"3. The Serbian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda hostile to the monarchy in the public instruction of Serbia while it must know that the textbooks introduced in the Serbian schools contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies.
"Furthermore the Serbian Government has not fulfilled a part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition desired by us: 'as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction'—a sentence which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the monarchy is to be found in the Serbian schools.
"4. By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure, the Serbian Government limits its assent to those cases, in which these persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the monarchy, which is generally not punishable in Serbia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point."
5. The Serbian reply declared that Serbia was willing to permit that cooperation of officials of the [Dual] Monarchy on Serbian territory which does not run counter to international law and criminal law.
"The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Serbia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.
"6. The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable:
"1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the outrage.
"2. Participation by Imperial and Royal Government officials in the examinations ('recherche' in contrast with 'enquête judiciaire').
"3. It did not occur to us to let Imperial and Royal Government officials participate in the Serbian court procedure; they were to cooperate only in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for the investigation.
"If the Serbian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between 'enquête judiciaire' and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the cooperation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great numbers) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.
"(In reference to arrest of conspirators).
"7. This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Serbian service on June 28. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his whereabout, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade.
"9. (In reference to expressions made against Austria-Hungary by Serbian officials in interviews.)
"The Royal Serbian Government must be aware of the interviews in question. If it demands of the Imperial and Royal Government that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfill the demand.
"10. (In reference to referring the dispute to arbitration of the powers.)
"The Serbian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time."
BEGINNING OF MOBILIZATION
The diplomatic issue now became that over mobilization by Russia: whether it was a threat of war against Austria-Hungary alone, or against Germany as well.
On the day of Serbia's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note, July 25, 1914, General von Chelius, German honorary aide to the Czar, sent a telegram to Kaiser William II through the German Foreign Office, which stated:
"The maneuvers of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The maneuvers have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austria are being made."
On the same day Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:
"Grey has told the German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] that in his opinion Austrian mobilization must lead to Russian mobilization, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian mobilizations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilization, and should at once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilize. He has therefore, as a first step, made an inquiry on this point at Berlin."
On the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky:
"The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take the position that this question must be localized by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as Allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers."
SUNDAY, JULY 26, 1914
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Szápáry, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, that Count Pourtalès the German Ambassador, upon hearing reports of measures for Russian mobilization, had called the attention of M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the fact that nowadays mobilization was a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure.
"For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control.
"M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honor that the reports on the subject were incorrect; that up to that time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, and perhaps Kazan and Moscow."
M. Suchomlinoff, Russian Minister for War, had immediately after this, summoned Major von Eggeling, German Military Attaché and confirmed M. Sazonof's assurance in detail. As reported by the major, he said:
"For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, which face Austria, would be mobilized. In no circumstances will mobilization take place on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. … I gave the Minister for War to understand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by us, but that we should also consider mobilization against Austria to be in itself extremely threatening."
Russia.