203. See generally Gross, Drug Smuggling, and Escobar, Accountant’s Story, 64.
204. See “Drugs: Central American Region a Cocaine Warehouse,” Interpress Service, 21 April 1999.
205. Lee, “Perversely Harmful Effects,” 191.
206. “Marijuana of the Eighties,” 1.
207. In 1994 the DEA discovered on a $1 million IBM computer, confiscated from José Santacruz Londoño, extensive telephone records, including those of the U.S. Embassy and its DEA office, and all of Colombia’s motor-vehicle records. This enabled Cali traffickers to gain clues as to the identity of informants. Chepesiuk, Drug Lords, 239–40.
208. U.S. Senate, Law Enforcement: Report, 139.
209. “Cartels Have Best Technology,” 12A.
210. Strange, Retreat of the State, 7.
211. Drug czar General Paul Gorman told the U.S. Senate that Medellín traffickers, in certain respects, were better equipped than the U.S. Air Force. U.S. Senate, Law Enforcement: Report, 33. Barry Seal demonstrated Medellín communications equipment to the President’s Commission on Organized Crime, stating, “I don’t believe there’s any paramilitary group better equipped than my former associates.” “Marijuana of the Eighties,” 2. See also “Equipo satelital controlaba trasiego de droga por mar,” LN (CR), 9 August 2007, 18A; “Cartels Have Best Technology,” 12A; and “Stemming the Drug Flow,” 17.
212. See Huff affidavit, 111; U.S. Senate, Laundering in Panama, 34–35; and “Gozan de impunidad sin costo,” LP (PA), 23 January 1999, 6A. In arresting a Salvadoran trafficker in 1998, Guatemalan authorities found an encryption device and equipment to monitor police conversations. “Desmantelan red telefónica que servía a narcotraficantes,” LP (HO), 13 July 1998, 71A.
213. “Target: Cali Cartel,” 1.
214. See “Patrols Push Drugs into Deeper Waters,” TT (CR), 20 February 2004, 12, and “Ticos Tour U.S. Anti-drug Ship,” TT (CR), 16 August 2002, 1A.
215. La Familia has developed certain parallel state functions in Mexico. See Grayson, Familia Drug Cartel, viii, 61–62. In Honduras drug money was involved in the 1978 coup and 1984 attempted coup. However, the extent of penetration by Honduran traffickers and of their ambitions may be distinguished from Bolivia’s cocaine coup of 1980, sometimes characterized as a cartel buying an entire government. See Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 54, and Shannon, Desperados, 475.
216. Garzón, Mafia and Co., 29, and Bagley, “Dateline Drug Wars,” 158.
217. Here, we paraphrase Thoumi in Political Economy, 141.
218. For information on sicarios, see Duzán, Death Beat, 202–15; Salazar, No nacimos pa’ semilla; and Krauthausen and Sarmiento, Cocaína y Co., 85–90.
219. In 2009 Costa Rica’s chief prosecutor, Francisco Dall’Anese, observed, “The truth is we have cases of hit men every day.” “Dall’Anese: It’s Easy to Traffic Drugs Here,” TT (CR), 30 January 2009, 2. For the downfall in a Honduran DEA operation of alleged Medellín assassin Guillermo León Velásquez, suspected of seven Florida killings and others in Colombia, see “Capturan en Tegucigalpa pistolero del ‘Cartel,’” Tiempo (Honduras), 18 May 1990, 3.
220. Andreas, Border Games, 23.
221. For the statement of Ana Martes, former director of prosecutors, Colombian Attorney General’s Office, see “Por la fuga de dos extranjeras suspenden a director del COF,” SV (GU), 25 June 1996, 12.
222. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “A ‘broker’ in the drug trade is a middle-man who for a fee will take on a consignment basis large shipments of drugs smuggled into this country to find a buyer for them.” United States v. Corona, 885 F.2d 766. See also Decker and Chapman, Drug Smugglers, 39–45, 55–56, and Levine, Big White Lie, 150. For the operations of one Cali cocaine broker, see Huff affidavit, 45–47.
223. See, for instance, United States v. Torres-Teyer, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 365. A New York federal court declared, “[Jorge] Torres-Teyer quite literally organized the Belizean trans-shipment operation. . . . He did not act as a mere manager or supervisor, but as a high-level operative who recruited, supervised, and directed dozens of individuals and organized their activity.”
224. United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d at 447.
225. See U.S. Senate, Drug Cartels, 42. For compartmentalization in a Colombian cartel’s New York distribution network, see Natarajan, “Understanding the Structure,” 273–98.
226. Bank employees, particularly those evaluated on the daily number of clients serviced, have sometimes failed to record electronic-transfer data conscientiously.
227. Loría Quirós, Caro Quintero, 244, 247–50.
228. Lee, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 17.
229. For one case of a Costa Rican arrested after transferring property to a shell company, see “Detienan a abogados,” LN (CR), 23 September 1998, 10A.
230. Confidential interview with official, May 1990, San José, Costa Rica.
231. See, for instance, “En fuga abogado de Mario Valverde,” LN (CR), 13 March 1997, 5A.
232. For instance, Guatemalan attorney Javier Barba Hernández, eventually killed in a shoot-out with Mexican police, was a reputed executioner for the Guadalajara cartel. Shannon, Desperados, 280, 448. A prominent Mexican defense lawyer showed a British journalist the U.S.-manufactured grenades that narcotics suspects had given him in lieu of pay. “Conspiracy to Corrupt,” 1.
233. In particular, Cali employees were supposed to sign sworn affidavits, soon after arrest, “disavowing knowledge of, or involvement with, [Miguel] Rodríguez-Orejuela.” United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d at 1291. For cases involving confidential informants against Cali traffickers intimidated into stopping their cooperation, see Chepesiuk, Drug Lords, 156–57; United States v. Orjuela [sic], 809 F. Supp. at 196; and “Cartel’s Lawyers, Legal Profession Also on Trial in Miami,” SPT (US), 1 August 1995, 1A.
234. United States v.