As a matter of fact, the history of the distinction follows the simple type of increasing precision and complexity, and Mill was in strict accord with standard tradition. By the Nominalist commentators on the Summulæ of Petrus Hispanus certain names, adjectives grammatically, are called Connotativa as opposed to Absoluta, simply because they have a double function. White is connotative as signifying both a subject, such as Socrates, of whom "whiteness" is an attribute, and an attribute "whiteness": the names "Socrates" and "whiteness" are Absolute, as having but a single signification. Occam himself speaks of the subject as the primary signification, and the attribute as the secondary, because the answer to "What is white?" is "Something informed with whiteness," and the subject is in the nominative case while the attribute is in an oblique case (Logic, part I. chap. x.). Later on we find that Tataretus (Expositio in Summulas, A.D. 1501), while mentioning (Tract. Sept. De Appellationibus) that it is a matter of dispute among Doctores whether a connotative name connotat the subject or the attribute, is perfectly explicit in his own definition, "Terminus connotativus est qui præter illud pro quo supponit connotat aliquid adjacere vel non adjacere rei pro qua supponit" (Tract. Sept. De Suppositionibus). And this remained the standard usage as long as the distinction remained in logical text-books. We find it very clearly expressed by Clichtoveus, a Nominalist, quoted as an authority by Guthutius in his Gymnasium Speculativum, Paris, 1607 (De Terminorum Cognitione, pp. 78–9). "Terminus absolutus est, qui solum illud pro quo in propositione supponit, significat. Connotativus autem, qui ultra idipsum, aliud importat." Thus man and animal are absolute terms, which simply stand for (supponunt pro) the things they signify. White is a connotative name, because "it stands for (supponit pro) a subject in which it is an accident: and beyond this, still signifies an accident, which is in that subject, and is expressed by an abstract name". Only Clichtoveus drops the verb connotat, perhaps as a disputable term, and says simply ultra importat.
So in the Port Royal Logic (1662), from which possibly Mill took the distinction: "Les noms qui signifient les choses comme modifiées, marquant premièrement et directement la chose, quoique plus confusément, et indirectement le mode, quoique plus distinctement, sont appelés adjectifs ou connotatifs; comme rond, dur, juste, prudent" (part i. chap ii.).
What Mill did was not to invert Scholastic usage but to revive the distinction, and extend the word connotative to general names on the ground that they also imported the possession of attributes. The word has been as fruitful of meticulous discussion as it was in the Renaissance of Logic, though the ground has changed. The point of Mill's innovation was, premising that general names are not absolute but are applied in virtue of a meaning, to put emphasis on this meaning as the cardinal consideration. What he called the connotation had dropped out of sight as not being required in the Syllogistic Forms. This was as it were the point at which he put in his horn to toss the prevalent conception of Logic as Syllogistic.
The real drift of Mill's innovation has been obscured by the fact that it was introduced among the preliminaries of Syllogism, whereas its real usefulness and significance belongs not to Syllogism in the strict sense but to Definition. He added to the confusion by trying to devise forms of Syllogism based on connotation, and by discussing the Axiom of the Syllogism from this point of view. For syllogistic purposes, as we shall see, Aristotle's forms are perfect, and his conception of the proposition in extension the only correct conception. Whether the centre of gravity in Consistency Logic should not be shifted back from Syllogism to Definition, the latter being the true centre of consistency, is another question. The tendency of Mill's polemic was to make this change. And possibly the secret of the support it has recently received from Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet is that they, following Hegel, are moving in the same direction.
In effect, Mill's doctrine of Connotation helped to fix a conception of the general name first dimly suggested by Aristotle when he recognised that names of genera and species signify Quality, in showing what sort a thing is. Occam carried this a step farther towards clear light by including among Connotative Terms such general names as "monk," name of classes that at once suggest a definite attribute. The third step was made by Mill in extending the term Connotation to such words as "man," "horse," the Infimæ Species of the Schoolmen, the Species of modern science.
Whether connotation was the best term to use for this purpose, rather than extension, may be questioned: but at least it was in the line of tradition through Occam.
Footnote 2: The history of the definition of the Proprium is an example of the tendency of distinctions to become more minute and at the same time more purposeless. Aristotle's ῐδιον was an attribute, such as the laugh of the man or the bark of the dog, common to all of a class and peculiar to the class (quod convenit omni soli et semper) yet not comprised in the definition of the class. Porphyry recognised three varieties of ῐδια besides this, four in all, as follows:—(1) an attribute peculiar to a species but not possessed by all, as knowledge of medicine or geometry; (2) possessed by a whole species but not peculiar to it, as being a biped in man; (3) peculiar to a species, and possessed by all at a certain time, as turning grey in old age; (4) Aristotle's "proprium," peculiar and possessed by all, as risibility. The idea of the Proprium as deducible from or consequent on the essence would seem to have originated in the desire to find something common to all Poryphyry's four varieties.
Footnote 3: It is a plausible contention that in the case of the Singular name the extension is at a minimum and the intension at a maximum, the extension being one individual, and the intension the totality of his attributes. But this is an inexact and confused use of words. A name does not extend beyond the individual except when it is used to signify one or more of his prominent qualities, that is, is used with the function of a general name. The extension of a Singular name is zero: it has no extension. On the other hand, it suggests, in its function as a Singular name, no properties or qualities; it suggests only a subject; i.e., it has no intension. The ambiguity of the term Denotation helps the confusion in the case of Singular names. "Denote" in common speech means to indicate, to distinguish. But when in Logic we say that a general name denotes individuals, we have no thought of indicating or distinguishing: we mean only that it is applicable to any one, without respect of individuals, either in predication or epithetic description.
Footnote 4: Strictly speaking, as I have tried to indicate all along, the words Connotation and Denotation, or Extension and Intension, apply only to general names. Outside general names, they have no significance. An adjective with its noun is a general name, of which the adjective gives part of the Connotation. If we apply the word connotation to signify merely the suggestion of an attribute in whatever grammatical connexion, then an abstract name is undoubtedly as much connotative as an adjective. The word Sweetness has the same meaning as Sweet: it indicates or signifies, conveys to the mind of the reader the same attribute: the only difference is that it does not at the same time indicate a subject in which the attribute is found, as sweet apple. The meaning is not connoted.
Chapter II.
THE SYLLOGISTIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONS INTO TERMS.
I.—The Bare Analytic Forms.
The word "term" is loosely used as