2. Ten 12in guns in five centreline twin turrets, two forward and three aft, arranged as in the first design, but the upper turret in the forward group was suppressed and the after turret was lowered one deck level. This too was rejected for similar reasons, and for being even less economical than the first design (needing more armour in the turret areas).
3. Twelve 12in guns in six twin turrets, three forward and three aft. Two turrets in each group were disposed abeam, with the third on the centreline above and between them. This was a modification of the first design although reduced in size and cost, yet providing a compromise of broadside and end-on fire. This design was rejected because of the distinct disadvantages of the beam turrets in respect of blast and seaworthiness; there was also the possibility of total disablement of a group of turrets because of their close proximity.
4. The Design ‘D’ series proved very interesting, calling for displacements ranging from 19,000 to 21,000 tons. The first sketch sported twelve 12in guns in six twin turrets, all on one (upper deck) level. Two turrets were centreline, one forward and one aft. The other four were abeam, two on each side and well spaced. This design, thought to coincide with Fisher’s original plan begun at Malta in 1900 and completed at Portsmouth in 1904, was similar to a proposal put forward by the Assistant DNC, J. H. Narbeth, during 1903–4 as an alternative to the Lord Nelson. The design was rejected because of its low freeboard and restricted arcs of fire caused by blast interference between turrets.
5. Twelve 12in guns arranged as in Design 4, but with the forward turret on a raised forecastle deck and the beam turrets placed closer together (Design ‘D1’). This was rejected on grounds of blast interference and turrets too closely spaced.
6. Design ‘D2’ was similar, with twelve 12in guns, although the beam turrets were even more widely spaced than before. This again was rejected because of the restricted arcs of beam and after turrets, relatively low percentage of broadside fire, and excessive size and cost.
A graph showing blast curves indicated that the only arrangement giving better results than ‘D2’ would be the substitution of a single centreline turret for the after pair of beam turrets, and this plan, which reduced displacement to 17,850 tons, had been approved by Rear-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg and was finally accepted on 13 January 1905. The final design was ‘H1’, mounting ten 12in guns in five twin turrets: three on the centreline (one forward on a raised forecastle, one amidships and one aft, all on upper deck level). The other two were disposed one on each beam amidships on the upper deck. This arrangement allowed a nominal ahead and astern fire of six guns with a broadside of eight and, although inferior to all of the centreline superfiring plans, provided a high percentage of all-round fire, and was generally conceded to represent the best compromise of the various wing and centreline proposals. With one turret less, the broadside was the same as in the 12-gun designs while, next to four, eight guns were considered the best workable unit for fire-control purposes.
After the 1914–18 war Sir Philip Watts implied, in a paper written for the Institute of Naval Architects, that the final armament plan for Dreadnought was developed along different lines, and that only four stages were needed to arrive at the final layout. He said that the six-turret, all centreline superfiring design was the first and then, reducing the upper turrets in each group produced the second layout. A further modification of the turrets resulted in the third stage, with the final layout showing the superfiring turrets brought down to the upper deck amidships, one on each beam and one amidships aft on the centreline. However, the majority of accounts (including the Ship’s Covers and Dreadnought’s Book) refer to a considerably greater number of alternatives discussed by the Committee, with eight basic designs and many variations considered (see Tables).
The main feature of Dreadnought was her all-big gun armament (12in) with nothing smaller as all battleships built before her (9.2in and 7.5in etc to support a usual 4 × 12in). The two views here show some of her crew posing for a photograph (note the ship’s cat on the gun) and across her deck looking aft whilst at battle practice (cleared for action) 1907.
The completed ship was fitted with the same mountings (BVIII) as those in the Lord Nelson class and allowed ahead fire for the beam turrets, the forecastle sides being well recessed for this purpose. In practice, however, they could not be fired within approximately 10° of the axial line for fear of blast damage to the superstructure. Direct astern fire from these amidships turrets was precluded for the same reason. The fore turret was set farther back than usual and, as a result of the high forecastle, had a considerably higher command than in preceding classes, the guns being carried approximately 6ft 6in and 4ft 6in higher than in the King Edward and Lord Nelson classes respectively.
When Dreadnought arrived in Portsmouth harbour after her acceptance trials in 1906 there was a huge rush of local press and commercial photographers taking to small boats in a bid to capture her image and show the public the new addition to their fleet. This over-exposure continued right up until the appearance of the Bellerophon class. A close-up of Dreadnought showing her bridge and forward 12in guns taken by Mr Ernest Hopkins, 1908.
The secondary armament consisted of twenty-eight 18cwt 12pdrs, an increase of four over Lord Nelson, the guns being much more widely spread than in that ship so as to reduce the risk of simultaneous disablement and to ensure, as far as possible, that some would remain operable during the closing stages of an action when a torpedo attack was considered to be especially probable. At the time it was believed that the unprotected quick-firing guns, widely dispersed in the open, stood a better chance of survival than if closely grouped together in a battery, even if light armour protection was allocated. The detachable mounts on the forecastle and quarterdeck, which enabled the guns to be lowered below deck when not in use, was a novel feature adopted after experiments had shown that they suffered badly from blast from the main armament.
Because of the ever-increasing size of destroyers, the 3pdrs were abandoned, and retention of the 12pdr, which had been the Royal Navy’s principal anti-torpedo gun for the last ten years, was subjected to severe criticism. All reports from British Naval observers with the Japanese fleet during the Russo-Japanese War had emphasized the ineffectiveness of the 12pdr and recommended that nothing smaller than 4.7in could be considered adequate. The provision for nothing heavier than the 12pdr in Dreadnought appears to have been largely due to a current report that it was not actually essential to sink attacking destroyers, provided they could be stopped or put out of action before coming into range.
The Committee considered that the new 18cwt 12pdr was quite sufficient for this purpose, and that twenty of them would be more effective than fourteen 4in quick-firing pieces which represented an equivalent weight. However, a substantial body of opinion, which included the former DNC, Sir William White, stated that the 12pdr had become quite inadequate and that a heavier calibre was required. Without the benefit of foresight the Admiralty were unable to see that this was, in fact, quite true, although