Thus, though there were considerable differences in the tactics that the PSP and the MR-26-7 proposed to implement their programs, there was no great difference in the basic politics behind the programs, with a shared concern for economic justice, national independence, and an end to corruption. Both groupings also sought to unite the Cuban “people,” a nebulous term that included workers, peasant farmers, the unemployed, small businessmen and professionals along with patriotic industrialists. However, while the MR-26-7’s tactics for the revolutionary overthrow of Batista centered on a general strike, they differed markedly from the PSP in stressing the need to combine that strike with an armed insurrection.77 The importance of these tactical differences would become clear as the struggle developed.
Trade Union Bureaucracy
There is a contradiction in the nature of trade unions under capitalism. They are both hierarchical and bureaucratic, with a top-down structure, as well as being democratic, voluntary organizations whose authority comes from the base. However, there is a danger of oversimplification if we solely equate the bureaucratic side of unions with the full-time officials and the democratic side with the rank-and-file membership and their local leadership. On the one hand, the full-time apparatus of a trade union depends on the support, or at least acquiescence, of local officials such as secretaries of local unions and workplace representatives and their wider support among the general membership. On the other hand, full-time officials sometimes respond to pressure from below and lead militant action in defiance of instructions from their hierarchical superiors. Nevertheless, the tendency for the trade union bureaucracy to be cautious and conciliatory in their dealings with management and government is an important factor in all industrial disputes and one that is often neglected by many writers.
The Cuban government appeared to be in a strong position in the 1950s and was recognized as being very pro-business. The legal political opposition was weak, corrupt, incompetent, and divided, with little interest in defending workers’ wages and conditions, being composed of the traditional representatives of business interests. In any case, the de facto powers adopted by the government since the coup left little public political space in which the legal opposition could operate. The trade union movement seemed to be firmly under the control of a corrupt bureaucracy which, given that incomes were guaranteed by the compulsory deduction of subscriptions from workers’ wages, were more dependent upon their good relations with the Ministry of Labor than on the support of the ordinary union members.
The employers and their allies neglected the tradition of independent militancy. The workplace activists who would be responsible for reviving this tradition provided an alternative pole of attraction within working-class politics opposed to the mujalista bureaucracy. This milieu was not politically homogeneous with the PSP and the MR-26-7 competing for influence. However, both groups were pushing in the same direction as the competition for influence and membership would be won by the group showing that its strategy was best able to advance the workers’ cause.
When a regime becomes involved in industrial relations, the class struggle becomes overtly political, and so the government’s close relationship with the United States, which still dominated the economy, would give credence to nationalist politics among militant workers. The domination of the Cuban trade unions by a corrupt clique exacerbated the normal trend of a trade union bureaucracy to reach an accommodation with the existing regime, yet despite this radical popular nationalism provided a political base for internal opposition within the labor movement. Thus the labor movement was divided. On one side was the pro-government mujalista bureaucracy and, on the other, the anti-government forces within organized labor, principally represented by the communists and the 26th July Movement, which were in competition for political influence.
Was the Cuban working class of the 1950s capable of acting as a “class for itself” and intervening in events to assert its own interests? The Cold War offensive appeared to have been successful in Cuba. It not only removed the communists and their allies from their controlling position in the CTC, but also replaced them with new leaders who were far more focused on their own interests than those of their members. This new bureaucracy seemed firmly entrenched, having subverted the internal democratic structures of the unions and marginalized the internal opposition. Thus at first sight it would appear that those who doubt the political importance of the working class at this juncture might seem justified.
Nevertheless, by the middle of the decade, there were signs of life among militant workers who were unhappy with this state of affairs. The PSP still had a base and, having recovered some confidence following the defeats of the late 1940s, was embarking on a new approach, based on the CDDOs, which were aimed at reconnecting with organized labor. There were also other, less formal networks of militants who were working to overcome the stranglehold of the bureaucracy, and the MR-26-7 was starting to seem an attractive home for these activists.
The tension between bureaucracy and democracy becomes more obvious at times of heightened class struggle, and by the middle of 1954 the scene was set for industrial confrontation. The fall in the price of sugar and the consequent crisis of profitability made the question of raising the level of productivity crucial for the Cuban employing class. In order to achieve this, they had to reduce staffing levels and wage rates. This did not seem to present too great a problem for the employers.
However, though workers may tolerate an undemocratic and corrupt leadership of their unions when their livelihoods are not in jeopardy, they can be much less tolerant when they see their wages and working conditions in jeopardy. The increasing difficulties faced by the Cuban economy, along with the employers’ determination to maintain their profit margins at their employees’ expense seemed to call for a more robust response than the CTC leadership was prepared to organize. Thus the question of working-class action can be reformulated to ask whether rank-and-file militants were able to overcome the dead hand of the bureaucracy and organize their fellow workers to fight for their interests.
2. A CRISIS OF PRODUCTIVITY
The assumption that economic conditions were not a significant factor in developing mass opposition to the Batista regime has resulted in a neglect of the class struggle in the period leading up to the regime’s overthrow, and the argument that Cuba was prosperous compared to other Latin American countries leads to the revolution being seen as an anomaly. This approach fails to look at the Cuban economy with particular reference to the way in which workers were affected by changes in economic conditions. This is important in assessing the role of organized labor in the Cuban Revolution, for if changes in the political economy of the island resulted in a deterioration of the working and living conditions of workers, then this will have a bearing on the form and degree of their involvement in the revolutionary process.
The whole Cuban economy was dependent on sugar, which in the 1950s provided 80 percent of the island’s exports. There was some other industry, but the tobacco industry was the only other major exporter, with the result that it was commonly said that “sin azúcar, no hay país” (without sugar, there is no nation).1 There was a large civil service, but this required a buoyant sugar market to finance it. This situation left the country highly dependent on the international price of sugar. As a result of sugar’s overwhelming importance, any deterioration in the price or the amount that could be sold in export had serious consequences for the rest of the economy. It is therefore logical to set any investigation of the Cuban economy in the context of Cuba’s position in the international sugar market and to ask whether the price fluctuations of the 1950s were serious enough to merit reference to an economic crisis. Yet, if there were indeed severe problems, why do many authors refer to Cuba being “prosperous” during this period?2
The real question is how one defines “prosperity.” It can be seen either as an environment in that business can make large