Other ambassadors were similarly instructed.
Russia. M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Sazonof reporting that he and the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had urged the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, to advise Vienna to extend the time limit in the ultimatum to Serbia. Von Jagow had telegraphed the request to Vienna, but, owing to the absence of Count Berchtold from the capital, feared that it would have no result.
"Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Serbia. I replied that a great power such as Austria could give way without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative."
M. Sevastipoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, telegraphed M. Sazonof that, at his instance, the French representative at Vienna had been instructed to request extension of the time limit in the note to Serbia.
Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed that the British representative at Vienna had been instructed to do the same, and also to discuss the prevention of hostilities should the request be refused.
M. Sazonof replied by telegraph that in event of hostilities, Russia counted on Great Britain siding at once and definitely with France and Russia in order to maintain the European balance of power for which Great Britain had constantly intervened in the past and which would certainly be compromised by the triumph of Austria.
Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, handed a note verbale to M. Sazonof, denying the press report that the action of Austria-Hungary was instigated by the German Government, and declaring that this government "had no knowledge of the text" of the note to Serbia before it was presented, and had "exercised no influence upon its contents."
"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers justified.
"Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the very beginning of the Austro-Serbian dispute, that this conflict should be localized."
The same statement was made to the French Government by Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, and to the British Government by Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador. The count asked Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that the British Government bring conciliatory pressure on Austria.
"Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long as complications existed between Austria and Serbia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilization would lead to Russian mobilization, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all the powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action."
Great Britain. Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, hoped that Serbia's reply to Austra-Hungary's demands would be sufficiently conciliatory to obviate extreme measures, but said that there would be revolution in Serbia if she were to accept the demands in their entirety.
Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szápáry, did not quite correspond with information received from German quarters, which information came too late to affect negotiations at Vienna.
"The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Serbia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Serbian Minister [Dr. Spalaikovitch] yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Serbian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the powers to help them. His excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the powers.
"If Serbia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.
"On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace, his excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.
"I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.
"I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war."
Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had instructed the German Ambassador at Vienna, Herr von Tschirscky, to present to Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grey's suggestion of an extension of the time limit for Serbia's reply, but that, owing to Berchtold's absence from the capital, the extension would probably not be granted. Von Jagow did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but admitted that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbia "could not swallow" certain of Austria-Hungary's demands.
"I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localized. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that the last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.
"Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge."
Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that the Italian Secretary General was of opinion that Austria will only be restrained by Serbia's unconditional surrender, and that there was reliable information she intended to seize the Saloniki Railway.