*BVIII mountings as in Lord Nelson.
In 1902, after Watts had been appointed DNC, the question of battleship design came under complete reconsideration. The next set of designs were intended to meet the requirements of a new policy aimed at initiating battleship types having a definite superiority over foreign designs rather than merely matching developments abroad. A large number of drawings embodying many variations in armament, protection and speed were considered in an endeavour to combine all essentials on a minimum displacement and cost. In conjunction, the Controller, Admiral Sir William May, instigated exhaustive investigations into the relative efficiency of the armament and protection provided in various battleship types. These indicated:
1. The destructive effect of secondary guns was very small in relation to that of the main armament.
2. Damage caused by heavy projectiles was so extensive that the more lightly protected secondary armament was likely to be destroyed before it got within its effective range.
3. Heavier armour was required over a much larger area than had previously been customary.
The outcome of these findings was a design that should have been put in hand for the 1903 Programme, but the Board instead decided to build three more King Edward VIIs and defer the new type until the following year. The 1904 ships were to have four 12in and twelve 9.2in, but by the time construction started the secondary armament had been reduced to ten as a result of constraints imposed by the docking facilities then available and the consequent limitation on beam. The two ships, Lord Nelson and Agamemnon, were to represent the end of the short-lived mixed calibre type in British battleship construction.
A major impetus to the evolution of the all-big-gun battleship came in 1904 with the appointment of Admiral Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord. While CinC Mediterranean Fleet, he had kept in close contact with developments in gunnery and torpedoes, and fully appreciated the necessity for armament changes to meet the requirements of increasing battle ranges. In conjunction with the Chief Constructor at Malta dockyard, W. H. Gard, he conceived the principles on which Dreadnought would eventually emerge – HMS ‘Untakeable’. Subsequently, as CinC Portsmouth, with Gard as Chief Constructor there, he prepared a series of all-big-gun designs, aided by advice from Alexander Gracie (Managing Director of Fairfield shipyard) on machinery and boilers.
LORD NELSON
Outboard profile and plan, October 1908
In the summer of 1902, Fisher had been considerably impressed by arguments put forward by Armstrong at Elswick in favour of the 10in gun; a new pattern of this calibre promised a very high rate of fire, and more of them could be carried on a given displacement than the standard battleship big gun, the 12in. Armstrong put forward a number of designs, the most interesting of which had been submitted in October 1902 and provided for eight 10in and twenty 6in, with a speed of 20 knots on a 17,000-ton displacement. These ideas coincided with Fisher’s. Examining the sketches, he eliminated the 6in battery in favour of a design mounting sixteen 10in, so arranged that ten could fire ahead, astern or on either beam. Fisher circulated the design to three officers who were later to serve on the Design Committee for Dreadnought: Captain R. H. S. Bacon, Captain H. B. Jackson and Captain C. E. Madden. They expressed a preference for a lesser number of 12in guns: the larger calibre shell would be more destructive in effect, and fire control would be simpler with fewer turrets.
In parallel with these developments, a more public discussion centred upon an article in the 1903 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships by the celebrated Italian naval constructor, Vittorio Cuniberti. His proposal, ‘An Ideal Battleship for the British Fleet’, mounted a main armament of twelve 12in guns in four twin and four single turrets, on a displacement of 17,000 tons and with a speed of 24 knots. (The turret arrangement in Fisher’s plan, of which no records have survived, is thought to have been similar.) And, on the other side of the Atlantic, views about the need for a one-calibre armament were being propounded by Lieutenant-Commander William Sims of the US Navy.
In the Admiralty itself, the design discussions for the Lord Nelson class in 1903–4 had produced two similar ideas. Philip Watts had revived a design concept dating back to 1882, when, in conjunction with Fisher, he had attempted to combine the best attributes of Devastation (1874) and Inflexible (1881). This proposed eight 12in guns in four twin turrets, one forward and one aft on the centreline, one on each beam amidships, echeloned. Meanwhile, the Assistant DNC, J. H. Narbeth, had put forward a plan that appears to have been similar to Fisher’s ideas in 1900: twelve 12in guns mounted in six twin turrets, one forward and one aft on the centreline, with two on each beam amidships. In view of the radical increase in size and cost implicit in these proposals, they were not taken up; but the scene was now set for Fisher to bring the all-big-gun battleship into reality.
Lord Nelson, 1911. Last of the British pre-dreadnoughts and the first British battleship for which Philip Watts, as DNC, was entirely responsible.
Specifically, the dreadnought type had its origins in these considerations:
1. The menace of the torpedo with its increasing range and accuracy made imperative longer battle ranges to over 3,000 yards.
2. Long-range hitting had become practicable with the introduction of satisfactory rangefinding instruments. Since 1899, shooting in the Mediterranean Fleet had indicated that, with efficient fire control, it might be possible to secure hits at 8,000 yards or over.
3. Effective fire control at ranges over 5,000 yards called for salvoes by eight or more guns of equal calibre, a large group of splashes being easy to observe. When the splashes straddled the target, the exact range could be determined.
4. The 12in gun combined destructive effect and accuracy to a degree that considerably outweighed the faster rate of fire of intermediate calibres, especially at long ranges. During the Russo-Japanese War, reports received by British Intelligence in May 1904 concerning actions fought by the Japanese off Port Arthur, Chemulpo (and, later, in the Gulf of Pechili) stressed the importance of long-range hitting and the substantially greater effect of 12in guns compared with 8in and under. Reports received after the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905 (after Dreadnought’s design had been approved) confirmed these findings.
5. A superior speed afforded important strategic and tactical advantages, especially when backed by superiority in armament. In the 1901 British fleet manoeuvres, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, a strong advocate of line-ahead formation and broadside firing, had utilized a speed advantage to envelope the head of the opposing line and concentrate the full weight of his force’s broadside to this. (In May 1905, similar tactics were used by Admiral Togo against a much slower Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima.)
6. The development of ‘all-big-gun’ ships abroad. Early in 1904, while CinC Portsmouth, Fisher had learned that designs had been worked out in the USA for a ship with a speed of 18.5 knots, carrying eight 12in guns on a displacement of 16,000 tons. The US Navy had tried unsuccessfully to increase these figures to ten 12in on 19,000 tons, but this had been thought too ambitious. (Construction of two ships to this design, Michigan and South Carolina, were to be authorized in 1905, at the same time as Dreadnought, but would not enter service until three years after