The American army lay on both sides of Charles river. The right occupied the high grounds about Roxbury; whence it extended towards Dorchester; and the left was covered by Mystic or Medford river, a space of at least twelve miles. These extensive lines could not be contracted without opening to the British general a communication with the country.
For the purpose of a more distinct arrangement, the army was thrown into three grand divisions. That part of it which lay about Roxbury constituted the right wing, and was commanded by Major General Ward; the troops near Mystic or Medford river formed the left, which was placed under Major General Lee. The centre, including the reserve, was under the immediate command of General Washington, whose head quarters were at Cambridge.
The army consisted of fourteen thousand five hundred men; but several circumstances combined to render this force less effective than its numbers would indicate.
Deficiency of the Americans in arms and ammunition.
So long had the hope of avoiding open hostilities been indulged, that the time for making preparations to meet them had passed away unemployed, and the neglect could not be remedied. On General Washington's arrival in camp, he had ordered a return of the ammunition to be made; and the report stated three hundred and three barrels of powder to be in store. A few days after this return, the alarming discovery was made, that the actual quantity was not more than sufficient to furnish each man with nine cartridges. This mistake had been produced by a misapprehension of the committee of supplies, (for the magazines were not yet in possession of military officers,) who, instead of returning the existing quantity, reported the whole which had been originally furnished by the Province. Though the utmost exertions were made, this critical state of things continued about a fortnight, when a small supply of powder was received from Elizabethtown, in New Jersey.[11] The utmost address was used to conceal from the enemy this alarming deficiency; but when it is recollected, in how many various directions, and to what various bodies, application for assistance was unavoidably made, it will appear scarcely possible that those efforts at concealment could have been completely successful. It is more probable that the communications which must have been made to the British general were discredited; and that he could not permit himself to believe, that an army without bayonets would be hardy enough to maintain the position occupied by the Provincials, if destitute of ammunition.
The troops were also in such need of tents, as to be placed in barracks, instead of being encamped in the open field; and were almost destitute of clothing. They had, too, been raised by the colonial governments; each of which organized its quota on different principles. From this cause resulted not only a want of uniformity, but other defects which were much more important. In Massachusetts, the soldiers had chosen their platoon officers, and generally lived with them as equals. This unmilitary practice was the certain index of that general insubordination which pervaded every department. The difficulty of establishing principles of order and obedience, always considerable among raw troops, was increased by the short terms for which enlistments had been made. The quotas of some of the colonies would be entitled to a discharge in November; and none were engaged to continue in service longer than the last of December. The early orders evidence a state of things still more loose and unmilitary than was to be inferred from the circumstances under which the war had been commenced.
An additional inconvenience, derived from this mixed agency of local governments with that of the Union, was thus stated by General Washington in a letter addressed to congress:—"I should be extremely deficient in gratitude as well as justice, if I did not take the first opportunity to acknowledge the readiness and attention which the congress and different committees have shown to make every thing as convenient and agreeable as possible; but there is a vital and inherent principle of delay, incompatible with military service, in transacting business through such various and different channels.[12] I esteem it my duty, therefore, to represent the inconvenience that must unavoidably ensue from a dependence on a number of persons for supplies; and submit it to the consideration of congress, whether the public service will not be best promoted by appointing a Commissary General for the purpose."[13]
Every military operation was also seriously affected by the total want of engineers, and the deficiency of working tools.
To increase difficulties already so considerable, the appointment of general officers, made by congress, gave extensive dissatisfaction, and determined several of those who thought themselves injured, to retire from the service.
These disadvantages deducted essentially from the capacity of the American force: but under them all, the General observed with pleasure "the materials for a good army." These were "a great number of men, able bodied, active, zealous in the cause, and of unquestionable courage." Possessed of these materials, he employed himself indefatigably in their organization. The army was arranged into divisions and brigades; and congress was urged to the appointment of a Paymaster, Quarter-master General, and such other general staff as are indispensable in the structure of a regular military establishment.
The two armies continued to work on their respective fortifications, without seriously molesting each other. Slight skirmishes occasionally took place, in which little execution was done; and, although the Americans made some advances, no attempt was made to dislodge them.
September.
The Commander-in-chief submitted with reluctance to this state of apparent inactivity. He felt the importance of destroying the army in Boston, before it should be strengthened by reinforcements in the ensuing spring; and with a view to this object, frequently reconnoitred its situation, and was assiduous in collecting every information respecting its strength. The result of his observations and inquiries seems to have been, a strong inclination to the opinion, that to carry the works by storm, though hazardous, was not impracticable. A council of general officers being unanimously of opinion, that for the present at least, the attempt ought not to be made, it was laid aside.
Distress of the British from the want of fresh provisions.
A rigorous blockade being maintained, the British army began to suffer considerably for fresh meat and vegetables. The small parties which sailed from Boston, in quest of these articles, were frequently disappointed by the vigilance of the minute men. But the continuance of active exertion, which this service required on the part of the inhabitants of the sea coast, soon became burdensome; and the governors of the several colonies pressed for detachments from the main army. Although it was impossible to spare the troops required, without hazarding the cause of the colonies, great irritation was excited by the refusal to comply with these demands of particular protection. They at length became so importunate, and the unavoidable refusal to comply with them was so ill received, that congress was induced to pass a resolution, declaring that the army before Boston was designed only to oppose the enemy at that place, and ought not to be weakened by detachments for the security of other parts of the country. At Newport, in Rhode Island, the committee sought to secure the place, by entering into a compromise with Captain Wallace, who commanded the ships of war on that station, stipulating that he should be furnished with provisions on condition of his sparing the town, and committing no depredations on the country. This compromise contravened so essentially the general plan of distressing the British forces, that General Washington deemed it necessary to interpose, and represent to the Governor of that province, the mischief to be apprehended from so dangerous a practice.
While the blockade of Boston was thus perseveringly maintained, other events of considerable importance took place elsewhere.
In July, Georgia joined her sister colonies, and chose delegates to represent her in congress: after which, the style of "The thirteen United Colonies" was assumed; and by that title, the English Provinces, confederated and in arms, were thenceforward designated.
September 5.
After a recess of one month, congress again assembled at Philadelphia. The state of the colonies, and the letters of the Commander-in-chief being immediately taken into consideration, the scarcity of arms and ammunition engaged their most serious attention. Great exertions[14] had been made, by importation and by domestic manufacture, to extricate the country