Eisenhower related further that SHAEF had begun a great deal of posthostility planning and that American and British specialist personnel had been earmarked for training. A basic manual for military government had also been drafted based on previously received presurrender guidance. The problem, however, was the lack of top-down planning: nothing had been done to provide senior leadership for Allied control staffs, policy guidance, or key personnel. The stage had now been reached, Eisenhower continued, where the appointment of a nuclear group had become an urgent necessity. Eisenhower then recommended that immediate appointments be made for deputies to the yet-to-be-named chiefs of the control council, for a US equivalent of the British element in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Demilitarization Group, and for key personnel in the Military Government Group.32
On 4 August, the JCS approved Eisenhower’s requests and agreed that US personnel should be so assigned. The JCS further concurred on the appointment of a general officer to be the acting deputy to the chief US representative to the control council and named Wickersham, still the US military representative to Ambassador Winant on the EAC, to fill the position. Ten days later, the JCS authorized the assignment of 289 officers, 32 warrant officers, and 356 enlisted personnel—some of whom were to come from the European theater as well as the war and navy departments—to the US element Eisenhower had requested.33
What is interesting and underscores the lack of coordination between the EAC, the JCS, and SHAEF is that eight months earlier, in mid-December 1943, Major General Ray W. Barker (US), deputy chief of COSSAC, had written to Major General Hilldring to ask about the status of the plan for German disarmament following the cessation of hostilities. He reminded Hilldring that the EAC had been tasked with creating the Terms of Surrender, of which disarmament was an important element. Given the broad guidance that was expected from the EAC, Barker wrote that a number of questions—some which would have political as well as military and technical ramifications—would arise and that answers would need to be found. Barker suggested coordinating the US-British position on these issues in order to have a common position upon which to base discussions in the EAC, formulate Allied policies, and prepare operational plans to implement EAC decisions. To this end, he suggested that the United States send a cadre of knowledgeable officers, headed by an officer of “suitable background and attainment,” to London to join with a similar group created by the British War Office. Barker closed by requesting that this cadre come with an agenda and firm guidance from both the War Department and the Department of State.34
While no record of General Hilldring’s response to Barker has been found, Hilldring obviously took the opportunity to fill what appeared to be an organizational vacuum and advance the interests of his Civil Affairs Division. He drafted and forwarded to the JCS a proposal that, in effect, duplicated General Barker’s suggestion to develop a cadre to deal with disarmament issues and even included several of Barker’s paragraphs verbatim as justification. Hilldring’s proposal stated at the outset that no agency had been designated to prepare policy recommendations for the JCS covering problems arising from this issue. Hilldring concluded that an agency was required to oversee the development of said policies for JCS approval and transmission to the US delegate on the EAC. However, instead of recommending that a cadre of qualified officers be sent to London, as Barker had suggested, Hilldring recommended that his Civil Affairs Division become that new agency, stating that the creation of a new entity, such as the proposed disarmament committee, was “unnecessary and undesirable.”35 Hilldring sent a copy of his proposal to General Wickersham in London, apparently in reply to a letter from Wickersham that addressed the same topic.36 Based upon Eisenhower’s memoranda to the CCS and the JCS, it appears that nothing became of Hilldring’s proposal.
The failure to provide guidance to Eisenhower, however, remained unresolved as late as fall 1944.37 In mid-October 1944, Grazebrook submitted a number of papers to SHAEF’s deputy chief of staff outlining the need for a senior officer to be in charge of posthostilities planning, as the EAC had still failed to devise any such policies and the three Allied powers had not come to an agreement on any final policy as of that date. This vacuum meant that the supreme commander would not be afforded the luxury of guidance regarding the occupation of Germany, unless a senior officer was appointed. Grazebrook felt that a senior officer could direct a survey of all the tasks and responsibilities that would face the supreme commander to ensure that the plans, now coming to fruition in SHAEF, represented a sound policy for him to follow under any of the conditions he might face.38
Once Grazebrook learned that his memo had been approved, he submitted a second paper with recommendations for executing his proposal, a list of agencies with whom coordination would be essential, and the suggestion that, due to its familiarity with the issues to be confronted, his posthostilities subsection become the staff of the new senior officer or co-coordinator for planning. Grazebrook then appended a list of important papers that had been or were being prepared by SHAEF or outside agencies, as well as a list of matters that required further attention, many of which were incorporated into subsequent studies, occupation directives, and laws.39
This planning coordination was undertaken by the deputy chief of staff and the first meeting to coordinate plans and policies was called for 8 November 1944.40 This initial meeting had far-reaching results in that it highlighted a number of issues that needed review, revision, or initiation, and a progress report issued a few weeks later showed that various SHAEF staffs were rapidly working to resolve these issues.41
An April 1944 SHAEF staff study, Preparation for the Surrender and Post Hostilities Middle Period, laid out the conditions and defined the responsibilities that would confront General Eisenhower upon the cessation of hostilities in Europe.42 In terms of the need to disarm and demilitarize German forces on the continent, the study initially envisioned retaining the OKW intact in order to control the German armed forces. While SHAEF was to remain temporarily in Great Britain, it was considered important for propaganda and psychological reasons to locate US and British officers at the OKW headquarters to establish appropriate control and to transmit necessary directives from SHAEF to the German military.
Additionally, the OKW was to remain responsible for the provisioning, maintenance, and housing of the German forces under its command. The study further stated that the terms of surrender would prohibit all forms of military training and that demobilization might be delayed for a considerable time as there might be a need to use the German forces for labor, either in Germany or in the liberated countries.
In early July 1944, SHAEF notified the naval, air force, and major SHAEF staffs that a CCS message gave the supreme commander the responsibility to act for an indeterminate period of time after Germany surrendered. The addressees were told that, as a result, SHAEF now had to decide on the scope and limitations of that power. Two appendices were attached to the notice. The first was a draft that outlined the basis for planning Operation Talisman, which only covered the movement of Allied forces into the liberated countries and Germany and not what was required in order to enforce the terms of surrender. This latter issue was covered in the second appendix, Outline of Post-Hostilities Functions, which was meant to cover the period between the surrender of Germany and the assumption of responsibility for Germany by the Allied Control Commission (ACC).
The several objectives for the postsurrender occupation of Germany, as stated in this appendix, were derived from an EAC document of 31 May 1944 and were as follows: to complete the disarmament of Germany and destroy the German war machine, convince the German people they had suffered a total military defeat, destroy the National Socialist Party and system, and prevent German militarism and National Socialism from going underground. In addition, the objectives directed the Allies to lay the foundation for the rule of law in Germany, and to encourage individual and collective responsibility in the German population.43
According to this latter appendix, the documents and proclamations being drafted by the EAC lacked the detail necessary to issue the required orders to the Germans pertaining to the occupation and the German Armed Forces.