1. Safety (stability, structural strength, etc.)
2. Potential foreign opponents
3. Time and cost
4. Docking facilities.
On any design committee would sit not only constructors but ship’s officers, engineers, ordnance experts, dockyard controllers and other specialist personnel experienced in warship construction. Each participant would be given a hearing and all opinions taken into consideration. This procedure meant more often than not that some essential features of the design could not necessarily be reconciled with others, and compromises would have to be reached, sacrifices being made in an endeavour to achieve a balance that would suit all the members of the committee. In most cases, this resulted in an ‘ideal’ warship being marred, usually because of the constant displacement restriction that was always of prime concern. Faced with innumerable problems, the British constructors not only came up with adequate designs, but more often than not with innovatory ideas that placed British ships well ahead of their rivals.
The British capital ship was expected to go anywhere and to operate as effectively in the Pacific Ocean as in the North Sea. Furthermore, they were expected to counter effectively any challenge from foreign navies, all of whose ships had differing features: the devotion to compartmentation and heavy armour plating of the German Navy; the prime importance of machinery and speed in Italian ships; and the ‘one-off’ experimental types of the French and Russians, which usually followed current trends in naval architecture and had no homogeneity among their respective fleets. Abroad, there was a strong tendency to design ships for the waters in which they would serve, and for the majority of powers, this meant home waters. The British warship, however, had to be a compromise of all these features and still be able to bring any antagonist to battle without being outclassed.
Builders
Ten yards were responsible for the construction of the battleships and battlecruisers that served in the Royal Navy during the First World War.
Armstrong An engineering firm founded in 1847, and a constructor of warships since 1882; in 1897 took over the firm of Joseph Whitworth; main yards at Elswick and Walker on the Tyne; other factories included ammunition works at Scotswood on the Tyne, Erith Engineering Works and an ordnance factory at Pozzuoli, near Naples.
Beardmore Warship constructors since the beginning of the twentieth century; also armour and ordnance manufacturers; yard at Dalmuir.
John Brown Sheffield steelworks; initially supplier of plates for warships; took over Thompson Shipyard on the upper Clyde in 1897 to become John Brown Construction Co.
Cammell Laird William Laird & Son were constructors in the 1840s of some of the very earliest iron vessels; became large warship builders from 1885; amalgamated with Charles Cammell Co., steel manufacturers of Sheffield, in 1903; yard at Birkenhead.
Devonport H.M. Dockyard, Devonport; warship construction here began in the last decades of the eighteenth century; the last battleship built here was Royal Oak, completed in May 1916.
Hercules at the Fleet Review, Spithead, in July 1914. This photograph was taken from the Royal Yacht by Mr Stephen Cribb, the official photographer.
Fairfield Founded 1864 by John Elder and Charles Randolph; 1869 carried on by W. Pierce and became Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. in 1885; constructors of machinery, merchant ships and warships of all sizes; yard at Govan on the Clyde.
Harland & Wolff E. J. Harland bought Robert Hickson & Co. in 1859, and was joined by G.W.Wolff two years later; builders of great liners and merchant vessels as well as major warships; yard at Belfast.
Palmer Founded 1852; built early iron warships including Defence, Triumph and Swiftsure in the 1860s; yard at Jarrow on the Tyne.
Portsmouth H.M. Dockyard, Portsmouth, the oldest of the Royal dockyards; major dry dock facilities, repair shops, etc., as well as construction yards; the last battleship built there was Royal Sovereign, which was completed in May 1916.
Scotts Founded in 1711; builders of cargo vessels, then turned to marine engineering in 1823; began warship construction in 1849 at Greenoch.
Thames Iron Works Warship builders since the beginning of the nineteenth century; constructed Warrior, the first iron-hulled sea-going warship in 1859; yard at Blackwall; the firm went into liquidation in 1912 on completion of Thunderer, which was the last major warship to be built on the Thames.
Vickers Originally a steel firm, based in Sheffield; amalgamated with Maxim in 1883 and began the manufacture of guns; subsequently manufacturer of warships, weapons, ammunition and aircraft; yard at Barrow in Furness.
Armament
The primary raison d’être of a battleship or battlecruiser was to carry her armament and use it successfully against an enemy. The change from mixed calibres to an all-big-gunned ship in 1906 (as described on page 20) certainly brought no shortage of problems. Dreadnought adopted an echelon system of turret layout, with one turret forward and one aft, one amidships and one staggered on each beam, port and starboard. At the time, however, many authorities still looked upon the mixed calibre as the better method of arming a battleship, and hailed the Lord Nelson class as the final answer. There was indeed something to be said for mixed calibres: the most telling argument in favour of including a weapon of approximately 9.2in calibre (as in the Lord Nelson and King Edward VII classes) was the effective amount of metal that could be thrown per minute compared with fewer numbers of 12in guns:
Marlborough looking aft from the forecastle showing forward 13.5in turrets and bridgework, summer 1914.
If the smaller gun could be judged by these figures, the discharge at any given time would have been more than half as much more metal than from the 12in. It was inevitable that those who considered the 9.2in battery ought not to have been abandoned could strengthen their argument with facts such as these. Moreover, although Dreadnought carried ten big guns, she could fire only eight on either broadside because of the disposition of her echelon turrets.
Such deficiencies in the design were outweighed by the advantage gained in fitting all large-calibre guns – a necessity given the greatly increased ranges at which engagements were now being fought as shown by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. The call for a main armament of eight or more guns of uniform heavy calibre was prompted by the need for maximum destructive effect and to facilitate long-range fire control by means of salvo firing and spotting the fall of shot.
The adverse criticism of those opposed to the new system did not deter the other major naval powers from following Britain’s lead, and all but the USA gave their early dreadnoughts the echelon fashion of mounting the big guns. The main armaments of the early dreadnoughts, both British and German, were adequate for the job and there was little to choose between them. But when the Queen Elizabeth class with their 15in guns were constructed, the lead in firepower and turret technology went to the Royal Navy. In fact, this gun and turret arrangement of four guns forward and four aft became ‘standard’ fitting for many successive warships.
Little good can be said of the British secondary batteries, which plainly lacked the punch required of them; they most certainly were not on a par with their German and French counterparts. From Dreadnought to the King George V class of 1910, the secondary battery of 4in guns was the subject