Meanwhile, in the spring of 1938, in order to test the implications of the new Atlantic ingredient in American strategy, President Roosevelt had decided that the U.S. Fleet should visit the East Coast the following winter and that the annual Fleet Problem, which had invariably taken place in the Pacific, should be conducted in the Caribbean early in 1939. The Fleet’s presence in the Atlantic could be ascribed to ceremonies related to the opening of the New York World’s Fair. For once, a Flower Show proved useful.12
That fall, 1938, in anticipation of the Munich Agreement, which Roosevelt thought shameful,c the President directed Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations, to speed up the reconditioning of the World War I destroyers reposing in “red lead” rows at Philadelphia and San Diego. After inquiring into the status of new construction on the East Coast, the President then ordered the formation of a temporary squadron of new cruisers in the Atlantic. He made it clear that these ships were to function independently of Training Detachment; they were to constitute a separate task force reserved for operational use. The task force was to be given an identity of its own: the Atlantic Squadron.13
The Atlantic Squadron was born on 6 September 1938. It was allotted fourteen new ships, and its mission was to serve as a task force strong enough to “discover and to turn back a sudden raid into the Caribbean” pending reinforcements from the Pacific. Three of its cruisers were to be held in readiness to show the flag in Latin America. The Squadron consisted of Cruiser Division 9 (the light cruisers Boise, Honolulu, and Phoenix), Cruiser Division 8 (the quick-firing, 10,000-ton light cruisers Philadelphia, Savannah, Brooklyn, and Nashville, which were favorites of the President), and the destroyers Sampson, Somers, Warrington, Ralph Talbot, Mugford, Helm, and Shaw.14 Since 1932 all new construction ships had been sent to the Pacific as a matter of routine, so Rear Admiral Sherwoode A. Taffinder, Director of the Ship Movements Division, wrote one of the cruiser commanders to explain his surprising assignment and perhaps to assure him that a command in the Atlantic was not evidence of official disfavor: “. . . the function of the Atlantic Squadron . . . is evidently a gesture aimed at political conditions abroad. The President personally directed the formation of the Squadron.”15
But Rear Admiral Johnson was vexed to discover the sudden appearance of an independent task force in his domain, especially as command of the Squadron, now the key post in the Atlantic, had been given to an officer junior to him, Rear Admiral Ford A. Todd, of CruDiv 8. Admiral Leahy coolly, if untruthfully, had to explain that the oversight was due to the speedy nature of the President’s decision. Roosevelt then agreed to honor the mandate of seniority, and on 10 October, the old battleships and destroyers of Training Detachment became part of the Atlantic Squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Alfred W. Johnson. While Johnson lacked the youth and fire that the President relished, he knew his ships and was not indifferent to progressive techniques of naval warfare.16 He would do.
Fleet Problem XX was slated for the Caribbean, and the Squadron was to participate. The ugly ducklings of Training Detachment had become part of a fighting command at last. It was a good feeling.
a New Bedford’s seafarers turned out 5,000 strong one day to see the Leary; in comparison, New York City had produced a maximum crowd of 3,000 to see the Texas a few weeks before.
b Congressman Donald O’Toole thought the Brooklyn Navy Yard should get more repair work because New York City contributed “more financially to the support of the Navy in the way of taxation” than other coastal regions.
c At the time of Munich, FDR was prepared to impound German ships in U.S. ports for Allied use.
3. A Mirror to War: Fleet Problem XX
IN KEEPING WITH THE NEW TREND of strategic thought, Fleet Problem XX was to be a comparatively realistic exercise in hemispheric defense. Its basic assumptions were these: A Fascist-led revolt had taken place in a friendly South American nation, Green (Brazil). While the United States (Black) tried to rally support for the legitimate government of Green, the rebels, fearing American intervention, requested the protection of a powerful European Fascist nation, White (Germany). Anxious to secure a base in the Americas from which to menace the Panama Canal and extend its influence in Latin America, the White government decided to assist the revolt with military advisers, aircraft, and modern arms. The White fleet sortied, escorting a supply convoy to the New World. In response, Black transferred part of its split main fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic to reinforce the Atlantic Squadron and intercept White’s force.
The Black fleet was commanded by Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, 59 years old, somewhat pompous, intelligent and flexible, but perhaps too long a staff officer. His force consisted of 6 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 32 destroyers, and 15 auxiliaries, mostly aviation tenders. The backbone of his air power was the carrier Ranger with 54 light bombers and 18 fighters; for long-range scouting and strikes he had 102 shore-based patrol bombers; 62 land-based Marine scout bombers and fighters rounded out his air force.
The Black fleet steamed at sea off Puerto Rico, as Admiral Andrews did not have a large anchorage to accommodate his force and was reluctant to disperse ships in several harbors or in a close blockade of Green lest the separate elements be defeated in detail by the concentrated enemy force.a Andrews reasoned that the White fleet, not the convoy, was his proper objective, for even if the White supplies allowed the rebels to gain control of Green, the permanence of their rule must depend on the ability of White sea power to keep open the lines of communication to Germany. Andrews’ decision, while technically sound, was politically flawed, for it meant that the rebels would be given time to solidify their position in Green, blurring the distinction between internal revolution and external aggression, thus making it more difficult for the United States to justify intervention.
However, Admiral Andrews had scant choice. Lacking air bases in the southern Caribbean, he had to use ships, not planes, to scout for the enemy convoy. Hence, the radius and effectiveness of his search must be limited. He sent a scouting line of 7 cruisers, backed by the Ranger, out to seek the White convoy and hopefully direct the Ranger’s planes to it; but the Ranger could not be risked in too close support of the cruisers because of the uncertain whereabouts of the White fleet’s three aircraft carriers.
Lack of sea and air bases in the Caribbean limited Admiral Andrews to a defensive strategy. He kept his fleet off Puerto Rico, protected by his shore-based aviation. His plan was to engage the White fleet in a decisive, daylight surface battle when the enemy passed within range of his land-based air power.
The White fleet was commanded by Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, an experienced, conventional battleship officer. He had a force of 6 battleships, more modern than those of his adversary, 6 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 31 destroyers, 13 submarines, and the auxiliary Utah, which simulated the White convoy. His air power consisted of the carriers Enterprise, Lexington, and Yorktown, with 72 light bombers, 54 torpedo planes, 36 torpedo-bombers, and 54 fighters.
Admiral Kalbfus’ intention was to escort the convoy to Green while keeping his main battle fleet well beyond a 600-mile circle out from the Black air bases on Puerto Rico and Haiti. The convoy and its escort were protected by one carrier in close support and by a second carrier astern; farther back were