§ 131. What sort of a right in them belongs to the ruler of the state
§ 130.
§ 167, part 8, Jus Nat.
Since the occupied parts of the sea belong to the territory of that nation which has occupied them, such a right belongs to the ruler of the state in the occupied parts of the sea as he has in his territory, and consequently those who frequent such parts of the sea are subject to the same laws as those who inhabit the lands or spend time there, including foreigners who have been allowed to enter.
If any prince had sovereignty over the whole ocean or a great part of it, he would have the same right over the whole ocean or part of it, as he has over his territory. But to aspire to a right of this sort is undoubtedly a foolish ambition.
§ 132. Of laws imposed on the sea
§ 131.
§ 813, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 812, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 969, part 8, Jus Nat.
Since in the occupied parts of the sea the ruler of the state has such a right as he has in his own territory, moreover, since in his own territory legislative power belongs to him, so that he can pass such laws as shall seem advantageous to the state, the ruler of the state can pass laws for the occupied parts of the sea, such as seem best to pass for the advantage of the state.
Therefore he can pass laws not only concerning the use of the sea and those waters which appertain to it, but also concerning the actions of those who dwell in them for any reason or sail through them, whether they are subjects or foreigners. Nay more, laws can be passed for the sea which differ from those which are passed for the land, in regard to the same actions. So offences committed on the sea can be punished more severely than the same offences committed on land.
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§ 133. Whether those born on the sea have the right of native born
§ 6, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 411, part 8, Jus Nat.
Those who are born of citizen parents either on the unoccupied sea, or an occupied part of it, are natives. For those who are citizens remain such, wherever they may live for the purpose of any business, consequently they do not lose the right of citizenship for the reason that they are spending time on the unoccupied sea or on an occupied part of it. Therefore, since a state is preserved through the children who are born of citizens, the children through their birth become members of the state, consequently citizens; and since therefore those are natives who are citizens of that region in which they dwell, those who are born of citizen parents either on the unoccupied sea, or on an occupied part of it, are natives.
§§ 411, 414, part 8, Jus Nat.
Here are to be reconsidered the things which we have elsewhere discussed. As of course a citizen does not lose his right as native born, because he is absent from the territory on account of some business; so he does not lose the right of sharing this same right with his children by their birth, and consequently even when absent from the territory in some other place he shares it with his children when born. If it shall have been decided otherwise by some statute of a people, that is merely a civil enactment and is contrary to natural law, which decrees from the very nature of a state that children have the status which their parents have. That controversies have arisen concerning that matter, means nothing else than that generally by starting from different points of view no decision is reached. Disorderly concepts become the causes both of mistakes and also of confusion.
§ 134. What naturalization is
Naturalization is the conferring of the right of a native upon an immigrant or foreigner. And he is said to be naturalized on whom the right of a native born is conferred. And so a naturalized citizen by a fiction of the law is considered as born of citizen parents, or native-born parents.
§§ 34, 42, part 8, Jus Nat.
So that illustrious astronomer Dominicus Cassini, an Italian by nationality, was naturalized in France, and his descendants are now natives, as though they derived descent from French parents. Of course when one has received the right of a native born, certain rights belong
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to him as a native which strangers or foreigners do not enjoy. And it is quite plain that it depends upon the will of the people, consequently on that of the ruler of the state, who has the right of the people, or exercises it, whether or not he desires to make a stranger, or a foreigner, a participant in those rights which depend upon native birth. Moreover, although the rights of the native born have been conferred by the free will of the people, or of him who has the right of the people, the method nevertheless of acquiring the same through native birth, as far as the law of nature protects rights of that sort, is considered natural, and nature assigns them to those who in accordance with the laws of the country are born with capacity for them. But it is an extraordinary method of acquirement, for the rights to be conferred upon any one contrary to law; in order that the law may be kept intact, it is assumed that one is born of citizen parents, who is not so born. And so the law is not annulled, but is replaced by a legal fiction.
§ 135. Of the obligation of a nation to care for its own self, and of the love of country
§ 2.
§ 4.
§ 607, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 607, part 1, Jus Nat.
Every nation ought to care for its own self, and every person in a nation ought to care for his nation. For every nation represents a single person, and therefore to it are to be applied those things which by the law of nature are enjoined upon individuals, and in this the necessary law of nations consists. And so, since every person ought to care for his own self, every nation also ought to care for its own self. Which was the first point.
§ 5, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 9, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 28, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 617, part 1, Jus Nat.
For if a state is established, consequently if a certain nation arises, individuals bind themselves to the whole because they wish to promote the common good, consequently the happiness of their nation. Therefore, since he cares for another who has the fixed and enduring desire to promote the other’s happiness, or to do everything that he can that the other may be happy or to prevent him from becoming unhappy, the individuals who belong to a nation ought to care for their nation. Which was the second point.
§ 634, Psych. Emp.
Each kind of love is referable to the love of country as to its source. For he who loves his country, gains pleasure from the happiness of his country, and this pleasure itself is a stimulus to deserve well of his country. But if individuals are devoted to the happiness of their
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nation, the nation loves itself and therefore also cares for itself, so that then it must be attributed to love of country if a nation cares for itself. Scarcely any nation exists which has not considered love of country an especially noble virtue, and therefore we see those are excessively praised by all, who have proved that they love their country, and their deeds are extolled, by which they have deserved well of their country.
§ 136. Of not harming one’s country
§ 135.
§ 617, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 722, part 1, Jus Nat.
Since any one who belongs to a nation ought to love his nation, therefore ought to take every care that she should not be made unhappy, no one ought to do anything by which he can in any way injure his nation.
Those who harm their country deservedly incur the reprobation of all good men. For this is ingratitude, the basest vice. There is no one indeed who is not loaded with many