thereto is the minimum force necessary to implement the oldest and most fundamental of our foreign policies, the defense of the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine.8
But the State Department, worried about Japanese intentions in the Far East during the fleet’s sojourn in the Atlantic, prevailed upon the President to order the abrupt return of Battle Force and Scouting Force to the Pacific. The news “surprised officers and men alike.” On the 26th and 27th of April, most of the Pacific ships, except those refitting and resupplying, steamed grimly out to sea. The fleet review of the 29th was thus of much diminished grandeur. Nevertheless, the Texas, the old battleships of Battle Division 5 and the four-stackers of Destroyer Squadron 10 looked bright and trim as they proudly led the other ships past the Battery into the green swells of the Hudson.
Probably as a result of Fleet Problem XX and Admiral Johnson’s report, the President decided to retain a carrier, the Ranger, in the Atlantic, along with the heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 7 (the San Francisco, Quincy, Vincennes, Tuscaloosa) and four modern destroyers, but to send the light cruisers of CruDiv 9 and CruDiv 8 to the Pacific; and two squadrons of patrol bombers from the Pacific were added to Patrol Wing 5 in the Atlantic. Thus, the Atlantic Squadron was substantially strengthened in the year of the outbreak of war in Europe.9
In ensuing days, the remainder of the Pacific ships steamed away, while the vessels of the Atlantic Squadron stayed behind to work at what seemed lesser tasks in safer waters. It was an old story to the Atlantic sailors. And it endured until they shaped a tradition of prideful legends out of the muted battles of their own rough, chill ocean.
a In order to avoid diplomatic complications, Trinidad served as the coast of Brazil.
b I suspect that a study of administrative history would support the operational evidence that the fliers were hardly a scorned and oppressed minority in the peacetime Navy, their visions ruthlessly dissipated by reactionary gunners in high places. Aside from the fact that the distinction between aviators and sailors with experience in or with aviation became increasingly blurred as many officers underwent flight training, or served in carrier crews, or served in ships operating with carriers, the Navy’s cumbersome, decentralized system of administration did not permit any one faction, even the Gun Club, completely to dominate the decision-making process. Amid the numerous independent fiefdoms of the Department, consensus was essential to get anything done. The decentralized machine of administration required much “grease”—personal pacts, compromises, horse trades—to function; as did the political system of the nation it existed to defend, it responded to internal pressures, lobbies, and interest groups. The fliers received recognition and appropriations commensurate with their ability to use political leverage inside the system; and since their ability was not inconsiderable, they did not have to resort to the unseemly publicity that marred the Army-Air Corps relationship. Such a system of administration by “genial conspiracy” rather than by executive fiat involved duplication of effort on the part of separate commands and bureaus, delay in reaching decisions, and then more delay in making certain that decisions attained were faithfully implemented by those who felt that the inevitable compromise had been achieved too much at their expense. Yet it also permitted factions to ride their own hobby horses and carry out projects of interest to no one else,