§ 400, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 456, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 475, part 8, Jus Nat.
Elsewhere already we have suggested that there may be several reasons on account of which admittance may be denied and that they must be determined by the state. Therefore since in the entire third chapter of the eighth part we have shown what things are to be considered in establishing a state, if any one shall desire to consider properly the details, he will without difficulty recognize that there are legal causes for the denial of admittance. Here properly belongs the fact that the number of subjects is greater than can be provided for adequately from the things which are demanded for the needs, comforts, and pleasures of life, both as regards the people in general and also as regards the class of people who follow the same pursuit in life. Here also belongs the reason that there is fear lest the morals of the subjects
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may be corrupted, or lest prejudice may be aroused against religion, or even lest criminals be admitted, because of whom injury threatens the state, and other things which are detrimental to public welfare.
§ 149. Whether exiles are to be admitted
§ 145.
§ 137.
§ 148.
§ 693, part 6, Jus Nat.
A permanent residence in its territory cannot be denied to exiles by a nation, unless special reasons stand in the way. For since exiles have been expelled from the place where they have a domicile, consequently dwell, they are allowed to seek admittance elsewhere. Therefore, since to these who, driven from their homes, seek admittance, a permanent residence in the territory subject to its control cannot be denied, unless special reasons stand in the way; permanent residence in its territory cannot be denied to exiles by a nation, unless special reasons stand in the way.
Note, § 148.
§ 2.
§ 156, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 121, part 2, Jus Nat.
§ 906, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 237, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
We have already indicated what reasons prevent the admittance of exiles. Moreover, since nations are free, the decision concerning these matters must be left to the nations themselves, and that decision must be respected. The right belongs to an exile to dwell anywhere in the world, but no absolute right to settle in any particular lands belongs to him, a thing which in fact is opposed to ownership. And if this right should be claimed as regards these lands, it is imperfect, consequently no nation can be compelled to receive exiles.
§ 150. Of compassion toward exiles
§ 145.
§ 137.
§ 259, part 4, Jus Nat.
We ought to be compassionate toward exiles. For exiles have been expelled from the place where they had domicile or have been compelled to depart from it on account of offences, therefore they have no fixed abode so that they can dwell in any place and support themselves honestly. Wherefore, since they cannot free themselves from this evil with which they are afflicted, and we ought to be compassionate toward those who cannot free themselves from the evil with which they are afflicted, therefore we ought to be compassionate toward exiles.
§ 652, Psych. Emp., and § 256, part 4, Jus Nat.
§ 619, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 256, part 4, Jus Nat.
§ 642, part 8, Jus Nat.
There is no reason why you should object that exile is also inflicted as a punishment, nay more, that certain ones even desiring to go into exile because of fear of punishment plan flight for themselves, and that these are not worthy of compassion. Compassion, indeed, is not
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confined to those who have fallen into misfortune without fault on their part, but since it arises from love, which is extended to all men generally, it applies also to all who are wretched generally, whether they fall into wretchedness of their own fault or simply from misfortune. Nor is it to be feared lest on this account we may approve crimes and offences, if any one is an exile on account of them; for we love the person, we hold in abhorrence the crimes or offences, which they have committed. Since the act cannot be undone by us or by them, it is rather incumbent on us that we bring them back to a better moral life, and that, if they should desire to reform of their own accord, we should not stand in the way to prevent it; a thing which would certainly occur, if there were no place for compassion. Nevertheless we do not therefore deny that those are more worthy of compassion who go into exile without fault on their part, or have been driven into exile for an unjust cause. This also is here properly to be noted, that when an evil is such of itself that it ought not to be punished, no attention is to be paid to it by another nation, if any one has gone into exile for the sake of avoiding punishment; in order that this may be more plainly apparent, I propose to add the following proposition.
§ 151. Whether any one can be punished by a nation against which he has not offended
§ 642, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 1061, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 832, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 34, part 8, Jus Nat.
He who has offended against a nation or committed some crime against it cannot on that account be punished by another nation to which he has come. For since the evil is not such of itself that it ought to be punished, and by nature the right belongs to a man to punish one who has injured him; by nature also the right belongs to no nation to punish him who has not injured it. Therefore, although the right to punish is a part of the civil power, and consequently belongs to the nation against which any one has offended or committed some crime, nevertheless one nation cannot on this account punish him who has offended against another nation or committed some crime against it. And so it is plain that he who has offended against one nation or committed some crime against it, cannot be punished by another nation to which he has come.
§ 559, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 579, part 8 Jus Nat.
Evil deeds are punished in a state because either some member of the state, or the corporation itself, has been injured. But he who for
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the purpose of escaping a penalty comes as an exile to another state, has not on that account injured any member of the state or any private citizen, nor the corporation itself. Therefore both reasons fail, as to why any one can be punished by a certain state, consequently a wrongful act committed in one state does not affect another state, nor from that thing itself does any right arise against an exile.
§ 152. Who should be called suppliants
Those fugitives are called suppliants who beg another nation, or the one who has the right of the people, to defend them against their own nation, or the ruler of the state whence they come.
Suppliants of course are to be distinguished from exiles. For although exiles may be suppliants, nevertheless not all exiles are suppliants, whether they be voluntary or involuntary. So if one expelled from his native country on account of religion comes to another nation and seeks admittance there, he as a suppliant can entreat the ruler of the state to see to it that his property, which he has been compelled to leave, be delivered over to him. Likewise if any one is spitefully accused, without a cause, of fraudulent administration of the public goods, he can as a suppliant entreat the powerful ruler of another state to defend him against the threatened injuries. But what the rights of suppliants are will be more clearly evident when we have discussed the duties of nations toward each other and the rights arising therefrom. Of course this word is taken in the stricter meaning, although the broader meaning allows him to be called a suppliant who begs another that he defend him against some other.
§ 153. What the