39. See the testimony of U.S. Coast Guard officers, found in United States v. May, 470 F. Supp. at 388.
40. See Decker and Chapman, Drug Smugglers, 73–75, and Riley, Snow Job, 227–28.
41. See United States v. Leuro-Rosas, 952 F.2d 616.
42. Wilson and Zambrano, “Commodity Chains,” 304.
43. By the early twenty-first century U.S. growers were harvesting fully ten thousand tons of cannabis, with another five thousand tons produced in Canada and Mexico. INCSR (2003), 2:7.
44. Medellín trafficker José Cabrera testified that although he had originally shipped marijuana, increased risks caused him to shift to aerial cocaine trafficking. “Continúa hoy el testimonio de José Cabrera en juicio a Noriega,” La Prensa (Panama) (hereafter cited as LP [PA]), 21 October 1991, 1A.
45. “Drug Smugglers Join Shipping’s Box Revolution,” Journal of Commerce, 12 April 1988, 1A.
46. Eddy, Sabogal, and Walden, Cocaine Wars, 44. For the early role of Cuba in international drug trafficking, see also Meyer and Parssinen, Webs of Smoke, 261–62.
47. For the development of heroin transshipment, see Clark and Horrock, Contrabandista, esp. 177–212.
48. Childress, Heroin Trade, 8.
49. Andreas, Border Games, 40. Harry Anslinger, director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics, testified that as early as 1941 Mexico was producing five tons of opium a year. Extradition of Ignacia Jasso Gonzales (La Nacha) from Mexico (case cited in ibid.).
50. See Riley, Snow Job, 128; Toro, Mexico’s “War,” 20, 23–25, 42–44; and Smith, “Semiorganized International Crime,” 194–95.
51. Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, Sealing the Borders, 18.
52. U.S. officials noted, “A mix of opium farmers, heroin processors, and small-scale trafficking groups operating independently or in mutually supportive business relationships controls Mexican heroin production.” INCSR (2007), 169.
53. Note the parallel to legitimate agriculture, where “U.S. grains tend to be handled by major agribusiness firms while fresh vegetables are moved by many specialized, small-scale distributors.” Zabludoff, “Colombian Narcotics Organizations,” 22.
54. Shannon, Desperados, 72.
55. See “Hermanos ligados a cartel de Medellín,” La Nación (Costa Rica) (hereafter cited as LN [CR]), 5 August 1998, 10A.
56. For calculations relying on 1997 prices, see Zabludoff, “Colombian Narcotics Organizations,” 22.
57. See “Aumenta el tráfico de heroína,” LP (PA), 15 August 2002, 5A.
58. “Colombian Cartels in Asia Connection,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 18 April 1993, 3. In noting that a “good chemist is like a good chef,” one counternarcotics agent observed, “Samples we are getting supposedly from Colombia show a similarity in composition to Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin.” Ibid.
59. INCSR (1992), 6.
60. Colombian National Police report “Amapola: Producción,” quoted in Thoumi, “Illegal Drugs in Colombia,” 74.
61. “Colombia’s Drug Lords Sending Heroin to U.S.,” New York Times (United States) (hereafter cited as NYT [US]), 14 January 1992, A10. See also “Poppy Plants in Colombia Raises Spectre of S. A. Heroin,” The Reporter (Belize) (hereafter cited as TR [BZ]), 18 July 1988, 16. If producers succeeded in harvesting a hectare of opium poppies the maximum of three times annually, they could produce ten kilos of opium gum or one kilo of pure heroin. INCSR (1999), 103.
62. DEA, Illegal Drug Price.
63. In 1996 the estimate was 62 percent, while in 2001, 59 percent of heroin submitted to DEA’s Heroin Signature Program was Colombian. INCSR (2002), 4:25, and INCSR (1997), 89. However, for statistical uncertainties associated with the HSP, see Childress, Heroin Trade, 14n10.
64. For numerous reasons, projected heroin yields are considerably less precise than figures for hectares cultivated. First, production depends on harvest size, and yet, as the U.S. government noted, “Small changes in soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place.” Second, because the figures assume no losses between the opium harvest and its processing into opium gum, they estimate potential: they assume that the entire crop is duly processed into drugs. Third, the efficiency with which opium gum is processed into heroin may not be a constant variable, as is typically assumed. The DOS noted, “Differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures all affect production.” Fourth, a 2001 research project found that yield and efficiency had improved in Colombia, further suggesting that potential heroin production had been underestimated for quite some time. Fifth, the DOS
initially based its figures on pure heroin yield; however, the yield of mere “export-quality” heroin would be markedly higher, and it appears that when figures were recalculated to correct for prior underestimating, the U.S. standard also shifted from pure to export-quality heroin. A further complication is that black tar heroin has also sometimes been exported and yet would require even less pure heroin than would export-quality. Quotes from INCSR (2009), 31–32; see also INCSR (2002, 2:14) and DEA, Special Report.
65. See Crandall, Driven by Drugs, 123–34.
66. See INCSR (1997), 89; INCSR (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/888pf.htm; and INCSR (2002), 4:25.
67. Kirkpatrick, Turning the Tide, 39.
68. See “Marijuana of the Eighties,” Los Angeles Times (United States) (hereafter cited as LAT [US]), 4 December 1985, 2, and the testimony of U.S. attorney Alan Bersin, U.S. House, Border Security, 17, quoted in Andreas, Border Games, 75.
69. After the 1988 seizure in Miami of almost 5.5 tons of marijuana in a shipping container, Michael Shaheen of U.S. Customs noted it could be smelled blocks away. “Drug Smugglers Join,” 1A.