172. See INCSR (2001), 2:4, 4:18, and “Intelligence Network Threatens to Drop Country,” TT (CR), 26 October 2007, 7.
173. Francisco Thoumi observed, “The illegal [drug-trafficking] . . . industry and the guerrillas have been strange bedfellows. At times the government has been their common enemy, but they have fundamentally opposite goals. The industry represents a crude, unrestrained form of capitalism, while guerrilla organizations have their origins in the fight against the unfair, crude capitalism that has prevailed in Colombia. The conflict between the long-term goals of these two social groups is irreconcilable.” Thoumi, Political Economy, 159. See also Lee, “Colombia’s Cocaine Syndicates,” 17.
174. “U.S. Government Identifies FARC ‘Kingpin’ Operative Here,” NT (CR), 10 October 2008, N2.
175. INCSR (2004), 18, and INCSR (2008), 120.
176. A useful source on Castaño’s career, written by Pulitzer Prize–winning Colombian journalist Gerardo Reyes, is Nuestro hombre en la DEA. Castaño was killed in 2006, allegedly on orders of his brother Vicente. See also “Castaño, asesinado por su hermano,” LP (PA), 25 August 2006, 30A, and “Policía y ejército buscan a Castaño,” LP (PA), 14 October 2006, 6A.
177. See Decker and Chapman, Drug Smugglers, 35–36, and Garzón, Mafia and Co., 107.
178. Indeed, as late as 2006 the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy estimated that of the $13.8 billion that Mexican syndicates had amassed in total annual revenues, more than 60 percent, or $8.6 billion, continued to come from marijuana. “Economic Battle.”
179. Zabludoff, “Colombian Narcotics Organizations,” 29; INCSR (1998), 4; Bonner, “New Cocaine Cowboys,” 36–37.
180. See Bonner, “New Cocaine Cowboys,” 37, and INCSR (1998), 4.
181. DEA, History Book, 1985–1990.
182. CIA, Allegations of Connections, 7.
183. Huff affidavit, 43–44.
184. For NAFTA’s effect on trafficking and interdiction, see Andreas, Border Games, 74–82; The trade liberalization marked by Mexico’s 1986 accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade also stimulated cross-border trade.
185. “Mexican Drug Traffickers Eclipse Colombian Cartels,” WP (US), 30 March 1997, 1A.
186. In 1996, despite instability within its cocaine industry, the Colombian minister of justice estimated that Colombia continued to export 80 percent of the world’s cocaine. “Colombia, primer exportador de cocaína,” LP (PA), 2 April 1996, 3A.
187. “Fragmenting Narcotics Industry,” 13.
188. FBI agent Huff stated of the Cali cartel kingpin: “Valencia was relentless in his exploration of other smuggling routes and methods . . . particularly . . . in a direct route from Colombia to the United States, as this would eliminate the high cost and periodic treachery associated with dealing with Mexican smugglers and traffickers. Valencia was weary of his Mexican associates’ lack of discipline and reliability in delivering cocaine pursuant to their agreement with him.” Huff affidavit, 49.
189. “Mexican Drug Traffickers Eclipse,” 1A.
190. Among U.S. federal cases the murder spawned were United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259; and United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599.
191. Grayson, Mexico’s Struggle, esp. 68–85, and Garzón, Mafia and Co., 98. See generally Grayson, Mexico.
192. See Jordan, Drug Politics, 151, and “Tons of Cocaine Reaching Mexico in Old Jets,” NYT (US), 10 January 1995, A1, A8.
193. For the 1993 Guadalajara airport shoot-out between Tijuana and Sinaloa traffickers that killed Catholic cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo, who was meeting the Vatican’s ambassador arriving from Mexico City, see Rotella, Twilight on the Line, 150–60.
194. For the evolution of the Gulf cartel, see Garzón, Mafia and Co., 82–89. For its ties to top Mexican judicial and federal police officials, see Jordan, Drug Politics, 85–86.
195. “Top Mexican Cartel Chief Sentenced to Prison,” Wall Street Journal (United States) (hereafter cited as WSJ [US]), 27–28 February 2010, A12.
196. Note that some originally used the term La Familia to denote the close ties in the early 1980s between the Guadalajara and Sonora cartels. See Toro, Mexico’s “War,” 79–80, 80n78.
197. Grayson, Familia Drug Cartel, esp. iii, 3, 42–43, 58–60.
198. “Según la DEA: La mitad de los principales cárteles de drogas del mundo son mexicanos,” LP (HO), 23 April 2001, 39A; “El poderío de los cuatro cuarteles,” LP (PA), 26 May 2007, 5A; “DEA privilegiará lucha contra narcos mexicanos,” LP (PA), 26 May 2004, 2A.
199. “Surgen sesenta grupos de narcotraficantes,” SV (GU), 15 July 2001, 13.
200. The Federation refers to cooperation among Pacific-coast Mexican organizations, including the Sinaloa cartel, after a 2002 meeting in Cuernavaca. Garzón, Mafia and Co., 100.
201. “Mexican Drug Cartels Move North,” WP (US), 20 September 2007, A14; “U.S. Strikes Blow Against Mexican Cartel,” WSJ (US), 23 October 2009, A3; “U.S. Arrests Hundreds in Mexican Cartel Sweep,” WSJ (US), 11 June 2010, 1.
202. In 1997 retired DEA agent Donald Ferrarone testified to Congress that “every indicator now and over the last 20 years reveals the government of Mexico consistently works together with the major drug-trafficking families, seeing to it that the drugs . . . are offloaded securely, protected, shipped cross-country under convoy, stored and safely transported to our border.” Jordan, Drug Politics, 142. For a corroborating statement by a Medellín trafficker to an undercover U.S. agent, see Mazur, Infiltrator, 65. In 1998 a 230-page confidential assessment by Swiss officials investigating money laundering reportedly alleged that President Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s brother Raúl had taken “control of practically all drug shipments transiting Mexico” during the Salinas administration. Jordan, Drug Politics, 259n42. Raúl Salinas was later convicted of ordering the assassination of his brother-in-law,