for a general codification of administrative procedural law concerning the Member States’ indirect enforcement of EU law. (par. 41–43)
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10.
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However, where the Treaties confer on the EU the power to regulate certain policy areas (e. g. Art. 114 or 192 TFEU), the European legislature may also adopt rules to accompany the Member States’ administrative enforcement of EU law on the basis of implied powers. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality apply to this as well as to the transfer of administrative competences to the EU and the establishment of agencies (par. 49–52).
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11.
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As a concrete expression of the general idea of subsidiarity and proportionality, the case law of the ECJ recognises the principle of the Member States’ procedural autonomy, which limits the EU’s powers in the field of administrative enforcement, as a general principle of law (par. 44–46).
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12.
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However, according to the ECJ’s case law, this principle, for its part, is limited by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, which in turn are rooted in the principle of loyal cooperation (Art. 4 [3] TEU) and represent a form of procedural solidarity with a view to the European common good (par. 47–48).
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13.
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In the context of indirect implementation, the EU depends on loyal cooperation (cf. Art. 4 [3] TEU) with the Member States. Here, the effective enforcement of Union law is dependent on functioning administrative structures in the Member States and a national administrative law open to integration (par. 47 and 56).
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14.
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In view of the many and varied implementation deficits as well as increasingly complex administrative tasks (e. g. in the fields of financial market regulation and banking supervision, protection of external borders, and migration or cyber security) on the one hand, and improved functioning of the EU in central policy areas on the other, a tendency towards the expansion of direct implementation and EU self-administration, which is closely linked to the process of so-called “agencification”, is unavoidable (par. 51–56).
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15.
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Therefore, within the framework of a new working method with elements of cooperative law enforcement, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the sense of a graduated responsibility (Auffangverantwortung) shape the European exercise of competence: If the enforcement of EU law falls seriously short, European institutions must be able to support Member States with implementation, by means of European agencies making recommendations and offering financial, personnel, or technical resources (par. 53–58).
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16.
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If national authorities are unwilling to cooperate in the common interest (defined by European common goods), European agencies must be able, as a last resort, to take over tasks from national administrations for a certain period of time (e. g. during a crisis situation) in order to maintain the functioning of key EU policies (par. 58–63).
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