It should be noted that there is little mention of the question of inflation in the discussion of wage levels. In part this is as a result of the lack of reliable data. The U.S. embassy, noting that it was “impossible to do more than conjecture as to the actual expenditure of the working classes,” concludes from their own observations that there was a considerable increase in the cost of living as a result of food price inflation.55 This would have been another factor in stiffening labor resistance to wage cuts. Thus increased productivity was to be achieved by mechanization and longer hours of work, both policies that would reduce the need for the existing number of workers in circumstances of a chronically high level of unemployment and at a time when real wages were in any case falling as a result of food price inflation. To this was added the proposal for a cut or at least a freeze in money wages. There was therefore little prospect of workers voting for a party that intended to implement the Truslow Report.
In this context, the outlook for the 1952 general election looked unfavorable to the employers. Of the three candidates for president, Roberto Agramonte for the Ortodoxos, the recently founded anti-corruption party, was widely expected to beat rivals Fulgencio Batista, who had headed an earlier regime in the 1930s, and Carlos Hevia for the Auténticos, the current ruling party. The Ortodoxos were not a workers’ party, but were relying on working-class votes for their expected victory. The main plank of their election platform was opposition to corruption allied to a vaguely expressed economic nationalism, which called for recovery of national wealth and promised to implement measures of social equality. Such was the popular revulsion with the level of corruption of the Auténtico administration that it was widely expected that the Ortodoxos were going to win the election handsomely, and that Batista seemed to be heading for a crushing defeat.56 The Ortodoxos displayed no interest in implementing the Truslow Report and its concerns with productivity received no mention in their public statements. The Ortodoxos’ platform spoke of the “Cubanization” of the economy, emancipating Cuba from foreign imperialism, nationalization of foreign-owned service industries and monopolies, and redistribution of arable land.57 A study of U.S. diplomatic correspondence shows that this platform worried U.S. business interests and their allies among the Cuban bourgeoisie.58 Eduardo Chibas, leader of the Ortodoxos until his suicide in 1951, would certainly have worried the First National Bank of Boston, which led a syndicate that loaned the Cuban government $200 million to build such projects as the tunnel under Havana Bay.59 Chibas made it clear that if he was elected he would not repay the loan.60
When Batista and his associates in the armed forces staged a coup on March 10, 1952, it was quickly welcomed by the United States. There was in fact remarkably little internal opposition to the army takeover, such was the cynicism with politicians in general that developed over the first fifty years of the republic. The only social group to react strongly was the students.61 The ousted president went quietly, partly for fear that an Ortodoxo election victory might have investigated and punished his corruption. Indeed, at the time some saw the main target of the coup as being the Ortodoxos rather than Carlos Prío.62 There was then an unseemly scramble by the majority of professional politicians to reach an accommodation with the de facto government in the hope of retaining their lucrative privileges.63 There are a variety of explanations for the success of the coup: the restoration of order, the corruption and inefficiency of the Auténticos, the desire of U.S. economic interests to restructure the Cuban economy, and the Cold War anti-communism of the U.S. government.64 These factors all played a part, and it is not the intention here to propose a monocausal explanation. Nevertheless, given the lack of importance accorded elsewhere to the support given by business interests for the specifically anti-labor role played by the dictatorship, that particular aspect will be stressed, not with the intention of downplaying the importance of other factors, but of redressing the balance and bringing forward a neglected aspect of the history of the period.
The coup was, indeed, generally welcomed by capitalist interests, as it was felt that Batista would be more business-friendly than the alternatives. Within ten days of the coup, the major business associations had visited the presidential palace to offer their support: the Asociación de Hacendados, the Asociación de Bancos de Cuba, the Asociación Nacional de Comisionistas del Comercio Exterior, the Socios de la Bolsa de la Habana, the Asociación de Industriales de Cuba, and the Cámara de Comercio.65 Meanwhile, the main pro-business daily paper, Diario de la Marina, which had supported Batista’s election campaign enthusiastically,66 contrasted the situation under the previous government, in which the “balance inclined monstrously toward the labor unions,” with the statements of the new government, which were described as “serene and reasonable.”67
In May 1952, the British ambassador wrote: “I am more and more convinced that the basic reason for the Armed Forces having staged the revolution was their utter disgust at the growing and unrestrained power of Labor.”68 Later that year he added: “The business community, industry and commerce have all welcomed the new regime.… If the coup d’état had to come, no better leader could in their view have been found and no more opportune moment chosen.”69
The U.S. ambassador equally noted that businessmen were among the new regime’s most enthusiastic supporters.70 The role of the state as ultimate guarantor of the interests of the ruling class was to be clearly demonstrated in the period under Batista’s rule.
A Business-Friendly Coup
Attempting to influence the international market price of sugar was an important policy objective for the Cuban government, and the sheer size of the country’s production seemed to offer the possibility of success in manipulating the market to maintain price levels. The government’s attempts to achieve this, first by a unilateral cut in exports and then through participation in the International Sugar Agreement, ended in failure as the price of sugar continued to fall. This fall made the question of labor productivity more urgent. The level of profitability was a serious problem for nearly all sectors of the Cuban economy by the middle of the twentieth century, even without the fall in the world price of sugar. The Truslow Report identified the principal challenge facing the Cuban economy as low labor productivity, and the task of resolving this problem would be made much more difficult if the still-dominant sugar industry ceased to be profitable. To achieve this general increase in productivity, wages would have to fall and manning levels would have to be cut, and that in turn would require state action. The report foresaw that a dictatorship might result from this conflict of class interest.71 Given the fear of most workers that the productivity measures proposed would be detrimental to their income and employment prospects, many employers thought that an authoritarian regime would be necessary to enforce the Truslow Report’s proposals that, at least in the short-term, could only result in a considerable increase in the already chronic level of unemployment.
One of the reasons for the success of the coup of March 10, 1952, was support from the business community for a regime that could reduce the ability of Cuban workers to defend their wages and working conditions. Such a regime could push the balance of national income in favor of the employers. The new government sought to reduce opposition from organized labor by incorporating and corrupting the trade union bureaucracy, which would operate with the support of the Ministry of Labor and the police if necessary. Should that be unsuccessful, the regime had the army at its disposal to enforce its priorities. The year 1955 would bring this conflict to the fore.
3. THE EMPLOYERS’ OFFENSIVE
The year 1955 was a crucial turning point in the developing history of the Cuban Revolution. Up to this point, the Batista government had not tried very hard to enforce its productivity agenda, and the mujalista bureaucracy had generally maintained its control of the union structures, with few examples of serious industrial action. This all changed during 1955, with important disputes in several key industries. These would have long-term effects on the relationship between organized labor and