Similar to Eclipse Memorandum No. 9, the air forces’ plan recognized the possibility that sufficient Allied forces personnel might not be available to guard every Luftwaffe establishment to effect direct control over war matériel. Thus, German Air Force commanders were to be held responsible to ensure Allied orders regarding such materiel and its inventory were followed.
The memorandum expected that USAAF and RAF air disarmament staffs would be in position behind advancing Allied forces and thus ensure that Luftwaffe units located within the area of advance were properly disarmed. It also specified that a “Reconnaissance Party” provided by both the US and British control councils would be sent to the Air Ministry and that other elements would go to various Luftwaffe headquarters to compel compliance with the terms of surrender, if required. Specific tasks of these units were set out in an appendix to the memorandum and two other attachments contained organizational diagrams of the respective US and RAF disarmament organizations.
The third memorandum of this group, Eclipse Memorandum No. 11 covering naval disarmament, was the briefest, at only two pages.79 It accepted the responsibility for disarming all German warships and merchant vessels, delegating the actual exercise of that responsibility to US, British, and Allied naval officers-in-charge in the areas under their control in accordance with instructions laid out in the SHAEF Military Occupation Handbook. In addition, it followed the line of responsibility for disarming naval forces ashore found in Eclipse Memorandum No. 9.
Section III of Eclipse Memorandum No. 9 addressed naval demolition and stated that the demolition of naval defenses in Germany, which included submarine pens, fortifications, and underground storages, to name a few, would most likely not take place during the supreme commander’s period of responsibility. Such demolitions, it indicated, would be carried out as part of a long-term policy by the ACC.
The last key disarmament memorandum, Eclipse Memorandum No. 17, “Disbandment of German Armed Forces,” was put into operation on 9 May 1945, the day after Germany surrendered.80 This memorandum laid down the policies by which army group commanders were to carry out the disbandment of the German armed forces. Like many of the other memos, this memo began by stipulating that it was impossible to forecast conditions in Germany when the war ended. It therefore posited several assumptions upon which the plan was based, the essence of which was that Allied forces would have penetrated deep into Germany by the time hostilities ended and that those German forces not already in POW camps would have been moved into containment areas under the control of their own officers working under close Allied supervision.
Additional assumptions were that those Germans eligible for discharge would be released with as little delay as possible to avoid large-scale desertions. Furthermore, it was believed that it would take as many as six months before the occupation armies were fully deployed in their respective zones.
While various memoranda and documents dealing with the anticipated surrender maintained that the German military machine was needed to effect the terms of surrender and control the surrendered German forces, the plans of Eclipse Memorandum No. 17 were designed not to utilize German machinery in the discharge process if it could be avoided.81 The discharge of captured and surrendered German forces would begin when directed by the supreme commander but would first be subject to the manpower needs of the Allied forces to assist in the occupation and to the manpower needs of the governments of Allied or liberated territories for purposes of reconstruction.
The remainder of the memorandum outlined very specific principles and responsibilities regarding the discharge process, including a very detailed set of statistical procedures by which members of the German armed forces were to be documented and prioritized for discharge. These procedures included the transfer of personnel who had been recruited in a different zone of occupation, non-German personnel, stragglers, deserters, and members of the German National Militia (Volksturm). Part II of this memorandum dealt specifically with the discharge of members of the Waffen SS and paramilitary organizations.
Shortly after this memorandum was issued, General Barker, now assistant chief of staff (G-1, Personnel Division) for SHAEF, wrote General Morgan, SHAEF’s assistant chief of staff, that the memo lacked both a “clear definition of the object to be obtained” and “practical guidance to the recipients.” With regard to the first omission, General Barker wrote that he would have a paper prepared that would provide a foreword or opening statement to explain the purpose of the disbandment procedure. Regarding the second issue, Barker felt that disbandment had been more than adequately covered in the occupation handbook and that the Eclipse memo was merely an extension of the handbook.82
Barker’s memo also stated that he did not believe SHAEF would be confronted with a shortage of guards as there were, on the US side alone, sixty divisions in the field.83 He also felt that the surrendered German forces would not have to be heavily guarded, believing that “from the German point of view, the advantages of obeying orders . . . under this plan, exceeded the disadvantages.”84
That said, Barker did think that the memo offered a “systematic and efficient procedure” for implementing the disbandment under any of the various conditions that might arise. Furthermore, he added, the statistical and documentation procedures had been thoroughly considered by commanders and appeared to meet the needs of the zone commanders and SHAEF. The only difficulty with the documentation issue, he concluded, was the vastness of its scope.
Despite promulgation of the Appreciation and Outline Plan for Operation Eclipse in November of 1944, Memorandum No. 10 (air force disarmament) had not been completed or issued as of 31 January 1945. On 1 February, Lieutenant General Morgan directed that all memoranda that had not yet been issued be completed and that those issued be revised or amended by 10 February.85 These memoranda were subsequently completed and approved on 10 March 1945 and disseminated to the appropriate commands for action.86 The first four months of 1945 saw accelerated progress in the development and issuance of additional Eclipse memos and directives, including memorandum nos. 10, 11, and 17, and the Interim Directive for Occupation of Germany.87
Demobilizing and Disbanding the German Armed Forces
More than a year before the final surrender of Germany, SHAEF’s G-3 (Operations Division) gave a great deal of thought to the manner in which members of the German armed forces were to be demobilized. Many issues, such as what to do with non-German members of the German armed forces, where to send Germans for demobilization (particularly those who had been recruited in what was to become the Soviet zone of occupation), what demobilization papers would be needed and what form would they take, and other more mundane details, such as what pensions or gratuities would be provided and what articles of clothing and personal equipment would they be allowed to retain, all required decisions.88
For example, on 15 July 1944, a draft directive titled Disposition of German Armed Forces Subsequent to Surrender that covered all these issues and more was submitted by the planning committee of the US advisor to the EAC for consideration and for forwarding to the Department of State and the secretariat of the JCS. Among other things, the draft ordered the three Allied commanders in chief to implement the surrender terms and made them responsible for the demobilization and disbandment of German forces in their respective zones and theaters of operation, and it directed the dissolution of the OKW and the service commands at the earliest possible date, but authorized temporary retention of portions of those organizations in order to effect the controlled administration of the German armed forces during the demobilization and disbandment.
It further authorized the commanders in chief to keep and use disarmed German forces or POWs as required to accomplish tasks deemed necessary, such as the destruction of fortifications, rehabilitation projects, and safeguarding surrendered German armaments and equipment. In addition (and in line with the ultimate objective of totally demilitarizing Germany), the commanders in chief were directed to impress upon the German people the complete defeat of the German armed forces. Accordingly, demobilized German personnel would be allowed to return home with only their approved personal effects and enough money and supplies to make the journey. Under no circumstances were returnees to be allowed to return home in military