By mid-June, Colonel Grazebrook’s posthostilities subsection appeared to be fully engaged on several drafts dealing with the control and disposal of German forces, and on 9 July, planning for Operation Talisman formally began.59 The objectives of Talisman were, inter alia, to disarm the Germans in the West to prevent a resurgence of hostilities and to occupy strategic areas on the continent to enforce the terms of surrender, which was to be accomplished in three stages. A supplement to the outline plan concluded that the supreme commander’s first three responsibilities would be (1) disarming the German forces, (2) disposing of surrendered war materials in the short term, and (3) controlling the German forces through subordinate headquarters but not through the OKW.60
The plan encompassed a very narrow view of occupation and thus rejected responsibility for control of the German munitions industries, the disposal of enemy war matériel, and the disbandment of German forces.61 The planning directive condensed the scope of the operation and made several technical changes to the three stages of the operation. Additional functions and tasks were also added, including the partial demobilization of the German armed forces for use as labor. The directive also defined Talisman as “plans and preparations for operations in Europe (excluding Norway and the Channel Islands) in the event of German surrender. Operations in Europe will include the liberated countries until their indigenous governments are firmly established and in complete and independent control, and will include Germany until it is taken over by the Tripartite Military Government.”62
The Talisman outline plan was distributed as a planning directive on 13 August 1944 and had a number of significant changes, including the assignment of responsibilities to the major commands. It also redefined surrender as a “formal surrender signed by properly constituted German authorities, or the capitulation of the major portion of the German forces opposing the Allied Expeditionary Force.”63 In this latter case, the supreme commander would designate a date, to be known as A-Day, signifying the beginning of Talisman. Thus, the plan allowed more flexibility in that it could be implemented not only upon Germany’s official surrender, but at the discretion of the supreme commander should a significant portion of Germany’s forces surrender. In addition, the definition of German forces was expanded to include both paramilitary forces and the police, and a distinction was made between primary and complete disarmament and control of German forces.64
On 16 August 1944, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, commander of the 21st Army Group, were directed to initiate plans and preparations in the event of a German surrender, which was not expected before 1 September 1944.65 The main objectives of this operation were to (1) completely disarm and control all German forces within SCAEF’s area of responsibility, (2) enforce the terms of surrender, and (3) establish law and order.
To this end, both army groups were expected to plan and execute the operation in their AOR and to collaborate closely with one another. Appendices to the outline plan provided the estimated number of troops available to both commands between 1 August 1944 and 1 January 1945 as well as the number of troops required. General Bradley was informed that his army group would have a large surplus of forces that might be required by the British 21st Army Group. One week later, both commanders were given drafts of the Directive for Military Government of Germany for their concurrence.
In early September, however, Lieutenant General Smith, SHAEF’s chief of staff, sent a letter to the chiefs of staff of the commander in chief of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Forces (ANCXF), the senior air officer of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF), and key SHAEF staffs stating that as Allied forces would soon be entering Germany and thus facing Talisman conditions, it was essential that army groups and air forces receive early guidance. He therefore requested that the memoranda for which they were responsible be prepared for distribution as soon as possible, even if incomplete. Several days later, Colonel Grazebrook was authorized to issue several memoranda on a provisional basis.66
Operation Talisman planning increased the size of the force required to thirty-nine and two-thirds divisions. A revised Talisman outline plan, distributed in October 1944, delineated zones of occupation as decided on by the second Quebec conference.67 On 30 October, the 21st Army Group notified Supreme Headquarters that a captured German document indicated that the code name Talisman was compromised, so on 11 November, the new code name Eclipse was substituted and planning continued under the new name.68
Eclipse was different than its predecessors in that its objectives were broadened to encompass not only the primary disarmament and control of the German forces, but paramilitary organizations and the police as well. It specified, for example, that operations in Europe included “operations in Germany until control there is taken over from the Supreme Commander by the Tripartite Military Government or by US and British Commanders” while retaining the definition of surrender from Talisman.69 It further explained that operations would most likely take place in two phases. The first would involve advancing to secure “especially important strategic areas deep within Germany, including Berlin” and the second would, in part, involve deploying forces to secure additional strategic areas and “carry out the disarmament and disposal of enemy forces in Germany.”70
The plan provided guidance to the several Allied army groups and air forces as to their respective responsibilities in both phases, among which were the primary disarmament and masking of enemy forces in contact with Allied forces; the flanking of the Allied axis of advance; the controlled concentration of enemy forces in areas selected by the Allies; the arrest and detention of individuals on the black list; and the seizure and control of German war matériel. Eclipse accepted that it was unlikely that the Nazi regime would be overthrown by internal forces and postulated that there would be neither a collapse of the German armed forces nor unconditional surrender until Germany had suffered “a further major defeat” that would enable the Allies to penetrate the homeland. The plan briefly outlined conditions expected in Germany following its collapse and indicated that while there might be some resistance and sabotage, these instances would be isolated. The possibility of civil war, however, was not discounted.71
Between 28 September and 13 December 1944, progress reports indicated that a study entitled Disposal of the German Military Caste had been circulated to planners and that Memo 9 (army disarmament) and the Operation ‘Eclipse’ Appreciation and Outline Plan had been approved and issued. They also reported that the handbook had been approved by the chief of staff and was in publication.72 Also in preparation was the first draft of a memo suggesting priorities for the destruction of war structures in Germany and the first draft of Eclipse Memo 17 (disbandment of the German armed forces). In addition, the final draft of Memo 10 (air force disarmament) had been approved by the planning staff. Nonetheless, and despite General Smith’s request, of the total seventeen Eclipse memoranda, only ten had been issued by late January 1945.
The Eclipse Memoranda
Operation Eclipse was spelled out in the Appreciation and Outline Plan and in seventeen memoranda, five of which speak directly to the issues of disarming, demobilizing, and disbanding the German armed forces.73
Eclipse Memorandum No. 1, “Instrument of Surrender, Surrender Order and Sanctions,” was issued in November 1944 but revised in April 1945. It was a lengthy, detailed memorandum that contained a short series of opening paragraphs that laid out what would take place in the event of (1) a formal surrender, with or without an EAC-agreed Instrument of Surrender (in which case special orders to the German High Command had been prepared by SHAEF and were appended to the memo as Appendix A), or (2) no formal surrender, and the sanctions that would be imposed if resistance to either form of surrender were encountered.74
The main elements of this memorandum were included